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ARE  WE  READY? 


ARE   WE   READY^ 


BY  HOWARD  D.  WHEELER 


WITH   A   LETTEB 

BY 

MAJOR-GENERAL  LEONARD  WOOD 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

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COPYRIGHT,  I915,  BY  HOWARD  D.  WHEELER 
ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 

Published  February  iqij 


•  •  •  •  >  • 


TO  THE 
DAUGHTER  OF  A  SOLDIER— MY  WIFE 


ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

I  wish  to  express  my  gratitude  to  the  editor  of  Har- 
per's  Weekly  for  permission  to  reprint  in  this  volume 
certain  papers  which  appeared  in  that  publication  dur- 
ing December,  1914,  and  January,  1915. 

I  am  also  indebted  to  Mr.  Oliver  Herford  and  to 
Mr.  Boardman  Robinson  for  the  right  to  use  drawings 
owned  by  them. 

H.  D.  W. 

New  York,  January  7, 1915. 


CONTENTS 

A  Letter sdii 

I.  Gold  and  Iron 1 

II.  An  Attack  on  New  York 11 

III.  A  Bottled  Navy 37 

IV.  The  Hole  in  our  Pocket 55 

V.  Our  Citizen  Fighters 83 

VI.  The  Battle  op  the  Connecticut  .    .    .  108 

VII.  Hell  on  Wheels 126 

VIII.  The  Great  American  Bugaboo       .    .    .  148 

IX.  The  Extra  Tire  in  War        175 

X.  Well? 195 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

Majoe-General  Leonard  Wood  .    .    .   Frontispiece 

Twentieth  United   States  Infantry  in  Ma- 
neuvers AT  Fort  Bliss,  Texas 4 

Madison     Square,     New     York,     after     an 

Aerial  Raid 14 

From  a  Drawing  by  Oliver  Herford. 

Signal  Corps  Man 20 

Henry  L.  Stimson,  Secretary  of  War,  1911- 
1913 28 

Big     Guns     at     Fort     Wadsworth,     Staten 
Island,  New  York 34 

George  Von  L.  Meyer,     Secretary    of    the 
Navy,  1909-1913 46 

Our  Thousand-Dollar  Soldier 60 

Fort   Cook,    Nebraska:   An   Army  Post   con- 
structed and  maintained  at  Maximum  Cost    68 

Fort  Sheridan,  Illinois:  A  National  Extrav- 
agance     72 

Militia  in  Sham  Battle 84 

A  Mess  Table  of  the  New  York  National 
Guard,  Montauk  Point,  Long  Island      .    .    90 

Militia  in  Battle  Practice 98 

xi 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

Militia    Officers    in    Consultation    during 

Field  Practice 10£ 

Prussian   Citizen   Soldiery  of   1870 .     .     .     .118 
From  a  Painting  by  Edouard  Detaiile. 

The  Terror  of  the  Germans:  The  Famous 
French  Artillery  in  Action 132 

Mountain  Battery  of  the  United  States 
Army 136 

Comparative  Strength  of  the  Nations  in 
Field  Artillery 137 

An  American  Field  Artillery  Battery  in 
Action 140 

A  French  Field  Artillery  Battery  .    .    .    .144 

Swiss  and  German  Soldiers  at  the  Frontier  158 

College  Students  learning  the  Fine  Points 
OF  Trench-Digging 170 

A  Student  Soldiers'  Mess 170 

We  have  16  Trained  Men  as  Listed  Re- 
servists        180 

Skirmish  Drill  at  the  Burlington  Camp  .    .  196 

Open-Order  Practice  at  Burlington,  Ver- 
mont   196 

The  Students'  Camp  at  Ludington     .    ...  212 

Students  in  the  Trenches  at  Gettysburg     .  212 

President  Wilson  delivering  an  Address  in 
Front  of  Independence  Hall,  Philadelphia, 
July  4,  1914         222 


A  LETTER 


Governor's  Island,  N.Y., 
January  8th,  1915. 

My  dear  Mr.  Wheeler:  — 

I  have  read  with  much  interest  your  articles 
in  Harper's  Weekly,  written  evidently  for  the 
purpose  of  bringing  to  the  attention  of  the 
American  people  the  necessity  of  adequate  pre- 
paredness for  defense,  and  I  am  very  glad  to 
learn  that  you  are  to  publish  a  book  on  the 
same  general  lines  with  a  view  to  bringing  our 
needs  in  this  particular  to  the  attention  of  the 
American  public.  It  is  a  subject,  in  my  opin- 
ion, deserving  of  serious  and  careful  attention 
on  the  part  of  the  people.  I  do  not  mean  to 
indicate  that  we  should  have  such  a  degree  of 
preparedness,  or  that  we  should  prepare  in  such 
a  spirit  as  to  justify  the  charge  of  militarism, 
but  only  to  such  an  extent  and  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  secure  that  rational  and  reasonable 
degree  of  preparedness  which  will  render  us 
able  promptly  and  eflfectively  to  defend  our- 

xiii 


A  LETTER 

selves,  our  interests,  and  our  institutions 
against  aggression. 

I  have  stated  plainly  in  oflScial  reports, 
which  are  public  documents  and  open  to  your 
inspection  and  use,  my  views  and  recommend- 
ations in  the  way  of  preparedness,  the  necessity 
of  preparation  in  time  of  peace,  and  the  impos- 
sibihty  of  making  preparation  after  war  has 
once  commenced,  at  least  without  such  delay 
as  would  result  in  great  and  unnecessary 
losses. 

While  entertaining  the  highest  opinion  of  the 
soldierly  qualities  of  the  American,  it  can  be 
stated  that  those  who  know  what  war  is  real- 
ize that  to  send  the  youth  of  this  country, 
untrained  and  unprepared,  into  war  means  a 
needless  and  wanton  waste  of  life.  It  means 
more,  —  it  means  that  the  lessons  of  history 
have  not  been  taken  to  heart. 

Even  in  the  early  days  of  the  Republic,  when 
our  territorial  possessions  were  limited  to  a 
relatively  small  portion  of  this  continent,  when 
transportation  overseas  was  slow  and  danger- 
ous, and  wars  came  slowly,  when  our  possible 

xiv 


A  LETTER 

enemies  were  unprepared  to  strike  promptly 
and  om*  people  were  still  to  a  large  extent  used 
to  the  rifle  and  accustomed  to  take  care  of 
themselves  in  camp  and  forest,  even  then  our 
early  Presidents  saw  clearly  the  danger  inci- 
dent to  unpreparedness  and  urged  upon  Con- 
gress in  message  after  message  reasonable 
measures  of  preparation. 

Washington,  in  his  first  annual  address, 
stated:  — 

To  be  prepared  for  war  is  one  of  the  most  effec- 
tual means  of  preserving  peace.  A  free  people 
ought  not  only  to  be  armed  but  disciplined,  to 
which  end  a  uniform  and  well-digested  plan  is  re- 
quisite. 

Again:  — 

The  safety  of  the  United  States,  under  Divine 
protection,  ought  to  rest  on  the  basis  of  systematic 
and  solid  arrangements,  exposed  as  little  as  pos- 
sible to  the  hazards  of  fortuitous  circumstances. 

President  Adams  said :  — 

But  in  demonstrating  by  our  conduct  that  we  do 
not  fear  war  in  the  necessary  protection  of  our  rights 
and  honor,  we  should  give  no  room  for  any  fear 

XV 


A  LETTER 

that  we  abandon  the  desire  of  peace.  An  efficient 
preparation  for  war  can  alone  insure  peace. 

Thomas  JeflFerson,  in  his  fifth  annual  mes- 
sage, advocated: — 

The  organization  of  three  hundred  thousand 
able-bodied  men  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and 
twenty-six  for  offense  or  defense,  at  any  time  or 
any  place  where  they  may  be  wanted. 

In  a  letter  to  Monroe  he  advocated  compul- 
sory military  service  in  the  following  words:  — 

We  must  train  and  classify  the  whole  of  our  male 
citizens  .  .  .  and  make  military  instruction  a  part 
of  collegiate  education. 

And  again:  — 

If  war  be  forced  upon  us  in  spite  of  our  long  and 
vain  appeals  to  the  justice  of  nations,  rapid  and 
vigorous  movement  at  the  outset  will  go  far  toward 
securing  us  in  its  course  and  issue  and  throwing  its 
burdens  on  those  who  render  necessary  the  resort 
from  reason  to  force. 

The  principles  laid  down  in  these  messages 
are  just  as  sound  to-day  as  they  were  when 
uttered,  and  they  are  even  more  pertinent  in 
all  which  relates  to  a  reasonable  degree  of  pre- 

xvi 


A  LETTER 

paredness,  for  wars  now  come  much  more 
quickly. 

That  a  rational  degree  of  preparedness  is  not 
inconsistent  with  American  institutions  and 
ideals  is  clearly  indicated  in  the  last  message  of 
President  Wilson,  in  which  he  states :  — 

It  will  be  right  enough,  right  American  policy, 
based  on  our  accustomed  principles  and  practices, 
to  provide  a  system  by  which  every  citizen  who  will 
volunteer  for  the  training  may  be  made  familiar 
with  the  use  of  modern  arms,  the  rudiments  of 
drill  and  maneuver,  and  the  maintenance  and  sani- 
tation of  camps. 

We  should  encourage  such  training  and  make  it 
a  means  of  discipline  which  our  young  men  will 
learn  to  value.  It  is  right  that  we  should  provide 
it  not  only,  but  that  we  should  make  it  as  attractive 
as  possible,  and  so  induce  our  young  men  to  under- 
go it  at  such  times  as  they  can  command  a  little 
freedom  and  can  seek  the  physical  development 
they  need,  for  health's  sake,  if  for  nothing  more. 

I  know  that  your  purpose  in  writing  these 
articles  and  in  amplifying  them  in  book  form  is 
to  concentrate  the  attention  of  our  people  upon 
that  side  of  national  life  and  responsibility 
which  we  hear  little  of.    I  mean  reasonable 

xvii 


A  LETTER 

preparation  for  defense  to  an  extent  consistent 
with  our  ideals  and  institutions.  While  we  do 
not  want  militarism  it  seems  to  me  most  desir- 
able that  we  should  secure  that  degree  of  mili- 
tary preparedness  which  is  found  in  Switzer- 
land and  is  now  being  Established  in  Australia, 
and  that  we  can  study  with  advantage  the 
methods  employed  in  these  countries.  In  doing 
this  we  shall  better  American  citizenship  and 
manhood  in  that  such  training  will  result  in  the 
physical  improvement  of  our  youth,  a  higher 
regard  for  the  rights  of  others,  and  a  fuller 
appreciation  of  each  man's  duty  to  the  State. 
Very  sincerely, 

Leonard  Wood. 


ARE  WE  READY? 


AEE  WE  EEADY? 

CHAPTER  I 
GOLD  AND  mON 
He  was  a  clean-limbed,  clean-minded,  clean- 


blooded  young  American.  By  virtue  of  two 
very  hard  fists,  one  very  active  brain,  and 
average  American  pluck,  he  had  pounded  his 
way  to  the  top  of  his  own  particular  pile. 
When  I  saw  him  last,  he  was  slouched  deject- 
edly on  a  narrow  wooden  bench  in  a  little  coop 
in  the  corner  of  a  prize-ring  enclosure  in  San 
Francisco  —  a  much-battered  youth,  absently 
pressing  the  back  of  a  swollen,  bandaged  hand 
against  badly  puflfed  lips.  The  usual  bevy  of 
fight  experts  were  grouped  around  him,  eye- 
ing him  critically,  pumping  questions  at  him. 
Finally  they  prodded  him  into  speech.  This  is 
what  he  said :  "Aw,  I  never  got  started.  He 's  a 
mark.  I  '11  knock  his  head  oflf  the  next  time  I 
get  him  in  a  ring  with  me."  Up  to  now,  there 

1 


'^    "ARE  WE  READY? 

has  been  no  ''next  time."  The  mauHng  the  lad 
received  shoved  him  from  the  top  of  the  heap 
to  the  ranks  of  the  "second-raters."  He  never 
got  back.  "Under-training,  over-confidence, 
and  carelessness"  was  the  verdict  of  the  "ex- 
perts." He  had  the  "class,"  they  agreed,  but 
the  other  lad  "beat  him  to  the  punch." 

All  of  which  may  or  may  not  have  anything 
whatever  to  do  with  the  question  of  whether 
the  United  States  of  America  is  prepared  for 
war  with  a  first-class  foreign  power.  It  all 
depends  on  the  way  you  look  at  it,  or  whether 
you  bother  yourself  to  look  at  it  at  all. 

Since  the  present  conflict  in  Europe  demon- 
strated the  terrific  possibilities  of  international 
disputes  and  exposed  the  horrible  perfection  of 
modern  scientific  warfare,  there  is  not  one  of 
us,  it  is  probably  safe  to  say,  who  has  not  had 
his  moments  of  speculation,  more  or  less  vague, 
as  to  whether,  just  in  case  .  .  . 

Our  military  experts  for  years,  particularly 
since  our  trouble  with  Spain,  when  some  rather 
startling  difficulties  presented  themselves,  in 
the  way  of  putting  where  they  were  needed 

2 


GOLD  AND  IRON 

men  and  guns  (and  the  things  to  put  into  men 
and  guns),  have  been  hammering  and  hammer- 
ing on  their  arguments  that  we  are  not  pre- 
pared for  trouble,  and  that  there  is  peril  in  our 
unpreparedness.  Largely  because  these  men 
are  experts,  perhaps,  and  therefore  to  the  lay- 
mind  over-zealous  and  over-fearful,  they  have 
not  been  able  to  plant  in  the  general  run  of  us 
any  very  serious  doubts  as  to  our  security  here 
at  home.  We  are  a  very  young,  a  very  busy, 
and  a  very  confident  people. 

Whether  or  not  our  confidence  and  our  sense 
of  security  are  justified,  it  is  a  fact  that  investi- 
gation will  immediately  reveal  facts  previously 
not  guessed  at  or  at  any  rate  not  fully  grasped. 
I  set  this  fact  down  because  it  was  only  re- 
cently that  I  completed  just  such  an  investi- 
gation. It  was  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of 
placing  before  the  non-professional,  unexpert 
American  the  facts  of  our  preparedness  for  war, 
as  found  by  a  writer  who  approached  his  task 
with  no  preconceived  notions  or  theories  of 
war  save  the  universal  American  sentiment 
against  militarism,  and  a  conviction  that  mod- 

S 


ARE  WE  READY? 

ern  warfare  will,  some  day,  be  looked  upon  as 
a  wasteful  and  ridiculous  means  of  expressing 
patriotism  and  advancing  national  hardihood, 
just  as  to-day  we  regard  burning  witches  as  a 
wasteful  and  ridiculous  means  of  expressing 
faith  and  advancing  religion. 

If  200,000  fighting  men  of  any  first-class  hos- 
tile power  should  be  landed  on  our  Pacific 
Coast  to-night,  we  should  have  no  course  save 
regretfully  to  hand  over  to  a  foreign  nation  the 
rich  empire  west  of  the  Rockies,  with  its  cities, 
its  harbors,  and  the  wealth  of  its  valleys  and 
mountains. 

If  war  were  to  be  declared  against  us  to-day, 
with  portions  of  our  regular  army  in  the  Philip- 
pines, Hawaii,  Panama,  and  elsewhere,  we  could 
throw  not  more  than  50,000  men  into  Une  of 
battle.  With  the  utmost  energy  on  the  part 
of  our  officers,  running  our  military  machinery 
at  top  speed,  it  would  take  us  at  least  six  weeks 
to  increase  this  force  to  150,000  men. 

A  successful  defense  of  our  long  coast  line,  in 
case  of  an  attempted  hostile  invasion,  would 

4 


GOLD  AND  IRON 

require  at  least  300,000  men  backed  by  a 
trained  field  army  of  not  less  than  half  a  million 
men.  We  are  wholly  unprepared  to  assemble 
any  such  defensive  force. 

Sudden  invasion  at  this  time  would  mean 
the  certain  loss  of  our  coast  cities,  to  be  re- 
gained only  at  an  enormous  cost  of  lives  and 
treasure. 

Of  the  very  limited  estimate  of  1300  field 
guns  for  our  army,  we  have  only  between  700 
and  800  built.  If  all  our  guns  were  put  into 
action  at  once,  there  is  not  enough  ammunition 
in  the  country  for  an  engagement  lasting  a 
single  day. 

These  are  all  facts,  agreed  upon  by  the 
ablest  military  minds  of  the  nation.  There  are 
many  more  just  as  interesting. 

Are  they  important  .^^ 

Is  a  trained  force  of  50,000  men  within  our 
borders  ample  at  this  time? 

Is  an  invasion  of  the  United  States  possible 
or  feasible? 

Could  a  foreign  nation  profit  by  it?  If  so, 
how? 

5 


ARE  WE  READY? 

On  the  premise  that  we  can  be  forced  into  a 
war  with  a  powerful,  perfectly  equipped,  and 
thoroughly  prepared  foe  and  confronted  with 
the  immediate  necessity  of  repelling  an  inva- 
sion, what  then? 

Can  we  provide  an  adequate  defensive  force, 
ready  for  action  on  short  notice? 

If  not  immediately,  is  it  possible  to  provide 
against  such  an  emergency  in  the  future  with- 
out adopting  some  sort  of  system  of  miUtarism, 
hateful  to  us,  contrary  to  our  best  traditions? 
If  so,  how? 

It  all  sounds  a  good  deal  like  an  examination 
paper.  Well,  perhaps  it  is.  Perhaps  the  Ameri- 
can people  will  find  it  worth  while  at  this  time 
to  work  out  the  answers. 

The  "first  punch"  is  considered  to  be  as 
important  in  the  military  art  as  it  is  in  the 
manual  of  the  prize  ring.  This,  probably,  was 
never  more  clearly  shown  than  at  the  opening 
of  the  present  war  in  Europe.  That  Wilhelm's 
first  "straight  right"  was  blocked,  then  coun- 
tered, was  due  to  no  lack  of  preparation,  train- 

6 


GOLD  AND  IRON 

ing,  or  agility  on  his  part,  but  to  the  fact  that 
the  other  fellow,  if  not  wholly  prepared,  was 
suflSciently  alert  to  be  able  to  block,  to  weather 
the  first  furious  assault,  and  to  wait  for  an 
opening  for  a  heavy  counter. 

The  initial  advantage  of  war  is  always  with 
the  aggressor. 

Major-General  Leonard  Wood,  former  Chief 

of  Staff  of  our  army,  in  a  recent  interview  I  had 

with  him,  illustrated  this  point  this  way:  — 

If  an  acquaintance  has  fully  decided  that  it  is 
necessary  and  advisable  that  he  give  you  a  thor- 
ough beating,  he  alone  knows  most  of  the  vital 
details  that  go  into  what  is  coming  your  way.  First 
of  all,  he  knows  of  his  decision.  You  do  not.  He 
knows  precisely  where  he  is  going  to  hit  you,  when 
and  how  he  will  deliver  the  attack.  You  know 
none  of  this.  What  is  more,  he  is  not  going  to  wait 
until  you  have  begun  to  take  boxing  lessons.  If  you 
know  that  his  attitude  is  not  altogether  friendly, 
you  are  lucky;  and  the  best  you  can  do  is  to  keep 
your  eyes  open,  your  courage  up,  and  your  wind 
good. 

Whether  this  great  military  man's  illustra- 
tion applies  to  the  position  of  the  United  States 
among  the  nations  of  the  world  is  of  course  de- 

7 


ARE  WE  READY? 

batable.  Whether  we  are  Hkely  to  become  the 
object  of  the  sinister  designs  of  a  foreign  power 
is  a  subject  which  we  have  entrusted  to  the 
gentlemen  and  ladies  whom  we  hire  to  keep 
their  ears  to  the  ground  —  our  secret  service 
and  oiu-  diplomatic  corps.  This  much,  how- 
ever, may  be  said: — 

Since  the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  when  there 
were  in  the  United  States  about  1,500,000  men 
under  arms,  to  the  present,  when  we  have  a 
mobile  army  of  about  32,000  men  ready,  as  a 
nation  we  have  been  steadily  advancing  our 
international  position.  Commercially,  indus- 
trially, and  politically  we  have  been  constantly 
becoming  more  important.  Our  responsibili- 
ties at  home  and  abroad  have  increased  in  the 
ratio  of  our  influence.  Growing  prosperity  and 
power  is  a  breeder  of  jealousies  in  nations  as  in 
men.  Back  of  the  European  war  is  the  latest 
demonstration  of  this. 

Generally  speaking,  we  are  taking  it  for 
granted  that  because  we  do  not  want  war  we 
shall  not  have  war.  We  argue:  War  is  barba- 
rous and  futile.  We  are  enlightened.  Therefore 


GOLD  AND  IRON 

we  shall  not  have  war.  The  world's  market  is 
an  open  market.  If  increased  productiveness 
and  enterprise  mean  broader  competition,  we 
will  compete.  We  will  not  fight. 

Generally  speaking,  we  are  taking  it  for 
granted  that  we  do,  and  shall  continue  to,  con- 
trol the  Pacific. 

Generally  speaking,  we  are  taking  it  for 
granted  that  we  shall  continue  successfully  to 
uphold  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  regardless. 

Generally  speaking,  a  nation  emerging  as  con- 
queror from  the  present  struggle  in  Europe,  it- 
self based  upon  several  things  taken  for  granted, 
would  look  upon  itself,  and  not  without  reason, 
as  fully  justified  in  taking  over  the  work  of 
development  and  culture  in  more  or  less  unde- 
veloped regions — South  America,  for  example. 

"In  the  support  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,"  a 
very  able  observer  of  international  affairs  said 
to  me  recently,  **we  must  bear  in  mind  that 
our  stand  has  had  the  tacit  support  of  Great 
Britain.  Great  Britain  at  present  and  for  some 
years  past  has  had  a  rather  superior  navy.  We 
cannot  see  from  where  we  sit  how  far  the  Euro- 

9 


ARE  WE  READY? 

pean  frog  is  going  to  jump.  We  can  form  no 
accurate  picture  of  what  Great  Britain  and  her 
navy,  or  any  other  nation  and  its  navy,  not  to 
mention  armies  and  purses,  are  going  to  look 
like  when  this  war  is  over." 

The  statement,  with  its  inference,  is  no 
doubt  open  to  debate.  There  is  no  reason  for 
presenting  here  an  argument  for  or  against. 

As  a  broad  proposition,  however,  may  it  not 
be  said  that  there  is  at  least  a  possibihty  that 
while  we,  chock-full  of  confidence,  happy, 
healthy,  and  prosperous,  go  blithely  whistling 
up  and  down  the  highways  of  the  world,  some 
other  fellow,  not  quite  so  care-free  and  a  little 
less  opposed  to  a  brawl,  may  be  watching  us 
with  the  cold  eye  of  speculation? 

Maybe  there  is  a  modern  application  of  the 
hint  that  Solon  dropped  to  Croesus:  "If  an- 
other king  comes  who  has  better  iron  than  you, 
he  will  be  master  of  all  this  gold." 

Over  in  Europe  we  are  getting  daily  proof  of 
the  fact  that  it  is  one  thing  to  thumb  one's  nose 
at  one's  neighbor  and  quite  another  thing  to 
watch  one's  eye. 


CHAPTER  II 

AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 

Suppose:  — 

Portland,  Me.,  March  12  —  A  destroyer  ar- 
riving here  with  one  of  its  funnels  shot  away, 
and  half  its  crew  dead  or  wounded,  reports  that 
in  a  terrific  engagement  on  the  east  and  west 
Unes  of  trade,  south  of  Newfoundland  and  oflf 
the  Banks,  the  American  main  battle  fleet  has 
been  partially  destroyed  by  a  superior  squad- 
ron of  the  enemy.  The  surviving  vessels  are 
apparently  seeking  refuge  in  Boston  and  New 
York  harbors,  and  Narragansett  Bay. 

Washington,  March  12  —  (Bulletin.)  In  a 
statement  issued  by  the  Government  Press 
Bureau,  the  defeat  of  our  main  battle  fleet  is 
officially  confirmed.  The  loss  in  ships  and 
men  is  not  given. 

Bar  Harbor,  March  14  —  A  dispatch  boat 
reports  the  presence  of  several  war  vessels, 
thought  to  be  the  enemy's  scout  cruisers,  oflf 

11 


ARE  WE  READY? 

the  Massachusetts  coast.  A  neutral  steamship 
reports  that  the  eneniy's  fleet  has  reassembled 
in  large  numbers. 

Boston,  March  14  —  A  scout  cruiser,  arriv- 
ing here  at  midnight,  reported  having  picked 
up  a  code  wireless  from  the  flagship  of  the 
enemy's  fleet,  carrying  the  information  that 
the  American  fleet  had  been  beaten  and  scat- 
tered, and  instructing  the  movement  of  trans- 
ports toward  the  Atlantic  Coast. 

Austin,  Texas,  March  14  —  The  Governor 
has  refused  to  transmit  the  President's  call  for 
militia.  Rumors  of  impending  raids  by  Mexi- 
can irregulars  are  active  along  the  border. 

Washington,  March  15  —  Semi-official  re- 
ports, from  New  England  coast  cities,  only  par- 
tially confirmed,  indicate  the  approach  of  a 
large  fleet  of  transports,  under  heavy  convoy. 

New  York,  March  16 — The  official  news  of 
the  defeat  of  our  main  battle  fleet  in  an  engage- 
ment off  the  Newfoundland  Banks,  followed  by 
the  arrival  to-day  of  several  of  our  smaller  war- 
ships which  crept  into  port,  all  badly  crippled 
and  carrying  hundreds  of  dead  and  wounded, 

12 


r 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 

has  brought  conditions  here  to  the  verge  of 
panic.  Frightful  stories  told  by  survivors, 
many  of  whom  are  in  a  state  of  hysteria, 
published  in  early  editions  of  the  evening 
papers,  all  indicate  a  disaster  appalling  in  its 
extent. 

Rumors  that  a  bombardment  from  the  sea  is 
imminent  persist.  Because  of  the  seemingly 
hopeless  confusion,  mobilization  of  the  militia 
is  proceeding  slowly  in  spite  of  the  utmost 
elBforts  of  the  military  authorities. 

Martial  law  has  been  declared.  The  Mayor 
has  issued  a  proclamation  advising  banks  and 
business  houses  to  remove  funds  and  valuables 
to  Albany.  Fear  of  bomb-dropping  raids  by 
aeroplanes  launched  from  hostile  warships  has 
intensified  the  terror.  Street  illumination  has 
been  prohibited.  New  York  will  be  in  darkness 
to-night.  Whole  blocks  of  shops  are  closed  and 
deserted.  Looters  have  been  ordered  shot  at 
sight. 

The  Croton  water  supply  is  unprotected. 
The  city  officials  have  asked  the  Government 
for  regular  troops. 

13 


ARE  WE  READY? 

The  tendency  of  civilians  to  rush  frantically 
to  arms  without  organization,  trained  oflScers, 
or  adequate  equipment  is  increasing  confusion 
and  adding  to  the  difficulty  of  preparing  for  a 
land  defense.  Motor  vehicles  are  being  com- 
mandeered for  the  transport  of  troops,  equip- 
ment, and  supplies.  Station  platforms  are  Ut- 
tered with  baggage  which  cannot  be  moved. 
Every  train  leaving  the  city  is  choked  with 
refugees.  Two  women  have  been  killed  in  a 
crush  at  the  Grand  Central  Station. 

Boston,  March  16 — A  hundred  or  more  per- 
sons, mostly  women  and  children,  were  injured 
to-day,  in  a  riot  at  the  South  Station.  An  un- 
official report,  published  here,  that  Boston  may 
expect  a  bombardment  within  the  next  forty- 
eight  hours,  has  thrown  the  city  into  a  panic. 
Thousands  are  leaving  by  rail,  every  descrip- 
tion of  vehicle,  and  on  foot. 

New  York,  March  16 — The  commander  of 
an  armored  cruiser,  who  brought  his  crippled 
vessel  into  port  last  night,  is  quoted  in  an  even- 
ing paper  as  saying :  *'  The  nature  of  the  engage- 
ment, in  which  the  enemy  was  successful  in  his 

14> 


7*7;/^"?*if*_, 


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\\i  '^^l 


^H^^^^^^^L 

-iji 

^^ 

'^^^^-'~ 

MADISON  SQUARE,   NEW   YORK,    AFTER  AX  AERIAL  RAID 
From  a  Drawing  by  Oliver  Herford 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 

first  purpose,  to  destroy  and  scatter  our  fleet, 
makes  anything  but  the  most  general  estimate 
of  our  losses  impossible.  That  the  disaster  is 
complete  there  can  be  no  doubt.  The  Ameri- 
can fleet  fought  with  the  most  desperate  cour- 
age. We  have  lost  our  most  powerful  vessels. 
Our  defeat  can  be  attributed  to  our  inferiority 
in  number  of  ships,  in  speed,  in  number  of 
heavy  guns,  to  lack  of  battle  practice,  and  to 
shortage  of  men.  We  were  hopelessly  out- 
weighed at  long-range  fighting." 

Washington,  March  16  —  Official  Washing- 
ton is  stunned  at  the  extent  of  our  naval  disas- 
ter as  indicated  in  the  fragmentary  details  con- 
firmed up  to  this  time.  The  ofiicial  statement 
of  our  losses  is  not  expected  for  several  days. 
A  comparison  of  reports  makes  it  evident  that 
a  third  of  our  fighting  ships  have  been  de- 
stroyed and  that  the  rest  have  been  so  badly 
crippled  that  they  cannot  go  into  action  until 
they  are  overhauled. 

New  York,  March  16  —  The  central  oflSce  of 
a  press  association  reports  that  every  important 
center  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  from  Galves- 

15 


ARE  WE  READY? 

ton  to  Portland,  is  frantically  appealing  to  the 
Government  for  troops. 

Boston,  March  16  —  The  hostile  fleet  has 
been  picked  up  by  a  dispatch  boat  150  miles  oflf 
Cape  Cod,  headed  west  and  steaming  slowly. 
It  could  not  be  determined  whether  the  fleet  is 
making  for  Boston  or  New  York.  It  is  the  evi- 
dent purpose  of  the  commander  to  conceal  his 
objective  until  the  troops  reported  to  be  ap- 
proaching under  convoy  shall  arrive. 

Panama,  March  16  —  The  Governor  Gen- 
eral has  reported  to  Washington  that  steamers 
arriving  at  Colon  have  sighted  hostile  cruisers 
in  the  Caribbean.  He  has  forwarded  an  urgent 
request  that  troops  in  the  Canal  Zone  be  in- 
creased and  that  an  adequate  ammunition  sup- 
ply be  estabUshed  at  once.  Preparations  for 
the  defense  of  the  Canal  are  inadequate. 

Washington,  March  17 — Reports  from  va- 
rious States  indicate  that  the  President's  call 
for  500,000  volunteers  has  met  with  instant 
response.  The  greatest  difficulty  is  being  ex- 
perienced in  the  effort  to  assemble,  organize, 
and  equip  the  recruits.  It  has  developed  that 

16 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 

there  are  practically  no  officers  available  for 
organizing  and  training.  The  total  lack  of  even 
a  partially  trained  reserve  for  fiUing  out  the 
essential  branches  of  an  effective  field  force 
presents  the  gravest  problems.  There  is  an 
alarming  shortage  of  cavalry,  signal,  engineer- 
ing, hospital,  and  field  artillery  equipment. 
The  total  available  supply  is  hardly  adequate 
for  the  regular  army  and  more  or  less  complete 
militia  organizations.  Reports  made  public 
indicate  that  both  the  regular  army  and  the 
militia  are  lacking  in  organization  and  equip- 
ment. All  the  available  coast  artillery  reserves 
have  been  sent  to  the  fortifications  along  the 
Atlantic  Coast.  This  will  supply  about  half 
the  men  needed  at  the  gims. 

New  York,  March  17  —  The  mobilization  of 
the  regular  army  in  the  Albany  district  is  com- 
plete. With  the  troops  from  the  Mexican  bor- 
der, withdrawn  in  spite  of  vigorous  protests  by 
Texas  authorities  and  by  several  border  cities, 
a  force  of  20,000,  organized  as  a  full  division,  is 
concentrated  in  the  military  camps.  One  divi- 
sion of  cavalry  is  en  route. 

17 


ARE  WE  READY? 

San  Francisco,  March  17  — A  mass  meeting 
was  held  here  to-night  to  protest  against  the 
mihtia  leaving  California.  The  presence  of 
what  are  believed  to  be  hostile  warships  off  the 
southern  California  coast  is  persistently  ru- 
mored. The  coast  artillery  has  been  brought  to 
its  full  war  strength.  The  artillery  reserves 
have  been  brought  in. 

Washington,  March  18 — It  is  the  consensus 
of  opinion  of  army  and  navy  heads  that  the 
enemy  intends  to  strike  in  the  region  between 
Washington  and  Boston.  A  high  army  officer, 
whose  name  is  withheld,  is  quoted  as  express- 
ing the  belief  that  New  York,  because  it  is  one 
of  the  most  vulnerable  of  our  large  cities  and 
would  be  most  efiFective  as  a  base  of  operations, 
and  because,  as  the  center  of  our  arteries  of 
commerce,  its  fall  would  have  a  paralyzing 
effect  on  the  nation,  has  been  selected  for  the 
initial  attack. 

Washington,  March  18 — In  spite  of  vigorous 
efforts  to  muster  every  available  man  during 
the  two  weeks  that  have  elapsed  since  the 
President's  call  for  militia,  the  figures  made 

18 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 

public  to-day  are  startlingly  low.  Reports  from 
every  State  are  in,  and  indicate  that  the  militia 
cannot  be  mobilized  at  more  than  forty  per 
cent  of  its  war  strength.    At  the  present  rate 
of  mobilization,  and  with  several  States  re- 
fusing to  allow  militia  to  leave,  it  is  estimated 
that  at  least  six  weeks  must  elapse  before  a 
force  of  150,000  men  can  be  concentrated  for 
defense.   Unless  men  who  have  had  service  in 
foreign  armies  come  to  our  assistance,  this 
force  will  remain  untrained.   The  shortage  of 
field  artillery,  cavalry,  equipment,  and  trains 
is  almost  incredible.   The  greatest  shortage  is 
in  field  artillery,  by  far  the  most  important 
auxiliary  in  infantry  operations.   This  arm  of 
the  service  has  not  sufficient  ammunition  at 
hand  for  more  than  a  brief  action.  It  has  de- 
veloped that  New  York  has  the  only  complete 
divisional   organization.  The   total   shortage, 
should  the  concentration  of  our  available  mili- 
tia be  accomplished,  is  estimated  as  follows: 
80  batteries  of  field  artillery;  70  troops  of  cav- 
alry; 17  companies  of  engineers;  26  field  hospi- 
tals; 30  ambulance  companies;  12  ammunition 

19 


ARE  WE  READY? 

trains;  12  supply  trains;  12  pack  trains.  For 
the  most  part  the  mihtia  is  suppUed  with  a 
3-inch  Kght  field  gun  only. 

Washington,  March  18  —  All  the  Atlantic 
States,  as  well  as  Texas,  New  Mexico,  Arizona, 
California,  Oregon,  and  Washington,  have 
flatly  refused  to  allow  their  mihtia  to  leave. 
The  President's  military  advisers  are  reported 
to  be  urging  him  to  order  the  concentration  of 
mihtia  over  the  heads  of  those  governors  who 
are  refusing  to  transmit  his  call.  It  is  admitted 
that  should  such  an  order  be  resisted,  it  could 
be  enforced  only  through  process  of  law.  The 
commanding  officers  of  the  North  and  South 
Atlantic  districts  are  greatly  exercised  over  the 
lack  of  coast-guard  troops  to  protect  the  de- 
tached harbors,  fire-control  stations,  and  mili- 
tary works. 

Harrisburg,  March  18  —  The  Governor  has 
agreed  to  send  the  Pennsylvania  militia  to  the 
Albany  region.  The  militia  is  practically  with- 
out field  artillery  and  other  equipment  neces- 
sary to  field  service. 

Springfield,  March  18  —  The  Massachusetts 
20 


*'.  J 


r 

^^"L      Tviili-f-io 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 

militia  has  finally  been  ordered  to  Albany.  It 
is  poorly  equipped.  Its  transportation  is  im- 
provised, every  description  of  vehicle  having 
been  pressed  into  its  ammunition  and  supply 
trains.  It  is,  necessarily,  proceeding  slowly. 

1^  Washington,  March  18  —  (Bulletin.)  The 
President  has  ordered  the  militia  of  every 
State  to  mobilize  in  the  Albany  district. 

L       New  York,  March  21  —  An  American  scout 

'  cruiser,  arriving  here,  reports  having  sighted  a 
large  fleet  of  transports  approaching  the  east- 
ern entrance  to  Long  Island  Sound. 

H  Washington,  March  21  —  (Bulletin.)  Under 
cover  of  a  night  fog,  the  coast  artillery  force 
on  Fisher's  Island  was  overpowered  and  the 
big  guns  rendered  useless  in  a  raid  last  night  by 
a  strong  landing  force  of  the  enemy,  according 
to  an  official  statement  issued  by  the  Press 
Bureau  to-day.  A  smaller  force,  with  field 
guns  brought  from  the  warships,  landed  on  the 
eastern  side  of  Watch  Hill,  drove  off  the  de- 
fenders of  Fort  Mansfield,  and  destroyed  the 
mechanism  of  the  guns,  according  to  the  same 
official  report. 

21 


ARE  WE  READY? 

New  London,  March  21  —  (Bulletin.)  A  large 
number  of  troop  ships  under  heavy  convoy  are 
entering  Long  Island  Sound  from  the  east. 
Troops  are  evidently  about  to  be  landed  on 
the  Connecticut  shore  east  of  here.  Advance 
bodies  of  the  hostile  forces  are  momentarily 
expected.  The  city  is  rapidly  becoming  de- 
serted. Terror-stricken  inhabitants  are  leaving 
by  hundreds. 

Washington,  March  21  — The  following  oflS- 
cial  statement  has  been  issued  by  the  War  De- 
partment: "Troops  in  large  force  are  being 
landed  from  the  enemy's  transports  at  a  point 
east  of  New  London.  Advices  from  the  vicin- 
ity of  the  invaded  area  are  that  United  States 
regulars  with  a  small  force  of  militia  offered  a 
short  resistance.  They  were  driven  back  by  the 
guns  of  the  warships.  With  the  hostile  troops 
are  being  landed  field  artillery,  several  heavy 
guns,  apparently  of  the  siege  type,  and  large 
quantities  of  supplies  and  ammunition.  An 
aerial  squadron  has  apparently  been  landed  in 
Fort  Pond  Bay  near  Montauk  Point,  where  the 
work  of  assembling  aeroplanes  is  reported  to 

22 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 

be  under  way.  Infantry  and  field  artillery  have 
also  been  landed  at  this  point,  according  to  the 
same  report,  indicating  that  the  enemy  plans  a 
movement  through  Long  Island.  Telegraphic 
communication  with  New  London  has  been 
severed.  Reports  froir.  Waterford,  Montville, 
and  Chesterfield  indicate  that  large  bodies  of 
troops  are  being  pushed  forward  rapidly.  The 
New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  lines  have 
been  seized.  It  is  evidently  the  enemy's  inten- 
tion to  advance  as  rapidly  as  possible  in  order 
to  hold  the  bridges  toward  New  York.  A 
strong  detachment  hasten  sent  out  in  the 
direction  of  Boston  wittithe  apparent  object  of 
interrupting  railroad  communication  toward 
Boston." 

Philadelphia,  March  23  — It  is  reported  from 
the  Delaware  Capes  that  a  large  fleet,  appar- 
ently composed  of  transports,  cruisers,  and 
battleships,  is  headed  for  the  Chesapeake.  By 
order  of  the  Governor,  the  movement  of  the 
Pennsylvania  militia  has  been  suspended. 

New  York,  March  23  — The  delay  in  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Pennsylvania  militia,  caused  by 

23 


ARE  WE  READY? 

the  rumor  of  a  war  fleet  making  for  the  Chesa- 
peake, has  caused  the  greatest  embarrassment 
in  the  preparations  for  the  defense  of  New 
York.  The  fleet  reported  in  yesterday's  dis- 
patch is  now  known  to  consist  of  Hght  cruisers 
and  colHers.  No  hostile  move  toward  the 
Chesapeake  is  apparently  under  way,  accord- 
ing to  the  latest  advices  from  Washington. 

Washington,  March  23  —  A  Press  Bureau 
statement  contains  the  opinion  of  naval  and 
military  authorities  that  the  enemy  will  not 
risk  his  ships  against  coast  defense  guns  and 
there  is  no  immediate  prospect  of  a  bombard- 
ment of  New  York  from  the  sea.  They  believe 
that  he  intends  moving  through  Connecticut 
to  cut  off  Boston  and  to  attack  New  York  from 
the  rear  of  its  fortifications.  This  move  will 
render  the  coast  defenses  powerless.  The  big 
coast  guns  cannot  be  trained  inland  and  cover 
the  harbor  entrances  only.  They  are  practi- 
cally unprotected  against  a  land  attack.  If 
the  surmised  movement  through  Long  Island 
is  correct,  it  means  that  the  defenses  at  Willet's 
Point  and  Fort  Hamilton  will  soon  be  in  the 

24 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 


hands  of  the  enemy.  This  would  put  Fort 
Slocum  out  of  action  and  open  up  the  eastern 
entrance  to  New  York  Harbor  to  small  ships. 
The  approach  of  additional  troop  transports  is 
reported. 

Boston,  March  23  —  Several  hostile  ships 
have  fired  long-range  shots  at  Fort  Revere, 
according  to  a  dispatch  from  Gloucester.  The 
Governor  has  requested  that  the  Massachusetts 
militia  be  returned  for  the  defense  of  Boston. 

Washington,  March  23 — The  President  has 
refused  to  allow  the  Massachusetts  militia  to 
return  to  Boston.  Apparently  he  and  his  mili- 
tary advisers  are  convinced  that  the  shots 
fired  at  Revere  were  intended  to  create  panic 
and  to  weaken  the  defensive  strength  of  our 
troops. 

New  York,  March  24  — An  aerial  scout,  who 
succeeded  in  reconnoitering  over  the  Sound, 
reports  the  enemy's  strength  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  150,000  men,  with  large  quantities  of 
field  artillery,  perfectly  equipped  supply,  am- 
munition, and  hospital  trains,  and  several  bat- 
teries of  the  heavy  siege  type.    The  force  at 

25 


ARE  WE  READY? 

Montauk  Point,  as  nearly  as  can  be  estimated, 
is  about  a  division  of  all  arms.  He  observed 
several  aeroplanes  aloft  apparently  trying  to 
locate  American  troops.  He  reports  the  main 
body  of  the  hostile  infantry  pressing  forward 
toward  Saybrook. 

Our  forces  are  known  to  be  advancing  rap- 
idly, and  it  is  believed  that  a  desperate  at- 
tempt will  be  made  to  check  the  enemy's  ad- 
vance at  the  Connecticut  River.  It  is  believed 
that  the  closing  days  of  the  month  will  see 
the  first  battle  of  the  war  being  fought  along 
the  river  between  Hartford  and  Saybrook. 
Our  total  strength  consists  of  one  division  of 
regulars,  a  cavalry  brigade,  one  division  of  New 
York  militia,  and  an  incomplete  division  of 
Ohio  and  Wisconsin  militia.  Small  arms  have 
been  secured  from  the  arsenal  on  Governor's 
Island  and  Frankf ord  Arsenal  at  Philadelphia 
sufficient  for  10,000  volunteers.  Without  or- 
ganization or  sufficient  officers,  these  recruits 
have  been  rushed  to  the  support  of  the  little 
army  advancing  toward  Saybrook. 

Washington,  March  27 — The  following  offi- 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 

cial  statement  was  issued  by  the  Press  Bureau 
at  noon  to-day :  — 

The  enemy  has  forced  a  crossing  of  the  Con- 
necticut River  at  both  Saybrook  and  Middle- 
town.  Our  troops  are  being  forced  northward, 
and  before  further  resistance  will  be  possible, 
they  will  have  to  join  with  the  New  England 
militia.  The  hostile  invading  force  numbers 
in  the  neighborhood  of  150,000  men,  with 
an  overwhelming  superiority  in  artillery  and 
equipment.  Transports  with  heavy  reinforce- 
ments are  reported  to  be  approaching.  The 
New  York  municipal  authorities  have  been 
notified  that  a  successful  defense  of  that  city 
seems  impossible. 


All  of  this  is  pure  speculation,  to  be  sure. 

Nevertheless,  the  speculation  has  a  basis  in 
facts  which  cannot  be  disputed.  I  have  shown 
the  manuscript  of  this  chapter  to  several  mili- 
tary experts  and  all  agreed  that  under  the  con- 
ditions which  I  have  imagined,  with  the  city's 
fate  hanging  on  a  bare  50,000  men,  and  an 
unorganized,  unoflScered,  and  poorly  equipped 

27 


ARE  WE  READY? 

force  of  volunteers,  capture  would  be  inevit- 
able. They  agreed  that  defense  by  citizens, 
under  modern  methods  of  warfare,  would  be 
hopeless,  and  pointed  to  the  German  opera- 
tions in  Belgium  as  proof  of  this.  They  agreed 
that  a  tremendous  indemnity  would  doubt- 
less be  demanded,  some  placing  it  as  high  as 
$1,000,000,000,  others  still  higher.  None  of 
them  suggested  that  there  was  absurdity  in  the 
speculative  treatment  of  the  facts  of  our  pre- 
paredness, and  they  were  of  one  mind  that  if 
the  events  imagined  should  occur,  the  nation 
would  face  the  immediate  necessity  of  decid- 
ing whether  it  would  pay  an  enormous  mone- 
tary price  for  peace  or  whether  it  would  enter 
into  a  long  war  to  retake  all  that  might  be  lost 
before  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  and  oflGi- 
cers  could  be  armed,  trained,  equipped,  and 
put  into  the  field. 

Among  the  men  with  whom  I  discussed  this 
chapter  was  Henry  L.  Stimson,  former  Secre- 
tary of  War.  After  a  close  study  of  the  manu- 
script Mr.  Stimson  permitted  me  to  quote  him 
as  follows:  — 

28 


HENRY  L.   STIMSON 
Secretary  of  War,  1911-1913 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 

I  have  read  "An  Attack  on  New  York."  There 
is  nothing  said  in  it  which  is  outside  the  bounds  of 
modern  military  possibility.  The  facts  with  refer- 
ence to  our  possible  defensive  force  are  accurately 
stated  and  the  speculative  treatment  of  them  is 
logical. 

The  facts  of  our  niilitary  preparedness,  as 
they  apply  to  the  possibility  of  an  attack  on  the 
Atlantic  Coast,  have  an  even  more  alarming 
bearing  on  any  speculation  touching  the  safety 
of  our  Pacific  Slope. 

Our  General  StaflP  and  our  War  College  have 
taken  problem  after  problem,  worked  each  one 
forward,  backward,  and  sideways,  conjured  up 
every  conceivable  proposition  touching  attack 
and  means  of  defense.  In  each  case,  eventually, 
the  solution  has  been  the  same. 

We  cannot  defend  the  Pacific  Slope  against  a 
trained  hostile  force  as  small  as  100,000  men. 

It  matters  very  little  at  what  point  the 
empire  west  of  the  Rockies  might  be  invaded. 
In  the  opinion  of  mihtary  experts  who  have 
worked  on  the  problems  of  the  military  de- 
fense of  that  portion  of  our  territory,  a  sue- 

29 


ARE  WE  READY? 

cessful  invasion  might  have  as  its  first  object 
the  region  of  San  Francisco  Bay,  of  Puget 
Sound,  or  of  Los  Angeles. 

There  are  many  points  on  the  Pacific  Coast 
entirely  outside  the  fire  zone  of  the  big  harbor 
guns,  where  landing  troops  could  be  easily, 
quickly,  and  safely  accomplished. 

It  is  probable  that  a  foe  would  select  the 
San  Francisco  region  for  the  initial  point  of 
invasion,  although  there  is  Uttle  or  nothing 
upon  which  to  base  a  theory  that  a  hostile 
power  would  not  land  its  fighting  men  at  two 
or  even  three  points  at  once. 

With  a  portion  of  our  fleet  destroyed  and 
the  rest  "bottled,"  transports  could  approach 
and  land  troops,  guns,  ammunition,  and  equip- 
ment at  points  either  north  or  south  of  the 
city  of  San  Francisco,  —  at  HaK  Moon  Bay, 
on  the  peninsula,  for  example,  —  or  north  of 
San  Francisco  at  some  point  on  the  Marin 
County  shore  line.  Small  bays  and  inlets 
furnish  many  accessible  points. 

We  could,  and  no  doubt  would,  throw  for- 
ward all  our  available  line  of  defense  across  the 

30 


r 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 


peninsula,  if  the  attack  came  from  the  south, 
and  north  of  the  city  of  San  Francisco,  if  troops 
should  be  landed  in  that  region. 

If  the  necessity  came  to-night  for  such  a  hne 
or  for  both  Unes  of  defense,  this  is  approximately 
what  we  should  have  at  hand  to  go  into  it: — ■ 

Three  thousand  regular  troops  in  California. 
'  We  should  have  three  regiments  of  infantry 
at  the  Presidio  of  San  Francisco,  and  one  regi- 
ment of  cavalry  at  Monterey.  All  the  coast 
artillery  troops  would  be  needed  at  the  guns. 
The  only  other  mobile  troops  available  along 
the  whole  long  shore  hne  would  be  two  regi- 
ments of  infantry  —  one  at  Portland,  Oregon, 
the  other  at  Seattle,  Washington.  The  total 
of  the  regular  mobile  forces  on  the  whole 
Pacific  Coast  would  be  six  regiments  at  peace 
strength,  or  about  4500  men. 
^  About  3500  men,  indifferently  trained,  in 
the  organized  militia,  short  of  field  guns,  with- 
out the  necessary  ammunition,  supply,  and 
hospital  trains,  and  lacking  in  other  necessi- 
ties of  actual  field  service,  would  make  up  our 
militia  strength.  The  mihtia  forces,  estimated 

SI 


ARE  WE  READY? 


from  recent  inspection  figures,  would  be  ap- 
proximately as  follows:  — 


Quartermaster  Corps 

Subsistence  Department 

Medical  Department 

Corps  of  Engineers 

Ordnance  . 

Signal  Corps    . 

Chaplains 

Cavalry     . 

Field  Artillery 

Infantry    . 

Coast  Artillery  Corps' 


2  oflficers,  no  men 

1  officer,  no  men 

20  officers,  90  men 

2  officers,  no  men 

2  officers,  no  men 

4  officers,  69  men 

3 

10  officers,  170  men 

15  officers,  300  men 

140  officers,  2000  men 

.  30  officers,  600  men 


Our  militia  force,  therefore,  though  well 
supplied  for  religious  ministration,  would  have 
not  more  than  3500  men  in  its  organization, 
and  this  number  would  include  many  non- 
combatants,  both  officers  and  men.  Without 
doubt,  militia  from  the  region  of  Los  Angeles 
and  San  Diego,  as  well  as  militia  from  the 
States  of  Oregon  and  Washington,  would  not 
be  sent  to  the  region  of  San  Francisco  because 
of  the  necessity  of  local  defense. 

An  attack  from  the  north  by  a  strong  force 
of  trained  men  would,  without  question,  result 
in  the  almost  immediate  capture  of  the  north 
batteries  of  San  Francisco  Bay. 

^  Which  cannot  be  counted  in  the  mobile  force. 
32 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK 

The  power  of  a  so-called  coast-defense  bat- 
tery is  in  exact  ratio  to  the  range  of  its  heaviest 
gun  within  the  radius  of  that  gun's  fire. 

It  is  right  there  that  we  have  been  so 
bUthely  fooling  ourselves,  ever  since  some 
one  called  harbor-defense  guns  "coast-defense 
guns." 

Without  men  defending  them,  the  great  guns 
mounted  along  our  coast  line  are  powerless 
against  an  attack  by  land.  Big  rifles,  and 
heavy  mortars,  if  big  enough,  heavy  enough, 
and  well  handled,  can  prevent  hostile  entrance 
of  our  harbors. 

f  Little  rifles,  small  guns,  and  many  men,  all 
of  them  well  handled,  the  men  well  trained,  are 
necessary  to  protect  our  coast  hne  against 
invasion. 

•  When  we  speak  of  having  a  regular  army  of 
about  5000  officers  and  88,000  men,  we  have 
to  consider  that  approximately  19,000  of  these 
officers  and  men  belong  to  the  coast  artillery, 
and  that  other  thousands  are  stationed  outside 
the  territorial  borders  of  the  United  States, 
leaving  an  actual   mobile  army  within  the 


I 


33 


ARE  WE  READY? 

United  States  of  not  more  than  1500  officers  and 
80,000  men.  The  men  who  handle  the  big  guns 
at  the  harbor  entrances  cannot  be  counted 
among  those  upon  whom  we  can  count  to  take 
part  in  an  effort  to  repel  an  attack  by  land. 
The  coast  fortifications  are  local  organizations, 
and  are  designed  wholly  to  protect  the  more 
important  of  our  seaports  from  direct  naval 
attacks  and  raids,  to  guarantee  against  the 
landing  of  hostile  troops  at  certain  definite 
places,  to  safeguard  our  naval  bases,  in  the 
absence  of  our  own  warships,  to  prevent  the 
use  of  individual  harbors  and  other  landing- 
places  as  points  which  could  be  used  for  naval 
operations  against  us,  and  to  secure  places  of 
safety  for  our  war-vessels. 

The  total  stretch  of  our  coast  line  is  enor- 
mous, and  the  portions  of  it  covered  by  the  guns 
in  our  harbor  defenses  are  very  limited  in  com- 
parison with  the  unprotected  intervals  that  lie 
between  them. 

Should  we  lose  control  of  the  sea,  as  has  been 
assumed,  it  would  be  possible  for  a  hostile 
power  to  commence  an  invasion  by  the  simple 

34 


BIG  GUNS  AT  FORT   WADSWORTH,   STATEN  ISLAND,  N.Y. 


AN  ATTACK  ON  NEW  YORK' 

expedient  of  landing  troops  in  one  of  these 
unprotected  intervals,  within  easy  striking 
distance  of  some  important  city.  Should  at- 
tack come  from  a  nation  having  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  reservists  already  within  our  borders, 
as  part  of  our  population,  our  fleet  and  our 
harbor  defenses  would  be  powerless  to  help  us. 
Ultimate  defense,  therefore,  can  be  accom- 
plished only  by  having  a  suflScient  mobile  army 
equipped  and  trained  to  fight  efficiently  in  any 
theater  of  war  which  an  enemy  may  select. 
The  complete  defense  of  our  coast  Hne  depends 
upon  the  combined  efforts  of  our  coast  artillery 
and  our  mobile  forces. 

This  fundamental  difference  between  the 
coast  artillery  and  the  mobile  portions  of  the 
army  has  not  yet  been  recognized  by  our  legis- 
lators, though  the  point  has  been  hammered 
at  constantly  for  years  by  our  military  men. 
Eventually,  if  we  are  to  have  a  really  efficient 
regular  army  organization,  the  mobile  forces 
must  be  free  to  move  on  instant  notice,  and 
should  not  be  tied  down  by  peace  administra- 
tion in  any  particular  locality.    Our  present 

35 


ARE  WE  READY  ? 

army  post  system  is  a  direct  violation  in  many 
instances  of  this  principle.  When  the  violation 
lies  in  the  fact  that,  as  in  some  instances,  one 
commanding  ojSScer  is  in  charge  of  both  mobile 
and  stationary  troops,  such  a  system  of  admin- 
istration would,  without  doubt,  break  down  in 
time  of  war. 

It  is  the  opinion  of  men  who  have  given 
years  of  careful  study  to  the  subject  that,  for 
the  defense  of  our  Atlantic  Coast  alone  in  time 
of  threatened  invasion,  we  should  require  at 
least  300,000  trained  men  of  all  arms,  organ- 
ized into  complete  divisions.  The  question 
that  army  officers,  cabinet  officers,  and  mem- 
bers of  our  national  legislature  are  asking  is:  — 

"How  can  we  get  them.^^" 


^^^B  CHAPTER  m 

^^^IP  A  BOTTLED  NAVY 

1^  If  our  fleet  is  unbeatable,  there  is  little  sense 
1  or  reason  in  speculation  as  to  our  readiness  to 
repel  invasion,  or  excuse  for  a  volume  such  as 
this.  No  foreign  enemy,  imless  able  to  strike 
directly  from  or  through  the  territory  north  or 
south  of  us,  would  venture  to  attack  us  by  land 
until  he  had  destroyed  our  war  power  on  the 
sea.  In  regarding  the  question  of  our  military 
preparedness,  therefore,  if  we  ignore  the  pos- 
sibility of  direct  attack  by  land,  two  assump- 
tions are  possible :  — 

We  can  assume  that  our  fleet  cannot  be 
beaten.  Or  we  can  assume  that  it  can. 

Unintelligent  patriotism  immediately  jumps 
to  the  first  premise  and  proclaims  that  military 
strength  is  unimportant,  and  that  any  agita- 
tion looking  toward  increasing  our  land  forces 
is  jingoism. 

Intelligent  patriotism,  the  kind  that  is  to  be 
37 


ARE  WE  READY? 

found  in  our  ablest  soldiers  and  in  many  of  our 
leading  statesmen,  holds  to  the  second  assump- 
tion, and  insists  that  the  safety  of  the  nation 
demands  that  it  be  prepared  both  by  land  and 
sea.  That  is  not  to  say  that  intelligent  patriot- 
ism admits  that  our  sea  fighters  can  be  con- 
quered, but  that  it  is  willing  to  assume,  in  seek- 
ing to  find  what  absolute  safety  demands,  that 
our  fleet  can  be  rendered  powerless  to  defend 
our  shores. 

This  second  assumption  was  the  basis  of  the 
speculation  in  the  preceding  chapter.  It  is 
at  the  bottom  of  the  contention  that  it  will 
be  profitable  for  the  American  people  to  con- 
sider the  facts  of  our  military  preparedness. 
Whether  or  not  this  is  warranted  can  be  estab- 
lished only  in  actual  warfare.  In  a  discussion 
of  our  military  strength,  there  is  little  space  for 
an  exhaustive  analysis  of  our  naval  strength. 

There  are,  however,  certain  general  grounds, 
which  it  may  be  well  to  indicate  at  this  point, 
for  assuming  that  a  naval  defeat  is  possible. 

Size  alone  cannot  always  be  counted  upon  to 
win  battles,  as  the  schoolboy  bully  has  often 

38 


A  BOTTLED  NAVY 

discovered  to  his  amazement  and  chagrin.  So 
long  as  the  issues  of  modern  warfare  are  de- 
cided by  explosives  and  projectiles,  battles  will 
be  won  and  lost  by  superiority  of  fire.  Larger 
numbers  and  bigger  guns,  greater  weight  and 
superior  agility,  all  are  distinct  advantages; 
but  the  ultimate  test  lies  in  how  the  gxms  are 
handled,  how  well  trained  are  the  men  behind 
them,  and  whether  the  agility  is  converted  into 
fighting  efficiency. 

It  is  not  our  poHcy  to  excel  all  nations  in 
greater  numbers  —  of  men,  ships,  or  guns.  We 
do  make  an  effort,  however,  to  keep  ahead  of 
all  nations  in  the  size  of  our  guns.  If  under  this 
policy  we  are  able,  under  any  circumstances, 
to  maintain  superiority  of  fire,  both  in  volume 
and  accuracy,  we  are  justified  in  assuming  that 
our  navy  is  unconquerable.  There  are  very 
definite  grounds  for  seriously  questioning  such 
ability. 

Throughout  our  history,  the  general  trend 
of  our  naval  policy  has  been  weak.  It  has  been 
"off  again,  on  again,  back  again,  Finnegan," 
with  us. 

80 


ARE  WE  READY? 

We  started  the  ''little  navy"  policy  im- 
mediately after  the  Revolution.  Contrary  to 
the  advice  of  Washington,  our  navy  was  abol- 
ished and  for  eight  years  we  had  none.  It  was 
not  until  the  outrageous  decree  of  the  Direc- 
tory of  France  in  1796,  followed  by  the  cap- 
ture of  American  vessels  bound  to  and  from 
English  ports,  that  the  necessity  of  fighting 
ships  was  driven  home  to  us,  and  we  established 
a  sea  power  which  forced  peace.  After  the 
Constellation  defeated  the  French  frigate  In- 
surgente,  and  strife  on  the  sea  was  stopped,  we 
went  back  again  to  our  "Httle  navy"  policy. 
We  soon  found  ourselves  paying  tribute  to  the 
pirates  of  Algiers.  Once  more  we  provided 
ourselves  with  warships  and  eventually  the 
piracy  was  put  down. 

England's  interference  in  1807  with  com- 
merce between  the  United  States  and  conti- 
nental Europe  should  have  warned  us  of  the 
folly  of  our  weak  naval  policy.  Jefferson,  with- 
out a  navy,  and  with  a  distaste  for  war,  per- 
suaded Congress  to  pass  the  Embargo  Act  as 
a  substitute  for  a  navy.  One  historian  has  said 

40 


} 


A  BOTTLED  NAVY 

that  "the  cost  of  this  experiment  emptied  the 
treasury,  bankrupted  the  mercantile  and  agri- 
cultural classes,  and  ground  the  poor  beyond 
endurance." 

By  1811,  it  was  plain  as  the  nose  on  om-  face 
that  we  were  rapidly  moving,  totally  unpre- 
pared, toward  war.  When  war  was  declared  in 
1812,  we  had  six  frigates  and  eight  sloops, 
against  the  hundreds  of  ships  in  England's 
navy.  We  had  three  years  of  the  War  of  1812. 
We  called  out  over  500,000  men  and  burdened 
ourselves  with  a  large  pension  list.  A  himdred 
years  after  the  war,  there  were  still  over  two 
hundred  widows  on  the  pension  roll  of  1812. 
A  strong  naval  policy  at  that  time,  if  not  actu- 
ally preventing  the  war,  would  very  probably 
have  Umited  its  duration  to  a  few  weeks  or 
months. 

It  is  interesting  to  consider  the  pension  fig- 
ures in  connection  with  the  argument  of  the 
**httle  navy"  men  that  we  cannot  stand  the 
expense  of  a  larger  navy.  Up  to  1914,  the  cost 
of  pensions,  due  to  the  Civil  War,  had  been 
about   $4,000,000,000.     The   pension   appro- 

41 


ARE  WE  READY? 

priation  for  1913  was  in  the  neighborhood  of 
$185,000,000.  This  is  about  $50,000,000  more 
than  was  appropriated  in  the  same  year  for 
the  navy.  Since  we  began  to  be  the  United 
States  of  America,  we  have  paid  $1,250,000,- 
000  more  for  pensions  than  we  have  paid  out 
for  our  navy.  How  much  of  this  enormous  sum 
a  strong  naval  poHcy  would  have  saved  us  can 
only  be  guessed  at. 

No  one  seriously  questions  the  assertion, 
frequently  made,  that  had  the  Northern  States 
in  1861  been  possessed  of  an  adequate  navy, 
there  would  not  have  been  four  years  of  cruel 
and  costly  conflict.  With  a  navy  of  adequate 
proportions,  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard  would 
have  been  seized,  the  Mississippi  would  have 
been  blockaded,  and  the  export  of  cotton  and 
the  importation  of  war  material  from  other 
nations  would  have  been  prevented.  The  ex- 
ploits of  the  Alabama  and  other  vessels  which 
were  built  in  English  ports  would  have  been 
impossible. 

If  Russia  in  1905  had  been  able  to  assemble 
a  suflGiciently  strong  fleet  at  Port  Arthur,  Japan 

42 


A  BOTTLED  NAVY 

would  not  have  dared  to  send  transports  to 
j  China  and  to  land  troops.  Turkey's  naval 
weakness,  in  the  recent  war  with  Italy,  opened 
the  way  for  the  Italian  Navy  to  seize  TripoU 
without  being  punished.  Turkey  was  unable 
to  prevent  Italy's  command  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean. 

To-day,  England  with  a  navy  of  superior 
strength,  has  been  able  to  completely  paralyze 
Germany's  over-sea  trade,  which  last  year 
amounted  to  close  to  $4,000,000,000.  Eng- 
land's navy  is  one  of  the  great  elements  which 
experts  are  taking  into  consideration  as  a  factor 
that  will  weigh  heavily  in  bringing  hostilities 
in  Europe  to  an  end. 

It  should  be  remembered,  however,  that, 
with  all  her  sea  power,  England,  without  the 
aUied  armies,  was  and  is  powerless  to  pre- 
vent Germany  from  overrunning  Belgium  and 
France,  or  any  other  territory  open  to  direct 
attack  by  land.  England's  weakness  is  Hke 
the  weakness  of  the  professional  bowler  — 
abnormal  development.  If  her  strong  arm 
should  be  broken,  she  would  be  out  of  the 

43 


ARE  WE  READY? 

running.  In  a  game  requiring  the  service  of  the 
weaker  arm,  she  is  outclassed  by  her  rivals. 
That  real  war  strength  must  include  mihtary 
as  well  as  naval  power  is  true  of  any  nation. 
We  are  no  exception. 

The  oflScial  figures  of  1914  show  that  the 
navy  of  the  United  States  ranks  third  among 
the  powers  of  the  world,  with  France  and  Japan 
fourth  and  fifth.  If  our  naval  programme  is 
carried  out,  the  United  States  Navy  soon  will 
have  dropped  to  fourth  place,  if,  in  actual 
fighting  strength,  it  is  not  already  there.  These 
same  figures  give  the  French  Navy  2406  offi- 
cers and  the  Japanese  Navy  3230  officers,  with 
the  United  States  a  bad  fifth,  with  1918  offi- 
cers. They  show  that  in  enlisted  men  we  rank 
ahead  of  Japan  by  2500  men  and  behind 
France  by  10,000  men.  Japan  has  96  enlisted 
men  per  1000  tonnage,  compared  with  69  men 
for  the  same  tonnage  in  the  American  Navy. 
In  ten  years,  Japan  increased  her  naval  expend- 
itures eleven-fold,  while  the  expenditures  of 
the  United  States,  on  its  navy, ;  only  doubled 
within  the  fifteen  years  ending  with  1914.  The 

44 


A  BOTTLED  NAVY 

German  expenditures  tripled  within  the  same 
period. 

Josephus  Daniels,  as  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
gave  voice  to  the  principle  that  "  we  are  not 
building  against  anybody."  He  expressed  the 
belief  that  the  war  in  Europe  is  going  to  ex- 
haust the  resources  of  the  countries  engaged, 
and  that  there  "is  less  hkelihood  of  our  hav- 
ing any  trouble  at  any  time  in  the  future  with 
those  nations  than  there  was  before."  This 
view  concerns  a  point  over  which  there  is  the 
widest  divergence  of  opinion.  It  involves  purely 
the  question  of  size  and  weight. 

George  von  L.  Meyer,  Mr.  Daniels's  prede- 
cessor as  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  takes  an  op- 
posite view.  His  opinion  is  this:  — 

Better  no  navy  whatever  than  a  navy  that  is 
insufficient  to  our  needs,  and  which  only  deceives 
the  ignorant  and  inexperienced  public  as  to  its 
safety  from  attack  or  circumstances  which  would 
result  in  a  paralyzing  foreign  commerce. 

It  is  impossible  and  unnecessary  for  this  coun- 
try to  have  a  large  standing  army  in  competition 
with  those  across  the  seas.  But  it  is  possible  and 
necessary  for  us  to  have  a  navy  that  is  superior 

45 


ARE  WE  READY? 

to  that  of  any  country,  with  the  exception  of 
England. 

To  bring  that  about  we  must  have  a  definite  and 
continuous  building  programme  of  four  battleships 
a  year  until  we  have  secured  an  ultimate  battle- 
ship strength  of  forty-eight  ships  of  the  line,  with 
the  necessary  auxiliaries. 

We  also  need  a  merchant  marine  as  an  adjunct 
to  the  navy,  which  in  times  of  peace  will  carry  the 
mails  and  our  products  to  the  foreign  markets  of 
the  world. 

England's  merchant  marine  has  been  of  incal- 
culable value  to  her  in  the  present  crisis,  and,  while 
with  us,  the  transportation  of  troops  by  water 
would  probably  be  limited,  it  would  require  a  large 
fleet  of  merchant  steamers,  of  which  this  country 
is  very  deficient,  to  transport,  in  case  of  war,  merely 
the  necessary  quantities  of  coal,  oil,  naval  supplies, 
and  ammunition. 

We  should  insist  on  a  strong  navy.  Battleships 
are  cheaper  than  battles.  The  sea  is  a  highway  for 
a  strong  navy  —  a  closed  path  to  a  weak  one.  In- 
vasion of  a  country  cannot  be  effected  in  the  face 
of  a  superior  fleet.  The  fleet  is  the  navy.  In  war 
nothing  fails  like  failure. 

A  powerful  navy  is  the  cheapest  insurance. 


laval 


The  factors  that  go  into  any  nation's  nava 
strength  are   ships,  men,  guns,  ammunition, 

46 


rf 


GEORGE  VON  L.   MEYER 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  1909-1913 


A  BOTTLED  NAVY 

and  administration.  If  we  insist  that  our  naval 
programme,  as  it  relates  to  the  nmnber,  size, 
and  armament  of  the  ships  which  we  maintain, 
is  sufficient  to  guarantee  our  security,  we  have 
left  the  important  elements  of  men,  ammuni- 
tion, and  administration.  That  we  are  short 
of  both  men  and  officers  to  man  our  war- 
vessels  is  generally  admitted.  Our  shortage  of 
blue- jackets  is  about  15,000,  and  we  are  to- 
tally without  reserve  strength  to  replace  losses 
in  battle,  to  man  our  second-Une  ships,  or  to 
supply  the  necessary  men  for  manning  the 
new  ships  which  our  naval  programme  calls 
for. 

That  we  are  short  of  ammunition  is  another 
defect  in  our  navy,  which  can  be  easily  reme- 
died. We  have  but  one  torpedo,  for  example, 
for  each  tube  in  our  navy.  We  could  not  give 
a  foe  "the  other  barrel"  if  he  were  looking 
right  into  the  muzzle  of  our  gun.  We  need  not 
only  enough  ammunition  for  a  protracted  en- 
gagement, but  a  sufficient  quantity  in  reserve 
to  insure  us  against  shortage  during  any  rea- 
sonable period  of  naval  conflict.   It  is  a  most 

47 


ARE  WE  READY? 

disconcerting  thing  to  have  the  hammer  of 
your  gun  go  down  on  an  empty  chamber. 

Quick  mobihzation,  in  time  of  war  or  threat- 
ened war,  is  as  important  at  sea  as  on  land. 
The  persistent  and  continuous  refusal  of  Con- 
gress to  abolish  our  numerous  and  unnecessary 
navy  yards  is  in  line  with  the  costly  and  useless 
maintenance  of  our  scattered  army  posts.  It 
is  the  opinion  of  naval  experts  that  highest 
efficiency  demands  that  we  have  not  more  than 
three  naval  bases  on  the  Atlantic,  and  three 
on  the  Pacific  Coast.  On  the  Atlantic  Coast, 
it  is  advocated  that  our  war- vessels  should  be 
concentrated  at  Hampton  Roads,  Narragan- 
sett,  and  Guantanamo,  and  that  the  Pacific 
naval  bases  should  be  Puget  Sound,  San  Fran- 
cisco, and  Hawaii. 

Given  sufficient  ships,  sufficient  guns,  and 
sufficient  ammunition,  and  means  of  quick 
mobilization,  the  administration  of  our  fight- 
ing craft,  and  the  men  aboard  them,  remains 
as  the  great  element  involving  efficiency. 

Under  our  law,  our  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
is  not  permitted  to  have  a  staff.  He  can,  how- 

48 


1 


A  BOTTLED  NAVY 

ever,  if  he  desires,  surround  himself  with  aides 
who  have  had  actual  experience  as  sea  fighters, 

Former  Secretary  Meyer  was  inchned  to- 
ward administration  through  cooperation  with 
advisers.  Secretary  Daniels  showed  an  inclina- 
tion toward  greater  concentration  of  adminis- 
tration in  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  himself. 
It  was  Secretary  Meyer  who  detailed  oflScers  to 
investigate  and  to  keep  him  informed  on  the 
four  essential  divisions  of  naval  affairs;  opera- 
tions, personnel,  material,  and  inspection. 

Under  Meyer,  the  work  on  the  problems  in- 
volved in  operations  was  performed  by  the 
best  strategists  in  the  navy.  Those  entrusted 
with  keeping  the  Secretary  informed  on  mat- 
ters of  personnel  were  kept  at  work  on  ques- 
tions concerning  the  supply  of  officers  and 
men,  and  the  selection  of  men  to  perform  the 
varied  duties  that  go  into  the  making  up  of  a 
fleet.  Such  matters  as  the  type  of  ships  needed, 
and  the  various  engineering  problems  that  go 
into  the  building  of  a  warship,  were  turned  over 
to  the  aide  entrusted  with  questions  of  mate- 
rial. The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  was  kept  fully 

49 


ARE  WE  READY? 

informed  of  the  condition  of  ships  in  service 
and  ships  building  through  the  aide  in  charge 
of  inspection. 

Secretary  Daniels,  in  large  measure,  aban- 
doned this  system,  as  well  as  the  custom  of 
having  five  instead  of  four  battleships  in  a 
division,  with  one  constantly  in  dry  dock  for 
altering  and  repair.  A  naval  division  contains 
four  battleships.  The  object  of  so  dividing  the 
fleet  that  there  would  be  five  was  to  provide 
a  system  whereby  the  battleships  in  each  divi- 
sion might  at  all  times  be  in  the  best  possible 
condition.  Something  of  a  luxury,  on  the  face 
of  it,  perhaps.  So  is  an  extra  pair  of  trousers. 
But  any  tailor  will  testify  to  the  better  appear- 
ance, longer  life,  and  all-round  greater  service- 
ability of  a  suit  with  an  "extra." 

A  college  football  team  would  not  be  con- 
ceded the  remotest  chance  of  success  if  it  went 
into  a  game  without  having  had  team  and  sig- 
nal practice.  Although  fleet  practice  is  con- 
ceded to  be  an  essential  of  efficient  naval  force, 
for  some  reason  we  seem  to  have  taken  a  posi- 
tion that  our  fleet  is  an  exception.   We  have 

50 


A  BOTTLED  NAVY 

not  had  our  warships  out  for  extensive  prac- 
tice for  three  years.  At  the  time  of  this  writ- 
ing, a  period  of  such  training  is  in  contempla- 
tion ;  but  if  our  fleet  were  called  out  to-day  to 
repel  a  naval  attack,  there  is  not  the  question 
of  a  doubt  that  there  would  be  a  costly  if  not 
a  disastrous  lack  of  teamwork.  The  "puUing'* 
of  "bones"  can  work  as  much  havoc  on  the  sea 
as  on  the  gridiron  or  diamond. 

Battle  maneuvers  on  paper  and  in  textbooks 
are  all  well  enough  in  their  way,  but  they  are 
not  enough  to  place  a  fleet  on  an  even  footing 
with  an  enemy  of  equal  strength,  well  trained 
in  the  actual  handhng  of  his  warships. 

We  pride  oiu'selves  on  the  marksmanship 
of  our  gunners,  but  we  are  apt  to  overlook  the 
fact  that  our  high  scores  have  been  made  under 
the  most  favorable  conditions,  —  in  calm  seas, 
and  without  the  strain  that  comes  in  battle. 
The  recent  naval  battle  off  the  coast  of  Chili 
was  a  clear  demonstration  of  the  value  of  the 
German  system  of  holding  fleet  and  target 
practice  in  rough  seas  and  imder  the  most  un- 
favorable conditions. 

51 


ARE  WE  READY? 

The  American  people  may  ultimately  decide 
how  large  our  fleet  is  to  be.  For  the  present 
the  immediate  necessities  are :  — 

Suflicient  men  to  handle  the  ships  and  guns 
which  we  now  have; 

Sufficient  men  and  officers  to  take  the  place 
of  those  lost  in  war  and  to  man  the  ships  now 
building; 

Sufficient  ammunition  to  supply  our  guns 
and  enough  in  reserve  to  supply  new  ships 
and  to  meet  the  demands  of  naval  warfare; 

Supply  ships,  such  as  coUiers,  oil  ships,  and 
ammunition  carriers,  to  meet  the  demands  of 
our  present  fleet  in  war; 

Equipment  for  aerial  scouting; 

Battle  practice,  sufficient  to  bring  our  sea- 
fighting  machinery  to  maximum  efficiency; 

A  good  general  staff. 

It  may  be  that  we  have  an  unbeatable  navy. 
Whether  we  have  or  not,  only  a  war  with  a 
first-class  power  will  demonstrate.  There 
surely  is  sufficient  ground  in  a  time  of  peace, 
such  as  this,  however,  to  set  us  to  wondering 
whether  it  is  possible  that  the  sea  defense  of 

52 


A  BOTTLED  NAVY 

our  country  might  be  partially  destroyed  or 
bottled  up  in  our  harbors,  to  an  extent  which 
would  enable  an  enemy  to  land  troops  on  our 
shores  and  throw  the  burden  of  defense  upon 
our  military  organizations. 

Many  of  us  are  falling  into  the  error  of  as- 
suming that  sea  defense  means  stringing  our 
^  warships  along  our  coast  Hue  to  prevent  an 
enemy  from  nosing  into  our  harbors,  shelUng 
our  cities,  or  landing  troops  at  unfortified 
points,  and  are  losing  sight  of  the  fact  that  a 
war  fleet  to  be  most  eflfective  must  strike  an 
enemy  in  waters  vital  to  him,  outside  the  trade 
routes  of  its  own  nation,  leaving  the  folks  at 
home  free  to  continue  trade  with  their  neigh- 
bors. 

As  a  nation,  we  are  assuming  that  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  is  an  established  policy,  that  the 
national  interest  demands  that  we  shall  con- 
trol the  Pacific  just  as  England  now  controls 
the  Atlantic,  and  that  we  shall  be  able  to 
prevent  an  enemy  from  landing  troops  on  our 
shores.  We  are  exhibiting  a  tendency  to  over-  j 
look  the  fact  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  just' 

53 


ARE  WE  READY? 

as  strong  as  our  fleet;  that  our  power  to  enforce 
international  agreements  is  as  great  as  the 
weight  of  our  guns;  that  our  grip  on  the  Pacific 
is  as  strong  as  the  ships  we  can  float  on  that 
ocean  in  case  of  necessity;  and  that  whether  we 
are  "building  against"  any  other  nation  or  not, 
an  enemy  can  land  troops  on  our  shores  unless 
we  have  ships,  guns,  and  men,  sufficient  in 
number  and  training  to  meet  any  emergency. 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 

I  THINK  the  worst  regular  beating  I  ever  got 
in  my  life  was  the  result  of  the  misappUcation 
of  a  thoroughly  sound  miUtary  pohcy. 

In  the  small  town  of  my  youth  there  was  a 
very  healthy  and  an  exceedingly  active  bimch 
of  young  Americans.  We  gloried  in  the  label  of 
"The  Hillside  Avenue  Gang."  In  the  same 
town  there  was  a  **dude."  He  was  our  pet 
aversion,  partly  because  we  had  a  natural  an- 
tipathy for  the  genus,  and  partly  because  he 
had  related  to  our  parents,  with  unnecessary 
detail,  many  things,  including  an  assorted  col- 
lection of  words  and  phrases  over  which,  so  far 
as  outsiders  were  concerned,  we  exercised  the 
strictest  censorship. 

Came  a  time  of  thirst  for  revenge;  came  long 
conferences  of  the  whole  as  a  strategy  board; 
an  advance  force,  to  hold  the  "dude's"  atten- 
tion —  then  an  assault  en  masse.    That  was 

5& 


ARE  WE  READY? 

it  —  a  strategy  as  old  as  Napoleon,  and  a  lot 
older. 

Largely  because  I  had  established  a  repu- 
tation as  a  middling  straight  shot,  partly  be- 
cause my  armament  was  to  be  a  carefully  se- 
lected assortment  of  rather  sickly  and  very 
squashy  oranges,  and  partly  because  of  a 
varied  experience  in  matters  such  as  that  in 
hand,  I  was  honored  by  being  singled  out  for 
the  advance  force.  I  dislike  to  put  the  mark  of 
approval  on  my  military  achievements;  but  I 
will  say  that  I  discharged  in  a  highly  efficient 
manner  the  duties  laid  upon  me.  My  courage 
never  faltered,  my  strategy  ran  like  clockwork, 
and  my  range-jBnding  was  perfect.  The  open- 
ing shots,  considered  so  vital  to  our  cause, 
went  home. 

But  my  support  expected  too  much  of  me. 
Instead  of  taking  advantage  of  the  temporary 
confusion  of  the  enemy,  the  main  force  hesi- 
tated, backed  and  filled,  pulled  this  way  and 
that,  refused  to  heed  the  commands  of  the 
officers,  until  I  had  been  overborne  by  superior 
speed,  weight,  and  endurance  (that  "dude" 

56 


r 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 


was  no  slouch) ,  and  the  whole  plan  was  spoiled, 
with  the  enemy  in  full  possession  of  the  field, 
before  the  gang  had  made  up  its  mind  on  any 
definite  fine  of  action.  The  great  battle  had  to 
be  left  for  another  day. 

Now  all  of  this  has  a  real  bearing  on  a  very 
serious  fact  —  that  a  courageous  and  efficient 
regular  army  of  less  than  90,000  men,  no  mat- 
ter how  well  armed,  how  well  trained,  how 
courageous,  or  how  physically  fit,  is  a  mighty 
slim  protection  for  this  country. 

The  traditional  military  poUcy  of  the  United 
States  contemplates  a  small  regular  army  as  a 
nucleus  in  time  of  peace  for  a  great  army  of 
citizen  soldiers  as  the  ultimate  force  in  time  of 
war. 

This  policy,  based  upon  a  theory  declared  by 
economists,  statesmen,  and  military  experts  to 
be  sound,  both  economically  and  politically, 
really  dates  back  to  the  days  following  the 
Revolution.  The  foundation  of  our  existing 
army  was  laid  in  the  Act  of  September  29, 
1789,  which  recognized  an  "estabhshment  for 
the  troops  in  the  service  of  the  United  States" 

57 


ARE  WE  READY? 

and  required  all  oflSeers  and  men  in  such  an 
establishment  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance. 

The  first  general  organization  of  the  army 
under  the  Constitution  took  place  under  the 
Act  of  April  30,  1790,  which  fixed  the  strength 
of  non-commissioned  oflScers  and  privates  at 
1216,  enlisted  for  a  term  of  three  years. 

The  Miami  expedition  painfully  demon- 
strated the  ineflBciency  of  so  small  an  estab- 
lishment, and  on  March  3,  1791,  another  regi- 
ment was  added  with  a  strength  of  912  men. 
St.  Clair's  defeat  was  followed  in  1792  by  an 
act  which  provided  for  three  additional  regi- 
ments of  infantry  and  for  filling  the  battalion 
of  artillery  and  the  two  existing  regiments  of 
infantry  then  in  service  to  the  legal  maximum. 

There  is  not  space  here  to  trace  the  growth 
of  this  little  force  into  the  present  organization 
of  the  regular  army.  Through  the  record  of 
our  military  legislation,  however,  there  runs 
distinctly  the  policy  of  restricting  the  regular 
force  of  the  United  States  to  the  smallest  pro- 
portions consistent  with  efficiency  and  the 
national  safety.   Through  all  the  records  runs 

58 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 

also  that  assumption  that  in  time  of  war  the 
small  peace  establishment  shall  be  nothing 
more  than  the  nucleus  for  great  forces  of  citizen 
soldiery. 

How  nearly  we  come  to  satisfactory  appli- 
cation of  our  traditional  policy  in  the  matter  of 
combination  of  professional  fighting  men  and 
citizen  soldiers  will  be  taken  up  in  succeeding 
chapters. 

It  would  appear  to  a  man  up  a  tree  that,  if 
the  nation  should  suddenly  be  confronted  by 
war,  and  should  depend  for  its  safety  upon  a 
trained  military  nucleus  intended  to  expand 
into  a  great  defensive  force,  that  nucleus  is  a 
very  important  thing. 

Whether  such  a  view  is  or  is  not  correct,  it  is 
a  fact  that  every  year  we  spend  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  ninety  million  dollars  for  less  than 
ninety  thousand  men  and  oflScers  in  our  regular 
army. 

Ninety  million  dollars  for  ninety  thousand 
soldiers  is  more  —  per  head  —  than  any  other 
nation  in  the  world  pays  for  its  army  —  from 
two  to  five  times  more.    (You  can  figure  the 

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ARE  WE  READY? 

average  cost  of  a  United  States  regular,  officer 
and  private,  anywhere  from  eight  hundred  to 
two  thousand  dollars  a  year,  according  to  what 
you  put  in  or  take  out  of  the  War  Department 
figures.  If,  for  example,  you  charge  the  cost  of 
building  the  Panama  Canal  and  the  River  and 
Harbor  Pork  Barrel,  the  cost  tag  on  your  sol- 
dier will  be  away  over  a  thousand  dollars.  But 
if  you  figure  only  what  goes  into  his  actual 
fighting  ability,  the  average  will  be  close  to  a 
thousand.) 

To  be  sure,  the  difference  between  the  cost 
of  our  soldier  and  the  cost  of  the  soldier  of  other 
first-class  nations  can  be  charged  largely, 
though  not  by  any  means  wholly,  to  higher 
pay,  higher  cost  of  food,  clothing,  and  other 
necessities  that  go  into  the  soldier's  mainten- 
ance, and  the  higher  cost  of  his  transportation. 

But  even  if  the  average  cost  of  our  soldier 
were  not  greater  than  that  of  the  soldier  of 
other  great  powers,  there  is  still  the  fact  that 
against  the  ninety  thousand  trained  nien  of  our 
regular  army  which  we  could  immediately  put 
into  the  field  in  time  of  war,  including  the 

60 


J 


R 


Copyright,  i'ndericootl  &■  Vmienrood 

OUR  THOUSAND-DOLLAR  SOLDIER 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 

thirty  or  forty  thousand  regulars  we  could 
promptly  assemble  on  the  continent,  Germany, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  present  war,  had  four 
milUon  trained  men  ready,  and  France  nearly 
that  many. 

As  a  business  proposition,  unless  we  admit 
that  we  are  colossal  spendthrifts,  the  conclu- 
sion has  to  be  either  that  our  theories  of  the 
home  defense  —  or  their  apphcation  —  are  all 
wrong,  or  that  there  are  prodigious  leaks 
somewhere. 

The  truth  of  it  is  that  our  theories  are  all 
right;  that  our  application  of  them  is  all  wrong; 
and  that,  for  a  nation  with  a  reputation  for 
hard-headed  business  sense,  there  are  the  most 
astonishing  leaks. 

The  problem  of  the  organization  of  our  regu- 
lar army  has  both  a  dynamic  and  a  political 
aspect.  It  has  been  said  that  battles  may  be 
won  and  lost  in  the  dome  of  the  Capitol  as  well 
as  on  the  field  of  battle.  The  military  man  may 
be  at  fault  in  proposing  measures  for  adequate 
defense  that  would  be  intolerable  to  the  Ameri- 
can citizen,  while  the  political  expert  may  pro- 

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ARE  WE  READY? 

pose  systems  and  schemes  of  organization 
which  may  be  ridiculously  impracticable  and 
ineffective. 

The  ultimate  test,  of  course,  is  the  capa- 
city of  the  armed  body  to  exert  a  superior  mil- 
itary force  in  time  to  meet  successfully  any 
hostile  pressure  that  is  brought  to  bear  against 
it. 

The  numerical  strength  of  our  standing 
army  is  fixed  at  100,000  men  and  oflBcers. 

On  June  30,  1914,  according  to  the  report  of 
the  Secretary  of  War,  its  actual  strength  was 
4701  officers,  and  87,781  men,  including  3809 
men  in  the  Quartermaster  Corps,  and  4055 
men  in  the  Hospital  Corps.  These  figures  rep- 
resent the  peace  footing  of  the  United  States 
Army.  In  time  of  war,  an  infantry  company 
now  having  65  men,  should  have  150  men;  a 
cavalry  troop,  which  now  has  71  men,  should 
have  100  men;  an  artillery  battery,  with  a  pres- 
ent strength  of  133  men,  should  have  190  men. 
No  provision  in  the  way  of  reserve  strength 
has  been  provided  for  filling  out  our  army  from 
its  peace  to  its  war  propositions.  These  forces 


I 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 

are,  and  so  long  as  our  responsibilities  outside 
the  continental  limits  of  the  United  States 
continue,  must  be  divided  into  two  parts: 
troops  on  service  beyond  the  territorial  hmits, 
and  troops  on  service  within  the  territorial 
limits.  At  present  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  main- 
tain forces  in  the  Philippines,  Panama,  Oahu, 
Alaska,  Guantanamo,  and  Porto  Rico. 

Increasing  responsibilities  outside  the  conti- 
nental limits  have  necessitated  distribution  of 
our  mobile  forces  approximately  in  the  follow- 
ing manner:  — 

In  the  Philippines,  3f  regiments  infantry,  2  regi- 
ments cavalry,  1  regiment  field  artillery,  2  com- 
panies engineers,  11  companies  coast  artillery 
(aggregate  strength  9572).  In  the  Hawaiian  Is- 
lands, 3  regiments  infantry,  1  regiment  cavalry,  1 
regiment  field  artillery,  1  company  engineers,  8 
companies  coast  artillery  (aggregate  strength, 
8195).  In  the  Canal  Zone,  1  regiment  infantry,  3 
companies  coast  artillery  (aggregate  strength, 
2179).  In  China,  2  battalions  infantry  (aggregate 
strength,  849).  In  Alaska,  1  regiment  infantry, 
(aggregate  strength,  862).  In  Porto  Rico,  a  2-bat- 
talion  regiment  infantry  (strength,  707).  In  United 
States,   17    regiments  infantry,    11^1  regiments 


ARE  WE  READY? 

cavalry,  3j  regiments  field  artillery,  2  battalions 
engineers,  148  companies  coast  artillery  (aggregate 
strength,  68,669).  Troops  en  route  and  officers  at 
other  foreign  stations,  1449. 

And  that  is  not  all.  In  the  near  future  it  is 
going  to  be  necessary  to  take  from  the  United 
States  and  put  in  the  Philippines  1950  men  of 
the  coast  artillery;  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 
6380  men,  including  infantry,  field  artillery, 
and  coast  artillery;  and  along  the  Panama 
Canal,  4774  men,  including  infantry,  cavalry, 
field  artillery,  engineers,  and  coast  artillery. 
When  the  necessary  distributions  are  made, 
we  shall  have  left  within  the  continental  hmits 
of  the  United  States,  12,610  coast  artillery 
troops,  and  28,692  mobile  troops.  This  whole 
force  is  a  little  more  than  twice  the  size  of 
the  police  force  of  the  City  of  New  York. 

All  of  those  groups  stationed  in  foreign  pos- 
sessions, depend  upon  communication  by  sea 
with  the  central  government.  In  time  of  war, 
therefore,  they  would  have  to  be  self-support- 
ing until  the  navy  should  have  secured  com- 
mand of  the  sea.  Until  naval  supremacy  should 

64 


Hf       THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 

be  decided,  there  would  be  no  opportunity  for 
their  expansion. 

The  contrary  is  the  case  with  the  troops 
within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  United 
States.  Theoretically,  our  troops  at  home, 
while  being  maintained  on  a  plan  to  insure  high- 
est eflSciency  together  with  maximum  mobility, 
should  have  the  backing  of  a  condition  which 
would  make  certain  speedy  and  orderly  expan- 
sion from  the  body  of  the  citizenship  into  what- 
ever force  an  emergency  might  demand. 

Our  regular  army,  while  serving  as  a  na- 
tional poHce  force,  for  administration  and  for 
instruction  and  training  of  citizen  forces,  should 
be  able,  in  time  of  sudden  need,  to  do  for 
the  nation  what  the  Belgian  army  did  for  the 
Allies  —  to  serve  as  the  line  of  immediate 
defense,  the  stopgap  to  provide  the  few  vital 
days  of  assembling  a  great  defensive  force  of 
citizens. 

With  ninety  milhon  dollars  to  spend,  it  would 
seem  that  we  should  be  able  to  provide  our- 
selves with  a  regular  army  which  would  be  the 
last  word  in  efficiency.   Yet  if  the  need  came 

65 


ARE  WE  READY? 

to-night,  as  has  been  shown,  we  could  put  into 
the  field  a  mobile  force  of  a  scant  32,000  men, 
indifferently  equipped  in  artillery  and  with  a 
supply  of  artillery  ammunition  hardly  suJ05- 
cient  for  a  day's  engagement. 

Behind  this  condition  are  wholly  avoidable 
eflBciency  wastes  and  money  wastes.  The 
necessity  of  distributing  troops  in  widely  sep- 
arated places  and  at  great  distances,  the  con- 
sequent cost  of  transportation  of  men,  equip- 
ment, and  supplies,  with  the  added  necessity, 
because  of  climatic  conditions,  of  frequent 
changes  of  troops  —  all  are  highly  expensive, 
and  operate  against  quick  mobilization.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  there  is  a  greater  or  less  degree 
of  waste  in  the  routine  of  handling  the  admin- 
istration and  distribution  of  our  regular  forces; 
but  since  measures  of  economy  and  efficiency 
in  these  matters  do  not  threaten  to  deprive 
any  budding  or  blossomed  statesman  of  his 
seat  in  Senate  or  House,  constant  progress  is 
being  made  toward  putting  technical  detail 
upon  a  thoroughly  economic  basis. 

The  big  leak  is  the  army  post. 
66 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  P0CEI:T 

The  army-post  graft  is  first  cousin  to  the 
navy-yard  graft. 

Genuinely  patriotic  American  voters  are 
really  the  grafters.  Their  representatives  in 
Congress  are  the  instruments. 

The  army  post  has  become  a  big  leak,  ri- 
diculously apparent  and  wholly  avoidable,  by 
reason  of  the  desire  of  poUticians  in  Congress 
to  please  a  very  limited  portion  of  the  folks 
who  put  them  there,  and  to  lend  color  to  their 
** district  loyalty"  campaign  utterances  at 
what  time  they  desire  to  be  put  there  again. 

Once  we  had  big  Indian  troubles  —  people 
being  terrorized,  and  scalped,  and  killed,  and 
tortured  in  a  lot  of  places.  Now  a  murder  by 
some  whiskey-crazed  redskin  gets  a  "scare- 
head"  in  our  metropoUtan  dailies. 

Once  we  estabUshed  many  rough  garrisons 
whose  chief  function  was  to  protect  white  peo- 
ple from  Indians.  Now  we  have  many  elabo- 
rate army  posts  whose  chief  function  is  to  make 
the  green  grass  grow  all  around.  They  represent 
a  great  investment,  on  which  no  interest  accrues ; 
and  they  are  very  expensive  to  maintain. 

67 


ARE  WE  READY? 

Back  in  1911,  along  toward  the  close  of  the 
year,  a  Secretary  of  War,  in  his  report  to  the 
President,  made  this  statement:  — 

The  mobile  army  is  distributed  among  forty- 
nine  posts  in  twenty-four  States  and  Territories. 
Nearly  all  of  these  posts  have  been  located  in  their 
present  situations  for  reasons  which  are  now  totally 
obsolete  or  which  were  from  the  beginning  purely 
local.  .  .  .  Comparatively  few  of  them  are  in  posi- 
tions suited  to  meet  the  strategic  needs  of  national 
action  or  defense.  .  .  .  The  posts  have  universally 
been  constructed  upon  a  plan  which  involves  a  maxi- 
mum initial  cost  of  construction  and  a  maximum 
cost  of  maintenance  both  in  money  and  men. 

Now  this  Secretary  of  War  —  it  was  Henry 
L.  Stimson  —  chanced  to  be  a  Republican.  So, 
in  accordance  with  our  time-honored  political 
traditions,  a  Democratic  House  started  after 
him,  passing  a  resolution  demanding  to  know 
what  he  meant,  if,  by  chance,  he  meant  any- 
thing. 

Some  observers  of  the  period  will  tell  you 
that  that  House  resolution  was  intended  to 
scare  the  Secretary  of  War  away  from  the 
army  posts.    However  that  may  be,  it  is  no 

68 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 

secret  that  he  was  besieged  by  Senators  and 
Congressmen,  who,  in  their  great  wisdom  and 
long  experience  in  such  matters,  m-ged  him 
against  the  folly  of  a  reply,  begging  that  if  he 
were  really  bent  on  making  a  chump  of  him- 
self, he  would  refrain  from  dragging  in  posts 
in  their  particular  neck  of  the  woods.  It  is 
no  secret,  either,  that  he  told  them  all:  "You 
have  asked  for  facts;  now  you  are  going  to  get 
facts"  —  or  words  to  that  effect. 

It  is  tradition  that  if  you  wish  to  hide  any- 
thing from  the  American  people,  the  best  place 
to  put  it  is  in  an  official  report.  It  is  too  bad; 
for  the  official  accounts  of  what  followed  are 
most  interesting. 

To  the  demand  that  he  give  "the  names  of 
all  army  posts  which  have  been  located  in  their 
present  situations  for  reasons  which  are  now 
totally  obsolete,"  Stimson  replied  by  calling 
the  roll.  He  named  Fort  Apache,  Arizona; 
Boise  Barracks,  Idaho;  Fort  Clark,  Texas; 
Fort  D.  A.  Russell,  Wyoming;  Fort  Douglas, 
Utah;  Fort  Huachuca,  Arizona;  Fort  Leaven- 
worth, Kansas;  Fort  Mackenzie,  Wyoming; 

69 


ARE  WE  READY? 

Fort  Meade,  South  Dakota;  Fort  Missoula, 

Montana;    Fort   Robinson,    Nebraska;   Fort 

Riley,  Kansas;  Fort  Sill,  Oklahoma;  Fort  Snell- 

ing,  Minnesota. 

When  the  Secretary  of  War  came  to  the 

straight  congressional  demand  that  he  declare 

the  intentions  of  the  War  Department  as  to 

legislation  it  would  urge,  he  came  back  with 

straight  talk.  He  said  —  what  to-day  military 

experts  agree  in  —  that 

K  the  mobile  army  is  to  be  efficient  its  distribu- 
tion must  meet  the  following  requirements :  — 

1.  It  must  be  favorable  for  the  tactical  training 
of  the  three  arms  combined  (infantry,  cavalry,  and 
field  artillery).  m 

2.  It  must  be  favorable  for  the  rapid  concentra- 
tion of  the  army  upon  our  northern  or  southern 
frontier,  or  upon  our  eastern  or  western  seaboard. 

3.  It  must  favor  the  best  use  of  the  army  as  a 
model  for  the  general  military  training  of  the  Na- 
tional Guard. 

4.  It  must  favor  the  use  of  the  Regular  Army  as 
a  nucleus  for  the  war  organization  of  the  National 
Guard  and  such  volunteer  forces  as  Congress  may 
authorize  to  meet  any  possible  military  emergency. 

5.  The  distribution  must  favor  economical  ad- 
ministration with  the  view  of  developing  the  maxi- 

70 


m 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 

mum  return  for  the  money  appropriated  for  mili- 
tary purposes. 

6.  The  distribution  must  permit  a  peace  organ- 
ization which  will  also  be  effective  in  war;  that  is, 
an  organization  which  will  permit  a  prompt  expan- 
sion in  time  of  war  by  means  of  a  system  of  reserve. 

The  conditions  back  of  the  recommendations 
made  in  1911  have  not  materially  changed. 
The  fact  that  close  to  $6,000,000  could  be  saved 
the  American  people  annually  by  the  compara- 
tively simple  process  of  the  concentration  and 
redistribution  of  regular  troops  is  still  a  fact. 

Yet  only  four  minor  posts  of  the  forty-nine 
have  been  abandoned.  The  United  States 
Army,  what  of  it  is  not  in  the  Philippines, 
Panama,  Oahu,  Alaska,  Guantanamo,  and 
Porto  Rico,  is  still  scattered  in  little  groups 
averaging  not  more  than  six  hundred  men  each 
and  without  a  possibility  of  getting  together 
frequently  for  effective  tactical  training. 

Take  Fort  D.  A.  Russell,  Wyoming,  as  an 
example.  It  cost  about  $5,000,000  to  build 
Fort  D.  A.  Russell.  The  soldiers  stationed  there 
are,  for  the  most  part,  recruited  in  New  York; 

71 


ARE  WE  READY? 

they  are  fed  from  the  Mississippi  Valley,  clothed 
from  New  York,  and  when  they  are  discharged, 
they  are  returned  to  New  York  at  our  expense. 
We  think  we  are  a  mighty  business-like  nation. 
Yet  a  nice  little  padded  coop  would  likely  be 
recommended  for  any  one  of  us  who  would 
build  a  costly  factory  at  Steubenville,  Ohio, 
and  persist  in  a  poUcy  of  frequently  paying 
transportation  to  and  from  New  York  of  la- 
borers to  run  it  on  a  plan  that  would  mean 
maximum  expense  and  minimum  profit. 

The  reasons  for  the  army-post  waste  are  the 
same  as  they  have  been  for  twenty  years :  Army 
leaders  grown  old  under  the  scattered  post  sys- 
tem; the  tradition  that  a  post  commander  to 
get  favorable  mention  must  maintain  the 
"beautiful  park"  idea,  with  its  extensive  roads, 
walks,  gardens,  lawns,  and  independent  and 
costly  systems  of  lighting,  water,  and  sewage; 
the  argument  that  abandonment  would  mean 
throwing  away  immense  sums  already  in- 
vested; and  finally,  the  influence  of  affected 
communities,  exerted  through  members  of 
Congress  and  backed  by  pleas  ranging  from 

72 


d 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 

"There  are  forty  thousand  Indians  near  this 
point"  to  "The  people  of  this  community  are 
peaceful,  law-abiding,  hospitable  and  patriotic"; 
and  the  plaint  of  the  legislator  himself  that 
"We  would  find  it  diflScult  to  square  ourselves 
with  our  constituency  if  our  promises  are  not 
made  good."  The  character  and  magnitude  of 
the  protest  that  goes  up  whenever  an  army 
post  is  threatened  can  be  found  by  anyone 
who  will  go  through  the  records. 

So,  year  after  year,  Congressmen  and  Sena- 
tors have  heard  from  home.  They  have  played 
politics  and  we  have  our  useless  and  wasteful 
posts. 

There  has  been  much  muck-raking  of  mem- 
bers of  Congress  over  army-post  expenditures, 
much  heated  protest  against  log-rolling  in  the 
interest  of  individual  communities.  Yet  the 
further  one  gets  into  the  army-post  records, 
the  clearer  it  becomes  that  if  muck-raking  of 
Senators  and  Congressmen  is  to  be  undertaken 
it  will  be  necessary  to  muck-rake  a  very  large 
majority  of  both  houses. 

73 


ARE  WE  READY? 

And  right  there  is  a  great  national  weakness. 

They  all  do  it. 

Once  in  a  while  you  come  upon  some  one 
who  did  n't  do  it;  and  a  few  pages  on  you  find 
that  he  did  n't  last  long. 

When  the  man  whom  we  send  to  represent 
us  in  Congress  is  called  upon  to  decide  ques- 
tions in  connection  with  an  inland  waterway 
or  a  harbor,  he  puts  the  consideration  of  his 
local  constituency  first;  when  tariff  questions 
arise  and  are  to  be  legislated  upon,  he  hears 
from  back  home  and  acts  accordingly;  when 
the  abandonment  of  an  obsolete,  useless,  and 
wasteful  army  post  is  advocated,  he  hears  from 
the  comparatively  small  local  community 
affected,  and  fights  it.  He  wants  to  stay  in 
Congress  and  needs  votes  to  keep  him  there. 

It  is  n't  his  fault.  It  is  our  fault.  Rather  it 
is  the  fault  of  our  system.  So  long  as  in  casting 
our  vote  we  place  our  home  town,  our  home 
county,  or  our  home  State  above  the  interest 
of  the  nation,  and  cling  to  the  tradition  that 
our  executive  officers  have  no  business  in  the 
halls  of  Congress,  we  are  not  going  to  be  justi- 

74 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 

fied  in  holding  our  representatives  to  account  if 
they  continue  to  throw  away  our  money. 

A  candidate  for  the  national  legislature  in  a 
district  where  the  vote  is  close  cannot  declare 
that  he  places  the  welfare  of  the  nation  above 
the  interests  of  his  district  and  win  the  place. 
We  voters  have  proven  it  time  and  again. 
Kent,  of  California,  to  be  sure,  is  one  notable 
exception  now  in  Congress.  PoUtically  he  is  a 
freak.  He  holds  his  place  not  by  reason  of  but 
in  spite  of  his  patriotic  utterances. 

It  would  be  a  fine  thing  if  we  could  bring  our- 
selves to  send  to  Congress  men  who  would  be 
free  to  exercise  a  real  executive  abiUty,  free  to 
consider  the  interest  of  the  nation  first. 

The  millennium  is  going  to  be  a  fine  thing, 
too.  Just  now,  human  nature  stands  in  the 
way  of  both.  We  can't  change  that  by  writing 
pieces  for  the  paper.  But  we  can,  if  we  want, 
give  our  representatives  in  Congress  a  chance 
to  hear  the  views  of  experts  who  have  no  local 
obligations  and  whose  whole  service  is  in  the 
interest  of  the  nation. 

The  proposition  that  our  executives  and  our 
75 


ARE  WE  READY? 

legislators  have  no  business  to  sit  down  and 
deliberate  together  has  become  almost  a  reli- 
gion with  us,  since  it  was  propounded  by  Mon- 
tesquieu back  in  1730.  There  is  no  place  here 
for  an  argument  as  to  whether  this  is  as  it 
should  be.  It  is  a  fact,  though,  that  this  idea 
has  been  abandoned  by  Great  Britain  and  by 
France  and  that  it  has  no  place  in  the  Govern- 
ment of  Switzerland. 

By  statute,  or  by  the  simpler  process  of  reso- 
lution, we  can,  if  we  want,  give  the  President 
the  right  to  appear  on  the  floor  of  either  house 
and  to  say  what  he  thinks  should  be  said  with- 
out exposing  himself  to  gibes  and  the  accusa- 
tion that  he  is  making  a  "grand-stand  play." 
By  the  same  process  we  can  give  the  same 
opportunity  to  each  member  of  the  Cabinet. 

If  we  want  to,  we  can  go  even  further  than 
this.  We  can  give  the  President  the  right  to 
introduce  bills;  to  prepare  and  introduce  a 
budget  containing  estimates  of  the  expenses 
of  the  Government  for  a  coming  year;  and  we 
can  give  Cabinet  members  the  right  to  defend 
on  the  floor  of  either  house  the  portions  of 

76 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 

the  President's  budget  involving  their  depart- 
ments. 

We  could,  of  course,  even  go  further,  and 
prohibit  the  addition  of  items  to  the  Executive 
budget  without  the  concurrence  of  the  Presi- 
dent and  Congress. 

Whether  we  will  want  to  do  all  this,  or  any 
part  of  it,  or  none  of  it,  we  cannot  dodge  the 
fact  that  we  are  wasting  milUons  on  our  army. 

To  stop  this  waste  and  to  secure  maximum 
efficiency,  military  experts  agree  that  the  first 
step  should  be  legislation  that  would  concen- 
trate the  army  in  eight  large  posts  of  approxi- 
mately equal  size  and  located  where  transpor- 
tation and  supply  would  be  most  economic. 

The  following  grouping  of  detachments  of 
all  arms  is  being  advocated  by  our  ablest  miU- 
tary  men:  — 

Two  or  three  groups  covering  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  on  the  line  between  the  St.  Lawrence 
and  Atlanta. 

Two,  possibly  three,  groups  covering  the 
Pacific  seaboard,  on  the  Une  between  Puget 
Sound  and  Los  Angeles. 

77 


ARE  WE  READY? 

Two  groups  between  the  Great  Lakes  and 
the  Rio  Grande,  which  would  serve  as  first 
reserve  and  which  would  supply  central  organ- 
izations around  which  could  be  built  organiza- 
tions of  the  National  Guard,  and,  in  time  of 
war,  volunteer  forces  in  the  interior  of  the 
continent. 

It  is  estimated  that  by  this  means  alone  a 
total  yearly  saving  of  more  than  $5,500,000 
would  be  accomplished.  That  very  large  sums 
are  now  invested  in  the  scattered  posts  is  true. 
The  real  estate  occupied  by  these  posts  is  valu- 
able. It  is  the  judgment,  however,  of  men  who 
have  spent  years  on  our  military  problems  that 
it  should  be  possible  to  refund  this  investment 
and  largely  to  finance  the  redistribution  of  the 
army  from  moneys  made  available  through  the 
sale  of  government  property  which  is  no  longer 
needed  for  military  purposes.  These  men  argue 
that  there  is  no  reason  why  the  United  States 
Government  should  not  adopt  the  policy  of  the 
wise  business  man  who  tears  down  an  anti- 
quated building,  representing  a  considerable 
original  investment,  in  order  to  make  room  for 

78 


L 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 

a  much  more  economical  and  profitable 
structure. 

There  is  becoming  more  and  more  evident  a 
growing  conviction  that  we  should  have  some- 
thing more  than  our  regular  army  and  our 
incomplete  militia  organizations.  It  is  being 
asserted  with  increasing  frequency  that  we 
should  have  a  citizen  force  wholly  adequate  to 
protect  the  nation  in  any  emergency,  and  that 
we  can  have  such  a  force  without  giving  ground 
an  inch  on  our  traditions  and  our  institutions. 

It  is  not  so  much  that  the  application  of  our 
military  theories  has  been  all  wrong,  as  stated 
in  a  previous  paragraph,  as  it  is  that  there  has 
been  scarcely  any  application  at  all. 

It  has  been  shown  that  in  a  time  of  desperate 
necessity  we  could,  perhaps  within  six  weeks, 
put  into  the  field  a  force  of  not  more  than 
150,000  men  made  up,  for  the  most  part,  of 
regulars  and  groups  of  militia  organized  with- 
out uniformity,  incompletely  trained,  short  of 
artillery,  and  practically  without  the  necessary 
auxiHary  arms  of  the  service.  That  pitifully 
small  force  would  represent  about  all  that  we 

79 


ARE  WE  READY? 

have  done  toward  applying  the  pohcy  laid 
down  in  the  days  of  the  Revolution.  We 
should  have  no  officers  for  training  new  levies, 
and  no  means  for  organizing  and  handling  the 
citizens  who  might  enlist. 

The  time  necessary  for  the  training  of  volun- 
teer forces  depends  upon  whether  or  not  there 
are  trained  instructors  available.  With  trained 
officers  at  hand,  and  with  the  necessary  sup- 
plies, implements,  and  equipment  in  reserve, 
bodies  of  raw  recruits  could  probably  be  trans- 
formed into  efficient  fighting  groups  within  six 
months. 

But  in  a  situation,  such  as  we  have  to-day, 
where  all  officers  available  would  be  hardly 
sufficient  for  the  regular  army  and  the  militia 
organization,  and  where  the  leaders  and  the 
men  comprising  volunteer  forces  would  have  to 
stumble  toward  efficiency  through  the  desper- 
ate and  costly  school  of  experience  in  actual 
battle,  months,  even  years,  and  thousands  of 
lives  needlessly  wasted,  would  be  the  expendi- 
ture required  to  transform  the  inexperienced 
soldiers  into  efficient,  defensive  units. 

80 


. 


THE  HOLE  IN  OUR  POCKET 


Probably  there  was  never  a  greater  demon- 
stration of  this  than  during  the  Civil  War. 
Between  1861  and  1865,  two  extemporized 
armies  gradually  developed  while  in  conflict. 

In  1861  both  officers  and  men  were  unready 
for  the  tasks  demanded  of  them.  There  was 
lack  of  cohesion  between  the  units  making  up 
regiments  and  armies,  and  lack  of  cooperation 
between  officers.  At  Bull  Run,  one  force  was 
disorganized  by  defeat,  the  other  by  victory, 
and  it  was  not  until  1863  that  the  armies  could 
be  regarded  as  complete  and  effective  mili- 
tary organizations.  Had  one  or  the  other  of 
the  armies  been  made  up  of  men  previously 
trained,  it  is  the  opinion  of  those  who  have 
given  close  study  to  that  war  that  it  would 
have  been  speedily  ended. 

The  private  cannot  become  a  good  private 
until  his  captain  is  a  good  captain.  The  captain 
cannot  become  a  good  captain  until  his  colo- 
nel is  a  good  colonel.  And  so  it  goes.  Training 
of  officers  and  men  in  actual  conflict,  without 
any  preliminary  training  whatever,  must  be 
appalUngly  wasteful  in  both  money  and  men. 

81 


ARE  WE  READY? 

Under  present  conditions  of  warfare,  it  is 
hardly  to  be  imagined  that  any  first-class  na- 
tion would  attack  us  by  land  with  anything 
but  trained  forces.  Yet  we  have  devised  no 
means  of  fiUing  out  our  professional  organiza- 
tion to  large  proportions  in  time  of  need. 

The  big  hole  in  the  pocket  where  we  carry 
our  army  funds,  of  course,  is  the  lack  of  any 
regular  system  of  reserve.  The  professional 
soldier,  the  fighter  who  enters  the  army  for  a 
living,  is  the  most  expensive  unit  of  defense  a 
nation  can  have.  The  citizen  soldier,  who  is 
called  to  the  colors  only  in  time  of  war,  or  for 
short  periods  of  training,  is  the  cheapest.  A 
reasonable  combination  of  the  professional  and 
the  citizen  soldier,  in  accordance  with  the  es- 
tabUshed  military  policy  of  the  United  States, 
would  give  us,  for  our  ninety  millions,  a  defen- 
sive strength  that  would  compare  not  imfavor- 
ably  with  that  of  any  first-class  nation. 


CHAPTER  V 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 

One  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  eflfect  here  at 
home  of  the  upheaval  in  Europe  during  the 
early  months  of  the  war  was  a  rapidly  devel- 
oped belief  in  some  quarters  that  matters  per- 
taining to  our  own  miUtary  fitness  should  not 
be  discussed  in  polite  society.  We  were  warned 
time  and  again  that  to  talk  frankly  among 
ourselves  on  this  subject  is  an  international 
indehcacy,  and  may  not  only  shock  some 
other  higher  up  among  the  nations,  but  will 
also  weaken  our  position  as  the  world's  great 
example  of  peace,  purity,  piety,  and  prosperity, 
when  the  day  arrives  when  we  shall  venture  to 
take  those  awful,  barbarous  foreign  cut-throat 
nations  by  the  hands,  or  hind  legs,  and  lead 
them,  or  drag  them,  into  ways  of  righteousness. 

No  doubt,  those  of  us  who  have  subscribed 
to  this  sort  of  propaganda,  should  we  discover 
that  that  horrible,  common  brawl  between 

83 


ARE  WE  READY? 

that  low-down  man  and  his  wife  next  door  all 
came  about  because  the  old  man  found  a  cock- 
roach in  his  soup,  would  immediately  throw  all 
our  own  bug  exterminators,  our  soup  tureens, 
and  ladles  into  the  garbage  can,  for  fear  that 
their  presence  in  our  possession  might  interfere 
with  our  showing  our  quarreling  neighbors  how 
silly  it  is  to  start  a  fight  over  cockroaches  and 
soup. 

It  used  to  be  believed  that  to  say  "limb" 
when  "leg"  was  meant  kept  boys  and  girls  from 
being  led  into  wickedness.  As  our  notions  have 
broadened,  we  have  come  more  and  more  to 
call  things  by  their  right  names.  Right  now, 
we  are  the  spectators  of  a  frightful  war,  be- 
tween highly  cultured  peoples.  To  pull  the 
long  "better-than-thou"  face  of  purity  and 
piety  is  rank  hypocrisy,  and  every  Tom,  Dick, 
and  Harry  of  us  knows  it.  There  is  no  "limb" 
about  it.  It  is  plain  "leg." 

We  are  notorious  in  our  national  tendency  to 
go  up  and  down  the  world  with  a  very  discern- 
ible chip  on  our  shoulder.  We  do  not  hesitate, 
or  at  least  we  have  not  hesitated  in  the  past, 

84 


■n^ 


>^ 


I 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 

to  meddle  in  the  aflfairs  of  other  nations,  —  of 
Russia,  or  China,  or  Japan,  —  and  we  get 
"sassy"  as  can  be  the  instant  there  is  the  faint- 
est suggestion  that  an  outsider  might,  in  the 
remotest  possibiUty,  resent  our  interference 
or  tread  on  our  pet  poUtical,  commercial,  or 
industrial  corns. 

We  are  a  healthy  and  very  courageous  sort 
of  folk,  mighty  willing  to  fight  if  we  have  to. 
Yet  some  of  us  insist,  even  when  people  are 
fighting  to  the  death  all  around  us,  and  it  has 
been  frightfully  demonstrated  that  war  can  no 
longer  be  regarded  only  as  a  thing  of  the  bar- 
barous past,  that  it  is  harmful  and  indelicate 
to  inquire  what,  if  anything,  we  tote  in  our 
national  hip  pocket. 

One  of  our  blossoming  statesmen,  boaster 
of  a  greater  stock  of  "clarion  tones"  than  of 
information,  is  quoted  as  having  dismissed  the 
whole  subject  of  our  preparedness  to  defend 
ourselves  in  the  following  "ringing  words": 
"Back  of  our  splendid  regular  army  is  our 
miUtia;  and  back  of  our  militia  is  the  sturdy, 
glorious  manhood  of  the  nation." 

85 


ARE  WE  READY? 

The  facts  leave  no  room  for  doubt  that 
somebody  should  have  led  the  gentleman  ten- 
derly away  and  explained  to  him  that  the  regu- 
lar army  really  is  not  splendid;  and  that  even 
if  it  were,  the  militia  should  not  be  back  of  it; 
and  have  advised  him  to  read  George  Wash- 
ington on  the  subject  of  the  value  of  sturdy, 
untrained  citizens  in  time  of  war. 

In  the  opinion  of  every  mihtary  expert  who 
has  made  public  his  views  on  the  subject  from 
the  time  of  Washington  to  the  present,  the 
militia  should  not  be  thought  of  as  being  back 
of  the  regular  army,  but  one  with  the  regular 
army.  The  fact  that  we  have  not  carried  out 
the  fundamental  principle  of  our  military  pol- 
icy, that  of  bringing  the  professional  and  the 
citizen  soldiery  into  uniformity  of  organiza- 
tion, equipment,  and  training,  is  one  of  our 
two  great  mihtary  weaknesses.  The  other  one 
is  our  total  lack  of  reserve  strength,  a  subject 
which  will  be  taken  up  further  on.  The  lack 
of  uniformity  between  the  militia  and  the  regu- 
lar army  can  be  charged  almost  entirely  to  a 
failure  to  build  up  an  efficient  cooperation  be- 

86 


4 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 

tween  the  individual  States  and  the  Federal 
Government.  No  doubt  this  failure  is  due  en- 
tirely to  thoughtlessness  and  an  incomplete  re- 
alization of  the  peril  that  Hes  in  this  shpshod 
method  of  applying  the  principles  of  our  mili- 
tary theories. 

Washington  sounded  a  warning  against  just 
such  a  condition  at  the  close  of  the  Revolution. 
Back  of  what  he  said  were  years  of  bitter  expe- 
rience. In  taking  leave  of  the  Governors  of  the 
States  before  resigning  his  commission,  writ- 
ing with  the  experience  of  a  soldier  and  with 
the  foresight  of  the  real  statesman,  he  said 
this:  — 

There  are  four  things,  which  I  humbly  conceive, 
are  essential  to  the  well-being,  I  may  even  venture 
to  say,  to  the  existence  of  the  United  States,  as  an 
independent  power. 

First.  An  indissoluble  imion  of  the  States  under 
one  federal  head; 

Second.  A  sacred  regard  to  public  justice; 

Third.  The  adoption  of  a  proper  peace  establish- 
ment; and 

Fourth.  The  prevalence  of  that  pacific  and 
friendly  disposition  among  the  people  of  the  United 

87 


ARE  WE  READY? 

States,  which  will  induce  them  to  forget  their  local 
prejudices  and  policies;  to  make  those  mutual  con- 
cessions which  are  requisite  to  the  general  pros- 
perity; and  in  some  instances,  to  sacrifice  their 
individual  advantages  to  the  interest  of  the  com- 
munity. .  .  . 

It  is  necessary  to  say  but  a  few  words  on  the 
third  topic  which  was  proposed,  and  which  regards 
particularly  the  defense  of  the  Republic;  as  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  Congress  will  recommend 
a  proper  peace  establishment  for  the  United  States, 
in  which  a  due  attention  will  be  paid  to  the  impor- 
tance of  placing  the  militia  of  the  Union  upon  a 
regular  and  respectable  footing.  If  this  should  be 
the  case,  I  would  beg  leave  to  urge  the  great  advan- 
tage of  it  in  the  strongest  terms.  The  militia  of 
this  country  must  be  considered  as  the  palladium 
of  our  security,  and  the  first  effectual  resort  in  case 
of  hostility.  It  is  essential,  therefore,  that  the  same 
system  should  pervade  the  whole;  that  the  forma- 
tion and  discipline  of  the  militia  of  the  continent 
should  be  absolutely  uniform,  and  that  the  same 
species  of  arms,  accouterments,  and  military  appa- 
ratus should  be  introduced  in  every  part  of  the 
United  States.  No  one,  who  has  not  learned  it 
from  experience,  can  conceive  the  difficulty,  ex- 
pense, and  confusion,  which  result  from  a  contrary 
system,  or  the  vague  arrangements  which  have 
hitherto  prevailed. 

88 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 

Notwithstanding  Washington's  warning  and 
similar  ones  by  military  men  ever  since  his 
time,  although  the  machinery  for  securing  uni- 
formity in  the  organization  of  our  military 
forces  has  been  provided,  the  militia  organiza- 
tions, except  in  rare  instances,  are  designed 
primarily  for  the  immediate  needs  of  the  in- 
dividual States,  and  very  Uttle  thought  is  given 
to  bringing  them  to  a  point  where  they  would 
be  really  eflScient  if  called  upon  to  act  in  the 
defense  of  the  nation. 

Twelve  years  have  elapsed  since  the  passage 
of  the  miUtia  law,  and  in  some  instances  the 
important  provisions  of  that  law,  especially  re- 
lating to  raising  the  standard  of  eflSciency  and 
to  providing  well-rounded  organization,  are  not 
nearer  to  being  complied  with  to-day  than 
they  were  when  the  law  was  passed.  The  act 
requiring  conformity  in  organization  between 
the  regular  army  and  the  militia  was  passed  in 
1903  and  permitted  five  years  for  the  carrying- 
out  of  its  provisions.  At  the  end  of  that  time 
the  period  was  further  extended  to  January  21, 
1910. 

89 


ARE  WE  READY? 

In  his  report  for  the  year  1913,  General  A.  L. 
Mills,  Chief  of  the  Division  of  Militia  AflFairs, 
discussing  this  point  said  this:  — 

Properly  balanced  divisions  are  so  vital  to  the 
successful  use  of  troops,  that  until  the  present  de- 
ficiency in  auxiliary  arms  is  removed  it  constitutes 
a  grave  peril.  This  fact  cannot  be  realized  by  the 
organized  militia  itself  at  present,  or  an  insistent 
demand  from  that  body  would  result.  There  is  but 
one  obstacle  that  at  present  stands  in  the  way  of 
obtaining  the  desired  result,  and  that  is  the  indif- 
ference of  the  organized  militia  itself  to  the  sub- 
ject. Since  the  members  of  this  body  are  engaged 
during  the  day  in  making  a  living,  and  devote  only 
a  certain  number  of  evenings  a  week  to  the  military 
profession,  and  since  there  is  so  much  ground  for 
them  to  cover  in  performing  their  routine  military 
duties,  naturally  the  work  immediately  in  hand 
fully  occupies  their  available  time,  and  large  ques- 
tions, such  as  the  one  now  under  consideration,  are 
in  general  left  in  each  State  to  the  organized  mili- 
tia officer  who  is  practically  continuously  engaged 
in  military  work.  I  refer  to  the  adjutant-general. 
This  man  in  most  States  devotes  his  entire  time  to 
the  organized  militia;  he  is  the  governor's  military 
adviser  and  he  largely  shapes  military  legislation 
in  the  State.  It  may  be  said,  therefore,  that  in  a 
great  measure  the  safety  of  the  United  States  de- 

90 


L 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 


I 


pends  upon  having  balanced  divisions  and  that  the 
securing  of  these  balanced  divisions  depends  upon 
the  forty-eight  adjutants-general.  This  is  a  fact 
seldom  realized.  There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind 
that  were  these  gentlemen  to  fully  appreciate  the 
great  responsibility  that  is  upon  them,  and  were 
they  to  lay  the  situation  before  the  members  of  the 
organized  militia  in  their  respective  States,  frankly 
and  earnestly,  entering  in  a  whole-souled  way  into 
the  work,  the  present  difficulties  would  disappear, 
and  in  a  short  time  we  should  emerge  from  the  seri- 
ous danger  that  now  threatens  us. 

The  peace  establishment  which  Washington 
urged,  we  have  secured,  and  having  secured 
it  and  brought  it  to  a  state  where  it  is  moder- 
ately well  equipped  and  thoroughly  well  trained, 
through  sheer  thoughtlessness  we  have  been  un- 
fair enough  to  place  upon  it  the  greater  portion 
of  the  military  responsibility  of  the  nation. 

The  regular  army  is  the  national  military 
hired  man.  At  present  among  its  most  impor- 
tant duties  are:  — 

m       To  supply  peace  garrisons  for  foreign  posses- 

■  sions  of  the  United  States; 

B       To  supply  peace  garrisons  for  fortified  har- 

I  bors,  and  naval  bases; 

i    " 


I 


ARE  WE  READY? 

To  prevent  naval  raids  which  under  mod- 
ern methods  of  warfare  may  precede  a  declara- 
tion of  war,  and  which  may  determine  the  ini- 
tiative by  giving  the  enemy  a  convenient  base 
for  invading  operations; 

To  supply  a  mobile  reserve  prepared  to  rein- 
force foreign  garrisons  in  case  of  insurrection 
and  disorder; 

To  furnish  forces  suflScient  for  the  occupa- 
tion of  foreign  territory  where  treaty  rights  or 
established  national  policies  are  threatened; 

To  be  able  to  cooperate  with  the  navy  in  the 
formation  of  joint  expeditions  to  protect  the 
foreign  interests  of  the  United  States  and  its 
citizens; 

To  be  ready  to  mobilize  on  instant  notice 
and  to  strike  quickly  and  successfully  at  the 
outbreak  of  war,  before  an  army  of  citizen  sol- 
diers can  be  concentrated; 

To  maintain  itself  as  an  experimental  model 
for  the  volunteer  army,  to  demonstrate  the 
application  of  military  practices,  and  to  serve 
as  a  means  of  educating  and  training  and  organ- 
izing citizen  forces.  It  must  be  a  school  of  mili- 

92 


4 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 

ry  theory  and  practice,  not  only  for  the  de- 
velopment of  soldiers,  but  for  the  development 
of  officers  who  will  be  capable  of  assuming  im- 
portant duties  in  war; 

To  unify  a  military  doctrine  and  policy 
which  must  permeate  the  entire  national  army 
if  it  is  to  succeed  in  war ; 
HI  To  prepare  an  advance  for  equipment,  trans- 
portation, and  supply  of  a  great  citizen  army 
in  time  of  war; 

To  act  for  the  peace  and  safety  of  any  com- 
munity within  the  borders  which  may  require 
its  services. 

It  may  be  that  it  is  high  time  for  us  to  de- 
cide whether  it  is  safe,  so  far  as  we  ourselves 
are  concerned,  and  whether  it  is  fair  to  our  mili- 
tary hired  man,  to  place  upon  him,  in  addition 
to  keeping  our  home  in  order,  and  taking  his 
part  in  preventing  our  neighbors  from  be- 
coming too  presuming,  practically  the  whole 
responsibility  of  defending  the  home  against 
other  fighting  men,  perhaps  twenty  or  thirty 
times  his  size.  If  we  decide  that  there  is  peril 
as  well  as  injustice  in  our  present  handling  of 

93 


ARE  WE  READY? 

our  military  resources,  the  way  out  is  most 
simple:  — 

First:  By  legislation  we  can  remedy  the 
defects  in  the  nucleus  about  which  we  can 
build  an  adequate  defensive  strength. 

Next:  We  can  coordinate  the  miUtia  and  the 
professional  organization. 

Finally:  We  can  utilize  our  tremendous  but 
undeveloped  miHtary  resources  in  men  and 
material. 

The  means  by  which  the  regular  army  organ- 
ization may  be  perfected  have  been  described 
in  a  previous  chapter. 

What  should  we  do  with  the  militia? 

If  it  is  to  form  a  part  of  a  peace  army  which 
in  time  of  war  is  to  be  eflScient,  what  must  be 
required  of  it? 

The  infantry  makes  up  the  bulk  of  an  army. 
Infantry  is  made  up  of  men  whose  means  of 
transportation  is  their  own  feet,  and  who  carry 
with  them  their  own  weapons,  ammunition, 
shelter,  and  food.  On  the  march  or  in  battle, 
the  infantry  bears  the  heaviest  burdens,  and 

94 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 

stains  the  heaviest  losses.  MiUtary  genius  in 
our  country  organizes  the  infantry  into  bri- 
gades of  three  regiments  each,  commanded  by 
a  brigadier-general.  Three  battahons  make 
up  each  regiment.  The  regiment  is  commanded 
by  a  colonel.  Each  battaUon  consists  of  four 
companies,  each  commanded  by  a  captain  and 
two  heutenants.  In  each  regiment  there  is  a 
band,  a  machine-gun  platoon  with  two  auto- 
matic guns,  and  a  few  mounted  scouts. 

The  fighting  arm  of  first  importance  asso- 
ciated with  the  infantry  is  the  field  artillery. 
The  largest  field  artillery  unit  which  we  have  is 
the  regiment,  commanded  by  a  colonel.  The 
regiment  consists  of  two  battahons.  The  bat- 
talion is  made  up  of  three  batteries  of  four 
guns,  each  in  command  of  a  captain  and  four 
lieutenants.  The  artillery  is  of  various  kinds, 
according  to  the  work  for  which  it  is  designed. 
We  have  horse  artillery,  which  may  accom- 
pany the  cavalry,  for  example,  and  mounted 
artillery  with  guns  of  a  type  that  may  be  dis- 
mounted and  carried  on  pack  mules.  Next  to 
the  field  artillery  in  importance  as  a  fighting 

95 


ARE  WE  READY? 

arm  comes  the  cavalry.  In  the  cavalry  the 
three  subdivisions  of  the  regiment  are  known 
as  squadrons  and  instead  of  companies  there 
are  troops.  As  other  auxiliary  arms  are  the 
engineers,  the  signal  corps,  the  medical  depart- 
ment, including  ambulance  companies  and 
field  hospitals,  and  the  quartermaster  corps  for 
the  furnishing  of  transportation,  rations,  and 
shelter,  and  which  has  charge  of  the  payment 
of  troops. 

The  branch  of  the  army  not  included  in  the 
mobile  forces  is  the  coast  artillery  intended  for 
operating  the  great  guns  which  command  the 
entrances  to  important  harbors. 

The  smallest  military  imit  which  contains 
all  arms  of  the  service,  and  all  branches  of  the 
staff  is  the  division.  The  division,  therefore,  is 
the  smallest  unit  capable  of  independent  ac- 
tion. A  complete  infantry  division  should  com- 
prise: — 

Headquarters,  27  men;  three  brigades  of 
infantry,  17,244  men;  one  regiment  of  cavalry, 
1308  men;  one  brigade  of  light  artillery,  2391 
men;  one  pioneer  battaUon  of  engineers,  514 

96 


i 


J 


i 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 


men;  one  field  battalion  of  signal  troops,  176 
men;  commander  of  trains,  military  police,  etc., 
15  men;  one  ammunition  train,  216  men;  one 
supply  train,  194  men;  one  sanitary  train,  570 
men;  one  engineer  train,  10  men.    The  ag- 
gregate, 22,665  men,  is  made  up  as  follows 
Combatant  officers,  620;  medical  officers,  94 
chaplains,  12;  combatant  enlisted  men,  20,673 
enUsted  men,  hospital  corps,  826 ;  enhsted  men, 
quartermaster  corps,  421;  civiUans,  9;  veteri- 
narians, 10. 

These  figures  are  based  on  long  experience  of 
all  the  nations  of  the  world,  and  although  the 
units  in  the  armies  of  diflferent  nations  vary  in 
size,  and  are  called  by  difiFerent  names,  the 
proportions  approximate  very  closely. 

A  study  of  the  experience  of  nations  in  mod- 
em warfare,  in  an  examination  of  the  condi- 
tions of  our  militia,  led  the  Army  War  College 
and  the  Divisions  of  MiUtary  Affairs  very 
recently  to  establish  twelve  divisions  of  organ- 
ized miUtia.  This  was  a  step  in  advance.  But 
an  examination  of  the  condition  of  the  militia 
shows  a  great  variation  in  the  proportions  of 

97 


ARE  WE  READY? 

the  various  arms  of  the  service.  No  two  are 
aUke,  and  not  one  is  wholly  complete.  With 
the  exception  of  the  sixth  division  (New  York), 
where  rapid  progress  is  being  made,  there  is 
not  a  complete  division  of  miUtia  within  sight. 
The  mihtia  divisions  have  been  established  as 
follows:  — 

Fifth  Division  —  Headquarters,  Boston; 
Maine,  New  Hampshire,  Vermont,  Massa- 
chusetts, Rhode  Island,  Connecticut. 

Sixth  Division  —  Headquarters,  Albany; 
New  York. 

Seventh  Division  —  Headquarters,  Harris- 
burg;  Pennsylvania. 

Eighth  Division  —  Headquarters,  Washing- 
ton; New  Jersey,  Maryland,  Delaware,  Vir- 
ginia, West  Virginia. 

Ninth  Division  —  Headquarters,  Atlanta; 
North  CaroUna,  South  Carohna,  Georgia, 
Florida. 

Tenth  Division  —  Headquarters,  Nashville; 
Tennessee,  Kentucky,  Alabama,  Mississippi. 

Eleventh  Division  —  Headquarters,  Colum- 
bus; Ohio,  Michigan. 

98 


11 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 

Twelfth  Division  —  Headquarters,  Chicago; 
Illinois,  Indiana. 

Thirteenth  Division  —  Headquarters,  St. 
Paul;  Iowa,  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  North 
Dakota,  South  Dakota. 

Fourteenth  Division  —  Headquarters,  Kan- 
sas City;  Missouri,  Kansas,  Nebraska,  Wyom- 
ing, Colorado. 

Fifteenth  Division  —  Headquarters,  San 
Antonio;  New  Mexico,  Oklahoma,  Texas, 
Louisiana,  Arizona. 

Sixteenth  Division  —  Headquarters,  San 
Francisco;  California,  Oregon,  Washington, 
Idaho,  Montana,  Utah,  Nevada. 

In  each  one  of  these  divisions,  with  the  pos- 
sible exception  of  the  sixth  and  fifteenth,  there 
is  an  excess  of  infantry  and  a  deficiency  in  the 
arms  upon  which  infantry  depends  for  main- 
tenance and  operation  in  war.  Recent  figures 
show  that  the  various  divisions  fall  short  of 
what  eflSciency  would  demand  in  action  ap- 
proximately as  follows:  — 


99 


ARE  WE  READY? 


j 

31 

1^ 

Is 

d 

1 

s 

S.2 

11 

a  8 
< 

ill 

< 

1 

1 

1 

5 
6 

7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 

6 

10 
9 

10 
10 

7 
6 

8 

7 
7 
7 

3 
3 
4 
9 
6 

12 
6 
3 

11 
8 
5 
7 

3 

1 
3 
3 
3 

2 
8 
2 
2 
3 

1 
1 

2 
1 

2 

1 

1 

2 
4 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 

2 
1 
4 
4 
3 
3 

3 
4 
3 
4 
2 

w 

Total 

87 

77 

25 

8 

26 

33 

12 

12 

12 

This  condition,  to  some  extent,  at  least,  is 
due  to  misinterpretation  by  the  organized  mili- 
tia itseK  of  the  terms  of  our  miUtia  law.  Under 
the  amended  Militia  Act,  the  President  has  the 
power  to  fix  the  minimum  strength  of  enlisted 
men  in  each  company,  battery,  troop,  etc. 
Misunderstanding,  or  misinterpretation,  or 
both,  seems  to  have  centered  around  the  mean- 
ing of  the  term  "minimum  number."  The 
original  intention  was  that  the  minimum 
strength  of  any  unit  should  be  sufficient  to 
provide  men  in  large  enough  numbers  to  be 
trained  as  a  unit,  and  a  sufficient  number  of 


100 


J 


IP  OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHPriiRS  ^ 

units  to  make  possible  a  nucleus  so  organized 
as  to  be  capable  of  expansion  to  adequate  war 
strength  without  losing  in  efficiency. 

In  other  words,  the  intention  of  the  act  was 
to  supply  enough  men  to  make  possible  the 
application  of  the  general  theory  of  the  na- 
tional defense,  so  far  as  concerned  the  mihtia. 
During  the  years  following  the  passage  of  the 
act,  however,  its  terms  have  been  interpreted, 
apparently,  to  mean  that  the  minimum  num- 
ber is  the  smallest  strength  that  units  must 
have  in  order  to  be  taken  into  the  Federal  serv- 
ice. There  has  come  about,  therefore,  the  ex- 
istence of  units  so  absurdly  small  as  to  make 
it  impossible  to  carry  out  what  our  miUtary 
men  had  in  mind  in  their  efforts  to  fix  a 
standard  of  minimum  strength.  The  latest 
complete  figures  available  show  that  out  of 
approximately  1600  companies  of  infantry, 
1030  are  below  minimum  strength.  The  aver- 
age strength  of  the  field  artillery  is  about  two 
thirds  of  what  the  law  requires.    In  no  other 

IB    arm  of  the  service  is  the  average  up  to  the 

ll    required  standard. 

■ 


^^    ;l  :mie  we  ready? 

In  recent  years,  very  definite  eflForts  have 
been  made  to  standardize  the  system  of  train- 
ing for  the  organized  mihtia,  but  the  shortage 
of  officers  in  the  regular  army  has  made  it  im- 
possible to  supply  anywhere  near  the  number 
necessary  for  instructing  and  training  of  troops 
outside  the  regular  organization.  Lack  of  facil- 
ities for  both  indoor  and  outdoor  training  has 
also  been  a  serious  obstacle. 

As  a  result,  recruits  are  admitted  to  militia 
organizations  as  trained  soldiers  fit  for  duty 
in  the  regular  army  who  have  had  no  actual 
field  experience  and  the  most  casual  indoor 
miUtary  training.  Among  my  acquaintances  is 
a  man  who  has  been  admitted  in  this  manner 
into  what  is  known  as  a  crack  regiment  of  mili- 
tia. He  has  had  eight  periods  of  marching  in 
an  armory,  during  which  time,  to  use  his  own 
words,  he  has  learned  "which  end  of  the  gun 
the  bullet  comes  out  of,  and  what  is  the  differ- 
ence between  'right'  and  'left  dress.' " 

The  militiaman  each  year  receives  twenty- 
four  hour-and-a-half  drills  in  the  armory  and 
a  period  of  training  in  the  field  —  if  the  legis- 

102 


MILITIA  OFFICEUS  IN   CONSULTATION  DURING  FIELD  PRACTICE 


I 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 

ature  of  his  State  does  not  refuse  to  appropri- 
ate the  necessary  money  for  the  field  practice. 

Statistics  recently  collected  show  that  of  a 
total  of  1971  naihtia  organizations  reported  on, 
480  had  drill  halls  not  adequate  for  indoor 
instruction;  162  had  armories  used  for  other 
than  mihtary  purposes,  which  interfered  with 
mihtary  training;  188  which  did  not  aflford  the 
United  States  property  the  proper  protection; 
470  which  were  not  equipped  with  means  of 
indoor  rifle  practice;  182  which  had  neither 
equipment  nor  room  for  indoor  gallery  prac- 
tice; and  628  whose  location,  construction,  and 
equipment  were  not  such  as  to  encourage  en- 
listment or  reenhstment. 

It  can  be  shown  that  one  fourth  of  our  or- 
ganized militia  cannot  be  properly  instructed 
in  drill,  and  cannot  receive  the  necessary  in- 
struction in  target  practice. 

Not  only  is  the  organized  militia  deficient 
in  the  necessities  for  proper  training,  but  it  is 
not  adequately  suppUed  with  uniforms  and 
equipment,  either  in  quantity  or  in  kind,  suffi- 
cient for  its  needs,  should  all,  or  a  large  part 

103 


ARE  WE  READY? 

of  it,  be  called  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States.  A  very  noticeable  tendency  is  shown 
in  many  States  to  provide  only  the  supphes 
needed  by  the  troops  for  the  short  period  of 
the  annual  field  exercises.  Many  States  equip 
their  troops,  apparently,  for  state  purposes 
only.  Yet  the  Federal  Government  spends 
about  $4,000,000  a  year  to  help  bring  the  mili- 
tia to  reasonable  efficiency  as  a  war  organi- 
zation. The  militia's  deficiency  in  the  most 
important  auxiliary  arms  of  the  service,  field 
artillery  and  cavalry,  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
these  arms  are  the  most  expensive  to  main- 
tain, and  least  likely  to  be  found  necessary  in 
handling  local  situations.  Federal  expenditures 
have  not  yet  given  States  generally  a  broader 
view  of  the  functions  of  their  militia  organiza- 
tions nor  secured  means  of  rapid,  orderly,  and 
eflfective  mobilization. 

The  condition  that  carries  with  it  the  great- 
est peril  is  the  total  lack  of  any  means  of  filling 
out  the  militia  organizations,  already  contain- 
ing many  untrained  men,  with  men  who  have 
had   even   preliminary   miUtary   instruction. 

104 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 

There  is  a  vast  difference  between  paper 
strength  and  actual  miUtary  strength.  On 
paper,  the  strength  of  our  organized  militia  is 
8323  officers,  and  119,087  men,  or  approxi- 
mately 127,300  men  and  officers. 

The  actual  strength  of  the  militia,  officers 
and  men,  can  be  placed  at  approximately  64,- 
000  men  and  officers,  but  it  is  not  conceivable 
that  even  this  number  could  be  assembled  in  a 
time  of  urgent  need,  and  it  is  a  fact  that  almost 
every  organization  contains  a  considerable 
number  of  men  who  have  not  received  suffi- 
cient or  proper  training  to  fit  them  to  be 
capable  soldiers.  In  time  of  sudden  war,  what 
is  now  beheved  to  be  the  actual  strength  of 
our  mihtia  would  undoubtedly  be  reduced  by 
the  inabihty,  physical  or  otherwise,  of  mem- 
bers of  the  organizations  to  serve  with  the 
colors. 

What  is  to  be  done  about  it? 

The  adjutant-generals  and  other  military 
officers  of  our  States,  the  mihtary  men  in  our 
regular  army,  and  many  of  our  leading  states- 
men have  given  the  closest  study  to  the  prob- 

105 


ARE  WE  READY? 

lem,  and  they  are  approaching  the  general 
agreement  approximating  the  following:  — 

That  in  time  of  peace,  each  State  should  be 
considered  as  a  territorial  militia  department 
with  the  Governor  the  commander-in-chief  of 
the  department; 

That  oflScers  on  the  staff  of  the  Governor, 
not  members  of  the  line  or  of  the  staff  corps  of 
the  organized  militia,  should  not  be  considered 
as  part  of  the  organization  under  the  law; 

That  there  should  be  sufficient  officers  and 
administrative  corps  to  carry  on  proper  mili- 
tary administration  in  time  of  peace,  and  to 
provide  sufficient  officers  for  the  state  organ- 
ization both  in  time  of  peace  and  war; 

That  the  organization  of  the  militia  should 
be  made  to  conform  with  the  divisional  organ- 
ization of  the  regular  army; 

That  if  the  number  of  companies  in  a  com- 
plete militia  regiment  falls,  at  any  time,  below 
twelve,  exclusive  of  the  machine-gun  company, 
the  deficiency  should  be  replaced  within  six 
months,  or  the  regiment  considered  as  perma- 
nently abandoned,  its  members  either  being 

106 


OUR  CITIZEN  FIGHTERS 


assigned  to  other  organizations  or  mustered 
out. 

We  opened  this  chapter  by  subscribing  to 
the  contention  that  it  is  worth  while  to  call 
things  by  their  right  names.  There  is  no  dis- 
puting the  fact  that,  with  few  exceptions,  the 
state  organizations  of  our  mihtia  are  poorly 
filled,  indifferently  trained,  partially,  and  in 
some  cases  wholly,  lacking  in  personnel  and 
equipment  necessary  to  a  well-balanced  fight- 
ing force  which  can  be  counted  upon  to  give  a 
satisfactory  account  of  itself  in  battle. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  CONNECTICUT 

An  army  across  the  Connecticut  River,  driv- 
ing our  handful  of  defenders  northward,  was  as 
far  as  the  speculation  was  carried  in  our  imag- 
inary attack  on  New  York. 

Suppose  it  is  carried  a  bit  further. 

Suppose  the  following  as  fragmentary  press 
accounts  of  a  struggle  at  the  Connecticut  to 
check  a  hostile  advance  on  New  York:  — 

With  the  Army,  March  28  —  Although  the 
presence  of  small  advance  detachments  of  the 
enemy  was  reported  by  our  scouts  toward 
evening,  apparently  the  main  body  of  the  en- 
emy's forces  had  not  yet  come  up,  and,  owing 
to  our  lack  of  aeroplanes  for  scouting,  it  was 
decided  to  throw  a  squadron  of  cavalry  across 
the  river. 

It  was  only  when  the  troops  were  pouring 
across  in  fancied  security  that  two  batteries  of 
the  enemy's  guns,  cleverly  posted  and  screened, 

108 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  CONNECTICUT 

opened  their  concentrated  fire  on  the  crowded 
bridge. 

Before  the  blast  of  shrapnel  and  machine- 
gun  projectiles,  scores  of  our  men  were  swept 
into  the  river.  The  challenge  of  the  enemy's 
guns  was  taken  up  by  our  artillery,  and  a 
spirited  duel  continued  for  an  hour,  under 
cover  of  which  our  cavalry  retreated  and  re- 
formed. The  enemy's  batteries  finally  became 
silent,  but  on  account  of  our  lack  of  aeroplanes 
it  was  impossible  to  determine  whether  the 
hostile  guns  had  been  put  out  of  action  by  our 
fire  or  had  changed  their  position.  Because  of 
an  appalling  shortage,  orders  have  been  issued 
to  save  every  possible  round  of  ammunition. 

In  the  trenches,  March  29  —  Before  dawn  it 
became  apparent  that  the  enemy  was  to  at- 
tempt the  crossing.  Several  night  advances  by 
small  detachments  were  made.  But  our  scouts 
were  alert  and  our  guns  had  the  range.  During 
the  night,  apparently,  the  enemy  brought  up 
additional  and  heavier  artillery. 

These  guns  were  set  to  work  at  an  early  hour 
this  morning,  when  the  prospect  began  to 

109 


ARE  WE  READY? 

change.  Several  of  our  batteries  were  soon 
moved  backward.  Though  suffering  heavy 
loss,  at  last  the  enemy  managed  to  get  a  bri- 
gade of  infantry  and  a  battery  of  artillery 
across  the  river  and  into  position.  Under  the 
protection  of  a  heavy  bombardment  of  our  posi- 
tion, two  more  batteries  were  got  over  and  were 
planted  at  the  bridge-head.  With  three  hos- 
tile batteries  and  a  brigade  of  infantry  over 
the  water,  a  retirement  to  our  secondary  en- 
trenched position  was  ordered. 

Hardly  had  the  movement  been  completed 
when  the  overwhelming  superiority  of  the 
enemy's  field  artillery  became  apparent.  A 
terrific  fire  was  poured  into  our  lines  from  a 
distance  fully  four  miles  away.  Our  lighter 
artillery  was  powerless  against  the  heavy  guns. 

The  enemy  is  now  centering  his  rain  of  steel 
upon  oiu*  entrenchments.  For  three  hours  our 
brave  young  fellows  have  stood  the  terrific 
ordeal,  unable  to  fire  a  shot  in  return.  Any 
man  raising  his  head  above  the  fire-swept  earth 
ramparts  is  certain  of  death.  Lying  flat  on 
their  bellies,  all  our  men  can  do  is  to  pray  for  a 

110 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  CONNECTICUT 

respite  and  a  chance  to  charge  the  ever-increas- 
ing forces  on  our  side  of  the  river  and  to  silence 
their  guns.  The  enemy  for  the  most  part  is 
using  shrapnel.  Hastily  entrenched  as  we  are, 
our  forces  are  suflFering  terribly. 

Hostile  aeroplanes,  like  great  hawks,  are 
soaring  continually  over  our  Unes.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  conceal  our  batteries,  no  matter  how 
frequently  they  are  moved.  Our  inferiority  in 
aircraft  and  the  impossibiUty  of  locating  hostile 
batteries  is  maddening.  While  the  hostile  gun- 
ners find  the  range  quickly  and  exactly,  we 
waste  round  after  round  of  precious  ammuni- 
tion in  attempting  to  search  out  the  enemy's 
positions. 

Ignoring  our  guns,  the  hostile  artillerymen, 
relying  on  concealment  for  immunity,  are  con- 
centrating all  their  efforts  to  enfilade  our 
trenches.  With  an  apparent  prodigality  of 
ammunition  they  continue  to  pour  bouquet 
after  bouquet  of  high  explosives  or  combined 
shrapnel  and  high  explosive  shells  into  our 
works. 

With  the  Army,  March  29  —  Toward  mid- 
111 


ARE  WE  READY? 

afternoon  our  artillery  fire  noticeably  slack- 
ened. The  enemy  continued  to  pour  a  wither- 
ing fire  of  ever-increasing  volume  and  intensity 
over  our  trenches.  The  enemy's  plan  was  to 
keep  our  artillery  busy  and  to  hold  our  forces 
in  the  trenches  while  the  crossing  of  the  river 
was  accomplished.  On  our  side  of  the  river,  the 
artillery  was  thrown  well  forward  in  screened 
positions.  Only  once  during  the  soul-racking 
day  was  there  a  charge.  It  came  during  a  lull 
in  the  artillery  duel  when  a  regiment  of  militia, 
lying  in  advanced  trenches,  cut  to  pieces  under 
the  merciless  hail  from  a  battery  of  quick-firers, 
cracked  under  the  strain  and  sprang  into  the 
open.  Careless  of  the  quick-firers  masked  be- 
hind the  enemy's  advance  posts,  they  charged 
with  the  bayonet.  A  stream  of  lead  was  poured 
into  them  before  they  had  covered  half  the  dis- 
tance to  the  river.  Only  a  handful  regained  the 
trenches.  It  was  here  that  the  enemy  showed 
immense  superiority  in  mitrailleuses,  which 
gave  them  marvelous  mobility  and  a  very 
deadly  advantage.  These  quick-firers  were 
masked  with  great  skill,  and  were  worked  with 

112 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  CONNECTICUT 

the  very  apparent  object  of  drawing  an  infan- 
try attack.  It  was  with  the  greatest  difficulty 
that  our  officers  were  able  to  prevent  impetu- 
ous and  disastrous  advances  from  our  trenches. 

Your  correspondent  has  talked  to  a  wounded 
lieutenant  brought  to  the  rear  at  the  beginning 
of  the  engagement. 

"We  are  helpless  against  those  guns  across 
the  river,"  he  said.  "It  was  heartbreaking  to 
see  the  boys  dropping  from  the  shrapnel,  with- 
out a  chance  to  get  back  at  the  beggars.  It 
made  me  sick,  even  in  the  excitement  of  it  all. 
The  enemy's  quick-firers  were  marvelous.  I 
am  bound  to  say  they  had  it  pretty  much  their 
own  way.  If  we  only  had  aeroplanes  to  match 
theirs!  They  are  constantly  saiUng  over  our 
positions.  Then  it  always  happens  the  same 
way.  Those  aeroplanes  are  really  wonderful  in 
the  way  they  search  out  the  positions  of  our 
guns.  We  always  know  that  within  halt  an 
hour  of  observation  by  aeroplane,  shells  will 
begin  to  fall  above  gunners,  unless  they  have 
altered  their  position. 

"The  shell  fire  is  terrifying.  I  confess  to  you 
113 


ARE  WE  READY? 

that  there  were  times  when  my  nerves  were 
absolutely  gone.  One  hears  the  zip-zip  of  bul- 
lets, the  boom  of  the  large  guns,  the  ste4ang  of 
the  hghter  artillery;  and  in  all  this  infernal 
experience  of  noise  and  stench,  the  screams,  at 
times,  of  dying  horses  and  men  joined  with  the 
fury  of  gun-fire  and  rising  shrill  above  it,  no 
man  may  boast  of  his  courage.  There  were 
moments  when  I  was  a  coward  with  all  of  them. 
It  cannot  last  much  longer.  We  must  either 
attack  or  fall  back." 

The  first  day  of  fighting  proves  conclusively 
that  the  enemy  intends  making  it  a  battle  of 
guns  against  men.  If  our  Hnes  are  forced  to 
retire,  it  is  clearly  the  enemy's  intention  to 
advance  to  our  position  with  as  little  loss  of 
men  as  possible.  It  is  evident  that  the  hostile 
forces  are  supplied  with  abundant  ammunition 
for  an  extended  campaign.  Our  men  have  not 
enough  at  hand  for  another  day's  action. 

With  the  Army,  March  29  (midnight)  —  Our 
forces  are  retreating  toward  the  North,  fighting 
a  stubborn  rear-guard  action.  They  have  failed 
to  hold  the  invaders  at  the  Connecticut. 

114 


r 


k 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  CONNECTICUT 

Washington,  March  30  —  A  War  Depart- 
ment statement,  admitting  defeat  at  the  Con- 
necticut River  and  the  hopelessness  of  fm-ther 
attempting  to  defend  New  York,  contains  the 
following  report  concerning  yesterday's  fight- 
ing:— 

"By  nightfall  it  became  apparent  that  if 
complete  annihilation  was  to  be  avoided,  a 
retirement  must  be  attempted,  and  an  order 
was  given  to  commence  it  at  8.30  o'clock.  The 
movement  was  covered  with  the  most  devoted 
intrepidity  and  determination  by  the  artillery, 
which  has  suffered  heavily,  and  the  fine  work 
of  the  cavalry  assisted  materially  in  a  most 
diflBcult  and  dangerous  operation. 

"Our  initial  force  has  been  cut  off  from  re- 
treat toward  New  York,  and  its  only  avenue  is 
north.  It  must  join  with  the  New  England 
militia  before  there  will  be  hope  of  successfully 
making  another  stand." 

Now  the  only  speculation  in  all  of  the  fore- 
going is  in  its  application.  The  description  of 
the  fighting  is  taken,  almost  word  for  word, 

115 


ARE  WE  READY? 

from  official  and  well-authenticated  news  ac- 
counts of  the  struggle  in  Europe  in  the  battle 
of  the  Marne,  practically  the  only  alteration 
being  the  substitution  of  the  words  "Ameri- 
can," "our/'  or  "enemy,"  for  "German," 
"EngHsh,"  "French,"  or  "Allies." 

It  is  admitted,  of  course,  that  portions  of 
actual  narration,  which  particularly  dealt  with 
incidents  where  there  was  a  marked  superiority 
of  artillery  strength  on  one  side  or  the  other, 
have  been  selected. 

Is  such  a  selection  and  such  an  apphcation 
warranted  in  a  discussion  of  our  miUtary 
strength,  —  a  discussion  based  on  a  premise 
that  a  first-class  nation  would  consider  it  possi- 
ble and  profitable  to  attack  us  by  land  ? 

A  part  of  the  answer  is  in  history;  a  part  of 
it  is  in  what  is  going  on  in  Europe  every  day;  a 
part  of  it  is  in  the  facts  of  our  own  power  of 
defense. 

"Battles  are  won  by  superiority  of  fire." 

When  a  military  expert  takes  a  long  breath, 
pauses  for  complete  silence  and  for  concen- 
trated attention,  and  divulges  this  one  great 

116 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  CONNECTICUT 

secret  of  success  in  armed  strife  on  sea  or  land, 
there  is  not  one  of  us  in  ten  thousand,  prob- 
ably, who  is  inclined  to  rear  up  and  dispute 
him. 

Even  the  man  who  has  never  laid  finger  to 
trigger  has  a  sneaking  notion  that  since  battles 
hang  on  the  ability  to  kill  or  maim,  and  since 
killing  in  war,  for  the  most  part,  is  done  by  the 
burning  of  powder  in  various  quantities  and 
various  ways,  the  side  who  can  set  oflf  its  pow- 
der to  the  greatest  advantage  is  the  side  that  is 
going  to  win. 

Eye,  reach,  and  hitting  power  may  be  set 
down  as  a  fairly  accurate  dynamic  analysis  of 
this  matter  of  superiority  of  fire.  "Volume, 
accuracy,  and  range  of  fire"  is  another  and 
more  technical  way  of  putting  it. 

Strategy,  bayonet  action,  cavalry  charges, 
all  the  tricks,  deceptions,  and  heroic  incidents 
of  a  campaign,  go  into  this  matter  of  burning 
powder.  For  it  is  true,  of  course,  that  all  battles 
are  not  won  by  actual  superiority  of  fire.  Many 
of  them  are  won  by  the  power  of  one  side  or 
another  to  exert,  instantly,  at  some  point  in 

117 


ARE  WE  READY? 

the  struggle,  an  overwhelming  superiority  of 
fire. 

Something  like  forty-five  years  ago,  a  Ger- 
man fighting  force  captured  the  French  Em- 
peror, Napoleon  III,  Marshal  MacMahon,  and 
all  of  the  French  regular  army  except  what  had 
been  bottled  up  at  Metz,  and  other  forts  on 
the  frontier. 

All  this  happened  by  reason  of  the  fact  that 
the  Germans  had  worked  themselves  into  a 
position  where  they  could,  if  they  wanted  to, 
pour  a.  fire  into  the  French  ranks  that  would 
mean  slaughter  and  practical  annihilation.  In 
securing  this  advantage,  the  artillery  had  been 
the  most  powerful  factor.  The  German  artil- 
lery had  been  rushed  to  the  front,  supported 
by  a  very  small  escort  of  cavalry  and  infantry, 
and  by  being  at  the  right  place  at  the  right 
time  had  been  able  to  exert  a  fire  which  drove 
the  French  back  in  their  efforts  to  escape 
to  the  East.  Rapidly  other  German  forces 
pressed  in.  German  batteries  secured  hills  bor- 
dering the  valley  of  the  Meuse  in  sufficient 
strength  to  repulse  every  attempt  of  the  French 

118 


m 


S3     S 


a. 

A     - 


Lj    fa 


TOE  BATTLE  OF  THE  CONNECTICUT 

army  to  break  through.  The  long-range  shell- 
ing of  the  forces  massed  in  Sedan  was  so  mur- 
derous in  its  effect  that  to  escape  the  slaughter 
the  French  were  forced  to  an  unconditional 
surrender. 

It  was  in  1870  that  the  tremendous  impor- 
tance of  the  field  gun  in  modern  warfare  began 
to  be  demonstrated.  Up  to  that  time  artillery 
had  been  looked  upon  as  an  awkward  and  cum- 
bersome weapon.  It  had  been  the  custom  to 
place  the  artillery  well  in  the  rear  of  marching 
columns  and  to  protect  it  with  large  bodies  of 
infantry  and  cavalry.  This  whole  theory  was 
upset  by  the  Germans  in  the  Franco-Prussian 
War.  They  risked  surprise  and  capture  of 
artillery  for  the  advantage  of  exerting  a  power- 
ful artillery  fire  before  the  enemy  could  bring 
his  field  guns  from  the  rear  to  the  front. 
H  In  the  present  struggle  in  Europe,  in  every 
individual  battle,  the  artillery  is  in  action  from 
the  very  start,  and  the  advantage  to  one  side 
or  the  other  is  almost  always  determined  by 
the  outcome  of  preliminary  artillery  duels. 

kThe  musket  has  not  gone  out.   The  rifle  is 
I 


ARE  WE  READY? 

simply  a  refined  musket.  It  has  its  part;  but  in 
modern  warfare  the  man  with  the  rifle  comes 
in  only  after  the  field  gun  has  done  its  work,  or 
when  the  field  gun  is  doing  its  work  effectively 
—  at  least,  as  well  as  the  field  gun  of  the  other 
fellow. 

The  rifle  and  the  bayonet  are  the  deciding 
factors  in  many  a  sharp  struggle  in  Europe, 
but,  in  the  official  accounts,  before  the  infan- 
try attack,  we  almost  invariably  read  of  the 
artillery  duel. 

The  charge  may  come  at  a  period  when  the 
duel  is  a  draw,  when  a  change  of  position  is  in 
progress,  or  when  the  batteries  of  one  side  have 
established  a  superiority. 

At  other  times  the  man  with  the  gun  lies  in 
the  shelter  of  the  trench  facing  death  with 
every  shrapnel  shell  that  screeches  its  way 
from  the  enemy's  lines,  waiting,  day  by  day, 
sometimes  praying,  for  action  that  will  break 
the  terrific  monotony. 

One  of  the  most  interesting,  illuminating, 
and  pathetic  documents  touching  this  phase 
of  modern  warfare  is  contained  in  the  letters  of 

120 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  CONNECTICUT 

Norman  Leslie,  a  captain  of  the  British  Rifle 
Brigade,  who  was  killed  in  action  near  Lille,  on 
October  18,  1914.  Only  a  few  days  before  the 
action  in  which  he  lost  his  life.  Captain  Leslie 
wrote  this  to  a  member  of  his  family:  — 

September  23  —  I  write  this  in  the  midst  of  a 
furious  battle,  but  as  our  part  is  to  sit  still  in  our 
trenches  for  the  time,  I  am  enabled  to  do  so.  Our 
artillery  are  about  seven  or  eight  thousand  yards 
from  German  main  position.  Night  before  last  we 
marched,  crossed  a  certain  river  and  climbed  up  to 
the  heights  on  the  other  side,  where  we  relieved  a 
certain  regt.  They  had  been  in  these  trenches  for 
seven  days  and  had  lost  Heaven  knows  what;  the 
2  co'ys  whose  lines  I  relieved  having  alone  120 
casualties,  i.e.,  25  per  cent!  Well,  we  got  the  busi- 
ness of  relieving  them  done  by  about  2  a.m.,  and 
the  minute  dawn  broke  their  snipers  (German) 
started  at  us.  It  was  light  about  5  a.m.,  and  we  had 
a  little  time  to  look  around  and  examine  our  posi- 
tion. The  trenches  are  at  the  top  of  a  line  of  hills 
with  the  valley  and  river  in  rear  of  us;  they  are 
most  irregular,  and  just  consist  of  little  zig-zag  lines 
on  the  highest  part  of  the  sky  line.  The  German 
main  position  is  only  1200  yards  off,  and  very 
powerful;  they  have  got  earth  trenches  and  infan- 
try about  300  yards  from  us. 

I've  now  got  to  7  a.m.  yesterday,  the  22nd.  About 
121 


ARE  WE  READY? 

7.30  hell  broke  loose  above  us  and  shrapnel  fairly 
tore  around  us;  we  lay  low  in  our  trenches  with 
only  one  sentry  looking  out  for  their  infantry.  I  Ve 
got  about  120  men  under  me  in  a  series  of  hollow 
ventrants,  so  I  can  only  see  the  50  men  in  my  par- 
ticular hollow,  but  I  walk  round  on  a  path  just 
below  these  little  hillocks  which  connects  them  all. 
About  8.30  a  man  ran  from  A  round  to  me  and 
said  he'd  got  about  7  men  badly  hit  in  their 
trenches,  so  I  dashed  round  with  him  and  found  a 
proper  charnel  house  —  all  shrapnel  wounds,  one 
arm  hanging  by  a  shred,  another  pierced  through 
the  lungs,  another  neck,  back  and  thigh,  2  broken 
legs.  ...  I  got  a  corporal  and  we  pulled  them  out 
and  down  to  the  path  where  we  had  got  another 

little  pit  dug.   It  was  d d  ticklish  work.  I  was 

trying  to  tie  up  one  fellow's  leg  when  crash  came 
another  shrapnel  and  wiped  out  another  man  20 
yards  off.  At  the  end  of  the  job  I  was  drenched 
with  their  blood,  the  unpleasant  part  being  that 
we  have  no  water  to  drink  at  present,  far  less  to 
wash  with.  I  returned  to  my  little  pit  and,  working 
hard,  made  it  moderately  bomb-proof  by  about 
1.00.  About  2.00  the  German  artillery  died  down 
and  we  were  n't  worried  again  till  the  evening  — 
their  snipers  don't  worry  us  at  all.  The  cruel  thing 
for  the  wounded  was  that  they  had  to  lie  there  all 
yesterday;  we  had  not  doctor  or  stretcher  bearers, 
and  even  if  they  had  been  there  they  could  n't  have 

122 


^ 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  CONNECTICUT 

gone  down,  as  it's  fair  death  moving  from  the 
trenches  to  the  river  by  day.  About  7  p.m.  it  got 
dark  and  we  sent  them  off,  but  one  was  dead,  and 
the  lung  fellow  died  on  the  way  down. 

Well,  I've  got  to  about  9  p.m.  yesterday,  and  I 
retired  after  my  bully  dinner  to  my  crevice  in  the 
ground  and  was  instantly  woke  by  star  shell,  2  of 
which  pitched  10  and  15  yards  away;  and  they 
were  of  course  followed  by  a  roar  of  rifle  fire  and 
artillery  as  well.  You  know  what  they  do:  they 
look  like  a  rocket,  and  bursting  diffuse  a  pale  light 
around  them  —  quite  harmless  in  themselves,  but 
excellent  in  lighting  up  our  position  to  the  German 
fire. 

They  started  up  again  with  their  old  shrapnel 
about  9  A.M.  —  it's  pretty  to  watch.  First  comes  a 
Taube  aeroplane  miles  high  above  us,  circles  round 
and  drops  out  sort  of  smoky  balls  just  over  us  to 
give  his  gunner  friends  the  range  —  then  about  five 
minutes  afterwards,  bang  come  the  shells.  How- 
ever, we  suffered  but  little  this  morning,  as  our  gun- 
ners came  up  about  a  mile  behind  us  and  helped 
by  one  of  our  aeroplanes  fairly  bombarded  the 
German  batteries.  We've  sat  here  quite  comfort- 
ably all  day  between  the  rival  batteries  watching 
the  shells  burst  on  both  sides.  The  aeroplanes  cross 
continually,  but  don't  molest  each  other,  and,  of 
course,  fire  clean  out  of  range  of  our  infantry  fire. 
They  certainly  are  the  masters  of  the  situation, 

123 


ARE  WE  READY? 

these  fliers  —  though  they  do  no  damage  them- 
selves, yet  they  give  all  information  and  are  ap- 
parently quite  immune  themselves.  It  is  a  curious 
position  being  between  the  rival  batteries.  We 
hear  them  sizzling  straight  over  us  all  the  time. 

The  shrapnel  bursting  emit  white  smoke,  and  the 
high  explosives  a  black  smoke.  The  Germans  have 
got  two  of  their  big  batteries  working  over  us. 
They  don't  cause  nearly  as  much  loss  of  life  as 
shrapnel,  unless  they  hit  a  column  of  men  or  house. 
But  anything  hit  is  blown  to  bits.  Very  little  re- 
mains of  a  house,  far  less  of  a  man.  Well,  I  must 
stop  now  and  try  and  sleep  a  little  before  the  night 
bombardment.  The  coming  of  day  is  a  real  joy 
to  us.  Night  is  bloody  and  we  fear  an  attack  the 
whole  time.  The  general  plan  — which  I  'm  allowed 
to  state  by  the  Censor  as  it's  already  in  your 
papers,  and  this  letter  won't  reach  you  for  ages  — 
is  that  we  sit  tight  till  the  French  outflank  them, 
then  a  general  advance  till  we  bump  up  into  an- 
other of  these  positions. 

October  6  —  Herewith  a  typical  night.  5 :45  p.m. 
All  stand  to  arms  during  the  dusk  till  night  has 
fallen,  the  Germans  being  rather  fond  of  attacking 
at  that  hour.   (Attack  on  the  guards,  etc.) 

The  men  sleep  in  the  trenches  with  double  sentry 
posts  every  15  yards  or  so.  I  lie  in  the  open  just 
behind  them  ready  to  go  to  any  part  of  my  line 
that  gets  engaged.  About  8.00  I  rise  with  a  start, 

124 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  CONNECTICUT 

and  see  a  star  rocket  coming  from  the  German 
trench,  and  pitching  right  beside  me  —  during  its 
flight  it  illumines  everything  round  it  with  a  pale 
yellow  light  —  every  one  instinctively  holds  their 
breath,  and  those  standing  up  lie  down,  for  that 
which  follows  comes  quickly !  A  rattle  of  musketry 
and  machine  guns!  I  get  up  and  walk  round  the 
sentries,  then  lie  down  again  —  suddenly  crash 
comes  the  German  shrapnel  and  for  about  5  min- 
utes the  peaceful  night  resounds  with  shell  fire. 
Silence  again,  and  I  try  and  sleep  for  a  few  minutes 
—  then  a  watery  gurgling  sound  over  my  head,  for 
all  the  world  like  the  lap  of  water  against  a  boat, 
and  it*s  our  own  shells  passing  over  our  heads  to 
burst  on  the  German  trenches  or  artillery.  This 
continues  on  and  off  throughout  the  night,  relieved 
occasionally  by  the  swish  of  a  sentry's  bullet  either 
from  our  or  their  trench. 

How  far  does  all  this  touch  America  and  our 
chance  of  successfully  resisting  a  land  attack.^ 


CHAPTER  VII 
HELL  ON  WHEELS 

Two  great  elements  go  into  the  matter  of 
"superiority  of  fire,"  or,  if  you  like,  of  "eye, 
reach,  and  hitting  power." 

One  is  the  element  that  goes  off.  The  other 
is  the  element  that  sets  it  oflf.  Guns  in  war  are 
of  no  use  without  men.  The  obverse  is  no  less  a 
fact.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  rifle  is  a 
gun  just  as  much,  though  not  just  as  big,  as  the 
heavy  howitzer. 

We  speak  of  our  "war"  strength  and  our 
"peace"  strength.  Our  peace  strength  is  made 
up  of  the  men  we  maintain  under  arms.  Our 
war  strength  includes  these,  and,  in  addition, 
the  men  who  would  be  under  arms  if  war  should 
come  our  way.  While  on  paper  the  peace 
strength  of  our  regular  army  is  about  90,000 
men  and  officers  of  all  arms,  and  of  our  organ- 
ized militia  127,000  men  and  officers  of  varie- 
gated arms,  —  mostly  infantry,  — the  strength 

126 


■^^        HELL  ON  WHEELS 

^Fo?  both  organizations  combined,  the  force 
which  we  could  instantly  throw  into  battle  Une 
on  the  Atlantic  Coast  is  about  50,000  men, 
while  the  mobile  force  we  could  assemble 
within  our  borders  within  thirty  days  is  about 
90,000  men.  That  is  about  our  peace  strength, 
and  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  our  actual  immedi- 
ate war  strength. 

Within  six  weeks,  of  course,  we  might  pos- 
sibly increase  our  force  with  men  who  have 
had  some  military  training,  to  something  near 
150,000  men.  That  may  be  considered  as  our 
semi-war  strength. 

Experts,  including  the  chief  men  of  our 
General  Staff  and  several  of  our  Secretaries  of 
War,  have  estimated  that  for  a  successful  de- 
fense of  our  continental  territory  against  hos- 
tile aggression  by  any  first-class  nation  of  the 
world,  we  should  have  ready  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  a  well-balanced  force  of  not  less  than 
500,000  men,  with  at  least  300,000  more  to  be 
raised  at  once.  We  should  without  the  shadow 
of  a  doubt  get  them  —  ultimately  — even  if  war 
should  come  to-night.    Yet  if  history  teaches 

127 


ARE  WE  READY? 

anything,  we  should  get  most  of  them  by  con- 
scription. They  would  be  poorly  trained,  if 
trained  at  all.  The  greater  the  time  required 
to  collect  them,  the  more  we  should  have  to 
collect.  Untrained  men  desert  faster,  are  cap- 
tured of tener,  and  are  killed  oflF  more  rapidly 
than  trained  men.  But  we  should  get  them. 
Sooner  or  later  we  should  have  the  men. 

Men,  millions  of  them,  are  already  manufac- 
tured. Iron  and  copper,  millions  of  tons  of  it, 
are  in  the  ground.  In  war,  the  men,  ultimately, 
would  be  trained  to  shoot;  minerals,  ultimately, 
would  be  converted  into  things  to  shoot  with. 
But  the  cost  in  life,  money,  and  time,  during 
the  process  of  converting  military  resources 
into  military  strength  during  actual  warfare, 
has  always  been,  and  must  always  be,  fright- 
ful. Our  actual  immediate  strength  in  the  one 
great  element,  men,  is  shown  elsewhere  in  these 
pages. 

If  we  should  find  it  necessary  to  put  half  a 
million  men  in  the  field,  and  if,  through  ne- 
cessity, we  should  find  the  way  to  do  it,  how 
should  we  arm  them.'* 

1^ 


i 


HELL  ON  WHEELS 

Rifles?  Probably.  We  have  finished,  or 
nearly  finished,  about  700,000  rifles,  with  some- 
thing over  200,000,000  rounds  of  ammunition. 
Counting  out  coast  artillery,  an  army  of  500,- 
000  men  would  have  about  420,000  infantry 
and  cavalry.  Our  field  service  regulations, 
based  on  the  experience  of  all  nations  in  war, 
call  for  1340  rounds  of  ammunition  behind  each 
rifle  and  1080  rounds  behind  each  saber.  If 
1200  rounds  be  taken  as  a  safe  average,  we 
should  need  a  small-arms  ammunition  supply 
of  about  504,000,000  rounds;  and  if  we  were  to 
have  an  adequate  supply  for  the  rifles  we  have 
finished  or  nearly  finished,  as  against  the  200,- 
000,000  rounds  we  now  have,  we  should  have 
about  840,000,000  rounds.  It  is  to  be  remem- 
bered, however,  that  small-arms  ammunition 
can  be  manufactured  quickly  and  in  large 
quantities.  It  is  not  in  this  shortage  that  the 
greatest  danger  lies. 

Should  we  be  forced  into  a  war  prepared  as 
we  are  to-day,  after  we  should  have  herded 
our  men,  put  rifles  in  their  hands,  buckled  car- 
tridge belts  around  them,  and  sent  them  into 

129 


ARE  WE  READY? 

battle,  thousands  of  them,  without  question, 
would  be  slaughtered  before  they  could  dis- 
charge an  effective  bullet  from  their  rifles. 

The  reason  for  this  would  be  our  weakness 
in  the  matter  of  the  fi.eld  gun. 

There  are  two  weapons  which  modern  war- 
fare has  developed  for  use  in  fire  action.  These 
are  the  magazine  rifle  and  the  field  gun.  The 
rifle  is  considered  to  be  most  effective  at  800 
yards,  although  the  modern  weapon  can  be 
used  effectively  at  a  range  of  1200  yards,  and 
even  beyond  that.  For  rifle  fire  to  become 
a  factor,  and  an  important  factor,  in  mod- 
ern warfare,  therefore,  the  infantry  must  be 
thrown  very  close  to  the  enemy's  line.  Now, 
the  range  of  the  modern  field  gun  is  measured 
in  miles,  and  in  every  battle  of  recent  times 
the  infantry  has  gone  into  the  zone  of  artillery 
fire  long  before  reaching  the  range  where  any 
purpose  would  be  served  through  the  use  of  the 
rifle.  The  field  artillery  is  designed  not  only  to 
cover  an  infantry  advance,  but  to  support  an 
infantry  attack  throughout  an  action.  The 
artillery  may  be  directed  toward  an  enemy's 

130 


I 


HELL  ON  WHEELS 

own  field  batteries  in  order  to  create  confusion, 
to  suppress  or  neutralize  opposing  artillery 
fire,  to  force  frequent  changes  in  the  location 
of  hostile  batteries,  or  it  may  be  used  directly 
on  the  infantry  of  the  opposing  force.  No 
matter  where  it  is  turned,  its  purpose  is  to 
shatter  an  attack  or  to  support  one.  When 
under  cover  of  supporting  field  guns,  infantry 
forces  gain  ground,  that  ground  can  only  be  held 
by  the  maintained  activity  of  the  field  guns. 

Through  the  variety  of  the  work  which  it 
has  been  called  upon  to  do,  field  artillery  has 
practically  classified  itself.  Common  to  mod- 
ern warfare,  there  are  now  batteries  used  for 
supporting  infantry  advances;  batteries  used 
to  neutralize  an  enemy's  field  artillery  fire; 
batteries  whose  function  is  to  break  down 
obstacles,  earth- works  or  men,  which  may  be 
in  the  way  of  advancing  infantry.  The  ac- 
counts of  engagements  in  all  our  modern  wars 
show  with  steadily  increasing  clearness  how 
absolutely  indispensable  in  successful  military 
operations  is  the  field  gun  and  back  of  it  the 
trained  artilleryman. 

131 


ARE  WE  READY? 

Only  as  this  is  being  written,  a  copy  of  a 
New  York  evening  paper  has  been  laid  on  my 
desk.  The  following  are  the  headlines  and  the 
first  few  paragraphs  of  its  daily  story  of  the 
War  in  Europe:  — 

KAISER  BEATEN  IN  BATTLES  TO  EXTEND 
HOLD  NORTH  OF  AISNE 


FRENCH  TWICE  DEFEAT  ATTACKS 


German  Charges  near  Vic,  Twelve  Miles  west  of  Soissana 
broken  up  by  Fire  of  Field  Batteries 


Hill  in  Argonne  valiantly  defended  against  Invaders 


Teuton  Artillery  outmatched  in  Long-Range  Engagement 
at  Perthes  —  Le  Pretre  Forest  cleared  of  Enemy 


Paris,  Monday  —  Germany's  aggressive  maneu- 
vers in  the  Soissons-Aisne  district  appear  to  have 
been  completely  halted  by  the  splendidly  con- 
ducted defense  of  the  French,  not  only  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  Aisne,  but  westward  of  Soissons,  where 
the  French  maintain  a  strong  hold  on  the  north 
side  of  the  stream. 

Deterred  from  attacking  east  of  Soissons  by  the 
fire  of  French  field  batteries,  the  Germans  have 
attempted  twice  to  break  down  the  defensive  of 
the  French  at  a  point  northeast  of  Vic-sur-Aisne 

132 


HELL  ON  WHEELS 

about  twelve  miles  north  of  Soissons.  Both 
these  attacks  were  defeated  by  the  French,  who 
maintained  their  positions  intact. 

Near  Perthes-les-Hurlus,  between  Rheims  and 
the  Argonne,  the  French  artillery  has  overcome 
that  of  the  Germans  in  a  violent  duel. 

French  artillery  forces  defending  "  Hill  263,"  near 
Bourseuilles,  in  the  Argonne  district,  have  repulsed 
a  determined  attack  by  the  Germans  and  have  held 
all  their  trenches. 

The  Kaiser's  troops  have  been  driven  from  sev- 
CTal  field  forts  in  the  foothills  of  the  Vosges  Moun- 
tains, notably  in  the  Forest  of  Le  Pretre. 

From  the  sea  to  the  Oise  there  was  yesterday  a 
T/iolent  storm,  particularly  in  Belgium.  The  day 
saw  artillery  fighting  at  certain  points. 

In  the  region  of  Perthes  there  was  very  eflScient 
marksmanship  on  the  part  of  our  artillery  on  the 
positions  of  the  enemy. 

The  Chief  of  our  Ordnance  Department  re- 
^fcently  estimated  that  to  build  enough  field 
guns  for  an  army  of  70,000  would  require  at 
least  a  year. 

Are  we  ready  .^  How  would  we  match  up 
with  any  possible  foe  in  this  single  matter  of 
'*hell  on  wheels,"  — the  modern  field  gun? 

K)se  it  should  transpire   that  we  were 


ARE  WE  READY? 

confronted  suddenly  with  just  such  a  problem 
as  the  situation  we  have  imagined  to  exist  at 
the  Connecticut  River.  Suppose  that  instead 
of  this  handful  of  50,000  men,  we  should  be 
able  to  throw  forward  as  a  battle  line  a  force 
of  500,000  men;  and  suppose  that  the  enemy, 
instead  of  outnumbering  us,  should  be  only 
equal  to  our  own  force  numerically,  but  should 
be  equipped  with  field  guns  and  ammunition  in 
accordance  with  the  most  advanced  theories 
and  practice  of  modern  warfare,  —  what  then 
would  be  our  chance  of  immediate  success  ? 

Our  General  Staff  has  set  the  proportion  of 
field  guns  which  we  should  have  at  3.16  guns 
for  every  thousand  infantry  and  cavalry.  That 
is  a  lower  proportion  than  exists  in  actual  op- 
eration in  the  army  of  any  other  first-class  na- 
tion in  the  world.  There  are  instances  where 
European  armies  average  five  guns  for  every 
thousand  infantry  and  cavalry.  The  present 
war  in  Europe  indicates  that  the  percentage 
in  the  future  will  be  much  higher. 

Our  General  Staff  has  classified  field  artil- 
lery as  follows :  — 

134 


I 


HELL  ON  WHEELS 

"Horse,"  "light,"  "mountain,"  and 
"heavy." 

Horse  batteries  are  armed  with  the  3-inch 
gun. 

Light  batteries  are  armed  with  the  3-inch 
gun  or  the  3.8-inch  howitzer. 

Heavy  batteries  are  armed  with  the  4.7- 
inch  howitzer,  the  4.7-inch  gun,  or  the  6-inch 
howitzer. 

The  4.7-inch  howitzer,  drawn  by  eight 
horses,  has  very  considerable  mobihty,  and  is 
really  intermediate  between  the  Hght  and 
heavy  calibers. 

Horse  batteries  are  assigned  for  service  with 
the  cavalry. 

Light  or  mountain  batteries  and  4.7-inch 
howitzer  batteries  are  assigned  for  service  with 
infantry  divisions. 

Heavy  batteries  (4.7-inch  gun  and  6-inch 
howitzer)  are  assigned  as  army  artillery. 

On  the  basis  of  3.16  guns  for  every  thousand 
of  infantry  and  cavalry,  the  General  Staff  and 
the  War  College  have  made  the  very  modest 
recommendation  that  provision    be   immedi- 

135 


ARE  WE  READY? 

ately  made  for  the  manufacture  of  1300  field 
guns.  What  we  have  built  or  approaching 
completion  is  not  over  800  guns.  What  we 
have  actually  built  is  about  650  guns. 

In  his  report  for  the  year  1911,  Henry  L. 
Stimson,  then  Secretary  of  War,  said  this: 

Attention  has-been  repeatedly  called  to  the  very 
unprepared  condition  of  the  army  with  respect  to 
reserve  supplies  of  field  artillery  guns,  carriages, 
and  ammunition.  We  are  less  adequately  supplied 
with  field  artillery  material  than  with  any  other 
class  of  fighting  equipment.  There  is  not  enough 
field  artillery  ammunition  for  the  guns  we  now 
have  for  a  single  engagement  such  as  were  frequent 
in  the  Manchurian  War.  The  manufacture  of  this 
class  of  material  involves  processes  requiring  much 
time  and  which  there  is  no  possible  way  to  hasten .  It 
follows,  of  course,  that  provision  must  be  made  for 
such  material  long  in  advance  of  its  probable  use. 
At  the  present  rate  of  appropriations  it  is  estimated 
that  it  would  take  more  than  fifty  years  to  secure 
a  reasonable  supply  of  the  field  artillery  guns,  car- 
riages, and  ammunition  that  would  be  necessary  in 
the  event  of  a  war.  I  invite  particular  attention  to 
the  following  views  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  upon  this 
subject:  "The  existing  want  of  field  artillery  guns, 
carriages,   and  ammunition  constitutes  a  grave 

136 


n 


i 


ENGLAND 


V.S. 


COMPARATIVE  STRENGTH  IN  FIELD  ARTILLERY 


ARE  WE  READY? 

menace  to  the  public  safety  in  case  of  war.  Ordin- 
ary prudence  would  seem  to  dictate  that  the  appro- 
priations, especially  for  those  field  artillery  guns, 
carriages,  and  ammunition,  should  be  very  greatly 
increased.  Once  a  state  of  war  exists  with  a  first- 
class  power  there  will  be  no  opportunity  to  buy  the 
material  abroad  or  time  to  manufacture  it  at  home, 
even  if  all  available  plants  in  this  country  were  run- 
ning at  the  maximum  capacity,  without  such  delay 
as  would  be  fatal  to  our  hopes  of  success.  This 
shortage  of  field  artillery  material  is  the  most  seri- 
ous feature  of  the  present  military  situation,  and 
one  which  should  be  immediately  corrected.  It 
constitutes  a  source  of  grave  danger." 

The  Chief  of  Stafif  to  whom  Mr.  Stimson 
referred  was  Major-General  Leonard  Wood. 
Although  Wood,  Stimson,  and  other  of  our 
military  men  and  statesmen  have  continued  to 
lay  stress  on  the  peril  that  lies  in  our  lack  of 
field  guns  and  equipment,  and  although  some 
progress  has  been  made  toward  securing  the 
most  modern  weapons  of  this  character,  the 
greatest  shortage  in  the  auxiliary  arms  of  our 
defensive  force  is  still  in  the  field  artillery. 

Mr.  Stimson's  statement  regarding  our  am- 
munition supply  is  approximately  as  accurate 

138 


I 


HELL  ON  WHEELS 

to-day  as  it  was  at  the  time  that  it  was  printed. 
It  is  abundantly  substantiated  by  figures 
which  have  been  secured  in  connection  with 
recent  wars.  A  statistician  in  the  French 
Army  recently  estimated  that,  during  an  en- 
gagement in  France,  a  battery  of  the  famous 
75-milUmeter  (3-inch)  guns  averaged  600  rounds 
of  ammunition  per  day  for  each  gun.  This 
figure  is  very  high  for  a  daily  average.  Some 
experts  fix  350  rounds  as  a  minimum  which 
should  be  with  the  gun.  It  is  conservative  to 
say  that  there  should  be  1850  rounds  with  the 
gun,  in  the  train  and  at  the  base. 

We  have  ready  in  this  country  not  much 
more  than  300,000  rounds  of  field-gun  am- 
munition. If  all  the  field  guns  which  our  esti- 
mates call  for  were  built  and  put  into  action 
at  once,  which  is  conceivable,  and  if  all  were 
of  the  same  type,  so  that  the  anununition  could 
be  interchanged  and  concentrated  at  the  points 
where  it  might  be  most  necessary,  we  should  have 
in  the  whole  country  not  more  than  suflBcient 
ammunition  for  a  single  day's  engagement. 

If,  in  a  desperate  situation,  such  as  we  have 
139 


ARE  WE  READY? 

imagined,  our  enemy  should  be  equipped  ac- 
cording to  the  most  advanced  theories  of  field- 
gun  artillery  fire,  he  would  have  probably  five 
field  guns  for  every  thousand  of  his  infantry 
and  cavalry.  If  we  should  have  in  the  field  the 
smallest  force  (420,000  rifles  and  sabers)  with 
which,  in  the  opinion  of  our  General  Staff,  we 
could  successfully  engage  in  a  defensive  war,  we 
should  have  about  1.6  guns  for  every  thousand 
of  our  infantry  and  cavalry.  An  enemy  would 
not  venture  to  attack  us  without  a  fully  ade- 
quate supply  of  ammunition  and  equipment, 
while  we  should  have  about  450  rounds  for 
each  gun  as  our  total  ammunition  supply  — 
about  one  fourth  of  the  amount  considered 
necessary.  The  volume  of  fire  which  an  en- 
emy could  exert,  both  by  reason  of  the  greater 
number  of  his  guns  and  the  fact  that  he  could 
afford  to  waste  ammunition  in  searching  out 
our  positions,  would  be  overwhelming.  It  is 
the  opinion  of  military  experts  that  our  in- 
fantry would  be  wholly  unable  to  advance  in 
the  face  of  a  fire  so  much  more  deadly  than 
anything  we  could  exert. 

140 


IT 


A  n 


^ 


'I 


I 


HELL  ON  \MIEELS 

Although  there  is  a  shortage  of  field  guns 
even  in  our  regular  army,  the  greatest  and 
most  alarming  shortage  is  in  the  militia.  For 
years  it  has  been  intended  that  the  militia 
should  be  equipped  ultimately  on  the  same 
basis  as  the  regular  army;  yet  our  citizen  force 
has  only  the  3-inch  light  gun,  and  this  in  num- 
bers wholly  out  of  proportion  to  the  infantry. 
The  total  shortage  in  the  militia  is  about  80 
batteries,  or  320  guns.  Only  one  division  of  the 
organized  militia,  the  Sixth  of  New  York,  has 
its  full  quota  of  field  guns.  The  latest  complete 
figures  available  show  the  shortage  in  other 
divisions  to  be  as  follows:  — 

The  Fifth  has  one  half  its  quota;  the  Seventh, 
one  sixth;  the  Eighth,  one  half;  the  Ninth,  one 
fourth;  the  Tenth,  one  sixth;  the  Eleventh,  five 
twelfths ;  the  Twelfth,  one  half;  the  Thirteenth, 
one  third;  the  Fourteenth,  five  twelfths;  the 
Fifteenth,  five  twelfths;  and  the  Sixteenth, 
one  third. 

The  cause  for  such  a  condition  is  easily 
found,  and  it  will  not  be  removed  until  some 
means  can  be  devised  for  securing  a  greater 

141 


ARE  WE  READY? 

degree  of  cooperation  in  military  matters  be- 
tween the  individual  States  and  the  Federal 
Government.  Field  artillery  is  a  very  expen- 
sive arm  of  the  service  both  to  estabhsh  and  to 
maintain,  and  it  is  an  arm  which  would  rarely 
be  called  upon  to  take  part  in  solving  any  prob- 
lem which  might  arise  within  the  borders  of 
an  individual  State.  The  obUgation  of  a 
State  to  maintain  its  field  artillery  at  top  effi- 
ciency is  purely  a  moral  one,  and  since  the 
Federal  Government  would  be  outside  its 
rights  in  insisting  that  the  necessary  propor- 
tion of  federal  funds,  supphed  for  mihtia  pur- 
poses, be  devoted  to  field  artillery,  it  must  be 
left  to  the  States  to  decide  whether  or  not  their 
individual  militia  organizations  are  to  be  re- 
garded as  purely  local  military  forces,  or  as 
parts,  also,  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States. 
Brigadier-General  A.  L.  Mills,  as  Chief  of  the 
Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  in  pointing  out  the 
dangers  of  this  shortage  of  field  guns  in  the  mili- 
tia in  his  annual  report  for  1913,  said  this:  — 

It  is  sufficient  to  state  here  that  if  the  present 
so-called  divisions  are  ever  pitted  against  equal 

142 


■ 


I 

I 

I 


HELL  ON  WHEELS 

forces,  adequately  provided  with  field  artillery  (and 
all  foreign  nations  are  so  provided),  we  are  fore- 
doomed to  defeat.  Other  factors  being  equal,  to 
place  the  so-called  divisions  of  the  Organized  Mili- 
tia in  such  an  action  will  cause  such  a  disaster  in 
morale,  time,  and  actual  loss  of  life  as  will  draw  on 
the  heads  of  the  responsible  authorities  maledic- 
tions from  one  end  of  the  land  to  the  other.  The 
preventive  is  to  now,  in  time  of  peace,  either  create 
the  necessary  field  artillery  units,  or  convert  the 
relative  excess  of  infantry  into  this  arm. 

The  cause  for  the  shortage  of  field  guns  in 
the  organized  militia  is  also  back  of  the  militia's 
inadequate  cavalry  equipment.  At  the  last 
inspection,  the  militia  was  short  64  troops  of 
cavalry.  The  cavalry,  like  the  artillery,  is  an 
expensive  arm  to  maintain.  The  militiaman  is 
paid  only  during  the  time  that  he  serves,  but 
horses  must  be  maintained  constantly.  In  re- 
1  cent  years  there  has  grown  up  the  erroneous 
impression  that  the  days  of  cavalry  are  passing. 
Nothing  is  further  from  the  truth.  Cavalry 
is  still  indispensable.  It  is  frequently  used  in 
both  attack  and  defense,  as  well  as  in  certain 
forms  of  scout  duty. 

143 


ARE  WE  READY? 

In  a  description  of  an  angle  of  the  fighting 
in  the  now  famous  battle  of  the  Maine,  for 
example,  a  well-authenticated  press  dispatch 
from  Paris  contained  this;  — 

A  terrific  cannonade  at  once  opened  upon  the 
wood,  which  took  fire,  and,  as  a  brisk  wind  was 
blowing,  the  flames  soon  turned  the  forest  into  an 
inferno.  The  Germans  rushed  out  in  great  disorder, 
and  the  British,  who  were  waiting,  fell  upon  them 
hip  and  thigh.  The  men  fought  with  terrible  fury. 
The  German  commander  concentrated  all  his  ener- 
gies upon  saving  the  guns,  but  the  British  cavalry 
swept  down  upon  the  German  horsemen  that  were 
trying  to  escort  the  guns  to  a  place  of  safety.  They 
went  through  them  like  an  avalanche. 

Once  again  it  was  clearly  demonstrated  that  the 
cavalry  arm  is  still  one  of  the  most  effective  that  an 
army  can  possess  when  used  at  the  proper  moment 
and  in  the  right  way.  Cavalry  may  be  useless 
against  men  intrenched  in  kopjes,  but  in  the  open 
field  it  is,  as  effective  as  in  the  days  of  the  first 
Napoleon. 

Not  only  did  the  cavalry  prevent  the  German 
guns  from  escaping,  but,  by  lightning-like  delivery 
of  charges,  it  prevented  the  gunners  from  taking 
up  positions  from  which  to  work  havoc  on  the  Brit- 
ish infantry. 

The  British  guns  were  busy  all  the  time,  and  thet  , 

144 


HELL  ON  WHEELS 

accuracy  of  their  firing  soon  made  every  fresh  posi- 
tion taken  up  by  the  Germans  untenable. 

The  British  infantry  went  into  the  fray  with  ter- 
rible relish  and  zest.  The  men  got  over  the  ground 
at  a  great,  swinging  pace,  and  when  they  closed  up 
for  bayonets  they  were  literally  on  the  run  and 
nothing  could  stop  them.  They  went  through  the 
Germans  like  fire  through  flax.  All  the  French 
gallopers  are  loud  in  their  praises  of  the  British  in 
this  battle. 

Stand  after  stand  was  made  by  the  Germans  in 
the  hope  of  stemming  the  tide  of  disaster  until  sup- 
port should  arrive,  but  the  British  knew  the  value 
of  time  as  well  as  the  Germans,  and  pushed  the 
attack  home  so  hotly  that,  according  to  the  latest 
verbal  reports,  the  Germans  lost  heavily  in  dead 
and  wounded,  while  a  large  amount  of  artillery, 
great  and  small,  big  guns  and  rapid-firers,  fell 
into  British  hands. 

In  time  of  war,  we  could  count  on  not  more 
than  9000  regular  cavalry,  and  6000  cavalry  of 
the  Organized  Militia,  poorly  instructed  and 
poorly  mounted.  We  should  be  short  at  least 
30,000  of  what  we  should  need  for  a  well-bal- 
anced army  of  500,000  men  of  all  arms  (in- 
cluding 40,000  coast  artillery) ,  and  should  have 
no  reserve  whatever. 

145 


ARE  WE  READY? 

The  aeroplane  is  the  eye  of  the  artillery.  The 
war  in  Europe,  the  first  great  struggle  in  which 
it  has  been  applied,  has  demonstrated  every 
day  the  tremendous  aid  rendered  by  an  aero- 
plane in  matters  of  strategy,  in  securing  infor- 
mation regarding  an  enemy's  movements  and 
in  assisting  gunners  in  finding  the  range. 

The  United  States  ranks  fourteenth  in  the 
nations  of  the  world  in  what  it  pays  for  mili- 
tary aviation.  Germany  leads,  with  France, 
Russia,  Italy,  Austria,  England,  Belgium,  and 
Japan,  following  in  order.  Greece,  Bulgaria, 
ChiU,  Spain,  and  Brazil  have  all  spent  more 
than  the  United  States  for  this  most  important 
arm  of  the  service. 

"Superiority  of  fire"  does  not  mean  alone  a 
greater  number  of  guns  and  a  greater  number 
of  projectiles  sent  in  the  general  direction  of 
an  enemy.  Accuracy  is  as  important  as  vol- 
ume. The  side  which  first  finds  the  range 
has  the  initial  advantage  in  modern  battles. 
Rapidity  in  range-finding  has  depended  almost 
wholly  on  the  successful  activity  of  aerial 
scouts. 

146 


HELL  ON  WHEELS 

We  need  not  only  the  material  and  personnel 
and  reserve  for  adequate  field  artillery.  We 
must  have,  also,  if  we  are  to  make  sure  that 
artillery  fire  is  to  be  most  effective,  auxiliary 
arms  in  adequate  proportion. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

"Militarism"  is  the  scare- word  thrown  into 
almost  every  serious  discussion  of  our  abiUty 
to  defend  ourselves.  Whether  or  not  it  is  some- 
thing really  to  be  afraid  of,  so  far  as  Amer- 
icans and  American  institutions  and  traditions 
are  concerned,  it  is  a  most  interesting  thing 
when  hauled  out  into  the  light  and  examined. 

The  problem  of  home  defense  has  been 
faced  since  the  primitive  family  squatted 
around  in  a  circle  and  figured  ways  and  means 
to  thwart  the  hostile  intentions  of  old  Stone 
Hatchet  and  his  gang,  over  across  the  river, 
and  spent  spare  moments  in  fashioning  newer 
and  deadlier  skull-crushing  implements. 

In  some  ways,  especially  in  the  science  of 
killing,  we  have  gone  a  long  road  since  then; 
but  we  have  not  got  away  from  the  family 
idea,  and  we  have  only  elaborated  on  the  fam- 
ily council.  We  have  learned  to  deal  with  each 

148 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

other  by  means  of  words  and  scraps  of  paper. 
We  have  fought  and  loved,  made  peace  and 
broken  it,  made  promises  and  defiled  them, 
gone  cahoots,  for  a  spell,  with  this  family  or 
that  —  all  to  protect  or  to  enlarge  the  power 
of  om*  own  particular  family,  and  with  never  a 
serious  attempt  to  work  out  a  scheme  for  one 
big,  world-wide  family. 

Some  families  have  said  that  the  head  of  the 
house  is  boss;  others  have  said  the  family  is 
boss.  So  we  have  Prussia ;  so  w^e  have  the  United 
States  of  America  —  each  sure  that  the  other 
is  wrong.  Yet  the  American  would  not  laugh 
at  the  idea  of  the  Kaiser's  "Ich  und  Gott" 
were  he  a  Prussian;  and  the  Prussian  would  not 
sneer  at  our  little  army  and  our  bungling  way 
of  doing  things  military  w^ere  he  an  American. 

It  cannot  be  expected  that  a  family  strictly 
brought  up  on  the  lines  of  a  military  autocracy, 
and  one  which  has  brought  itself  up  on  the 
broadest  theories  of  democracy,  can  have  many 
notions  in  common  as  to  the  ways  and  means 
of  defending  the  home,  save  the  great  essen- 
tial —  to  be  willing,  and  ready,  to  fight. 

149 


ARE  WE  READY? 

Recent  events  across  the  Atlantic  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  the  German  family,  on 
instant  notice,  was  both.  Certain  facts  and  fig- 
ures set  down  in  the  course  of  previous  chap- 
ters seem  to  suggest  that  the  American  peo- 
ple, though  willing,  are  not  at  all  ready. 

The  first  is  no  proof  that  the  Prussian  idea 
is  right  any  more  than  the  second  is  proof  that 
the  American  idea  is  wrong. 

There  is  one  fact  which  the  average  American 
finds  it  difficult  to  swallow.  It  is  this:  Funda- 
damentally,  the  German  military  idea  is  more 
democratic  than  ours.  The  application  of  the 
idea,  of  course,  is  diametrically  opposed  to 
the  principles  of  democracy.  Yet  the  German 
fighting  force  is  directly  from  the  citizenship. 
Democracy  has  swung  away  from  the  profes- 
sional soldier  of  a  hundred  and  fifty  years  ago. 
The  British,  ourselves  —  and  China  —  of  the 
world's  great  nations,  are  the  only  ones  in 
whose  military  systems  there  is  a  survival  of 
the  days  of  Frederick  the  Great.  With  the 
abhorrence  of  anything  approaching  military 
rule,  bred  in  the  bone  of  the  Anglo-Saxon,  we 

150 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

have  taken  elaborate  means  of  insuring  the  sub- 
ordination of  the  miUtary  to  the  civil  authority. 

Modern  economists  very  generally  agree 
that  the  danger  of  the  professional  soldier  to 
a  democracy,  not  so  safe-guarded,  is  his  eager- 
ness to  practice  his  profession  —  his  hanker- 
ing to  try  out  new  tools  placed  in  his  hands. 
Yet,  go  to  the  soldier  of  long  experience,  and 
he  will  tell  you  how  silly  this  notion  is.  He  will 
insist  that  the  experienced  soldier  dreads  war, 
because  he  knows  what  war  is;  just  as  a  sur- 
geon dreads  to  be  operated  upon,  because  he 
knows  the  danger  and  suffering  that  an  opera- 
tion entails. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  the  fact  is  that,  no  matter 
how  much  we  have  subordinated  him,  we  still 
have  the  professional  soldier,  and  that  in  the 
Prussian  system  the  professional  soldier,  the 
man  who  carries  the  gun,  has  been  discarded 
for  the  citizen  fighter.  It  is  true,  of  course,  that 
most  of  the  officers,  particularly  the  higher  offi- 
cers and  the  general  staff,  are  all  professionals, 
making  a  study  of  war  their  Hfe-work. 

Militarism  is  not  a  thing.  It  is  not  a  form  of 
151 


ARE  WE  READY? 

government.  It  is  not  even  a  system,  wholly. 
It  is  a  state  of  mind.  That  is  a  fact  that  we 
Americans  find  it  difficult  to  get  hold  of.  In 
Germany,  militarism  is  superimposed  on  a 
democratic  theory  of  national  defense,  evolved 
by  Prussia  after  Napoleon,  through  sheer 
necessity.  The  armies  that  Prussia  poured  into 
the  field  in  1813  were  no  longer  professional  but 
citizen  forces,  poorly  trained  and  organized, 
but  fired  with  patriotism  and  enthusiasm. 
After  the  war,  the  Prussian  rulers  sagaciously 
made  permanent  the  system  found  to  be  so 
effective.  That  system,  though  modified  and 
enlarged  upon,  was  substantially  the  same  as 
that  now  in  force.  The  victories  of  1866  and 
1870  thoroughly  popularized  it.  The  military 
alliance  in  1866  between  Prussia  and  all  the 
other  German  States,  with  the  union  in  1871 
of  all  the  armies,  opened  the  way  for  model- 
ing the  whole  German  military  force  after  the 
Prussian  pattern.  The  system  of  a  citizen 
army,  once  laughed  at  by  the  French  as  a 
"sort  of  militia,"  is  essentially  the  marvelous 
war  machine  of  to-day. 

152 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

The  militarism  so  abhorrent  to  us  is  not  this 
machine,  not  the  German  system  of  govern- 
ment, not  compulsory  military  service,  nor  yet 
wholly  the  Prussian  influence  personified  in  the 
Kaiser  and  his  advisers.  No  doubt  all  these 
elements  go  into  it,  but  the  militarism  of  Ger- 
many is  the  state  of  mind  of  the  German  people. 

Such  an  impartial  observer  as  R.  M.  Berry, 
in  his  ''Germany  of  the  Germans,"  has  this  to 
say  of  this  German  state  of  mind :  — 

That  the  army  is  the  people  can  perhaps  be 
asserted  of  Germany  more  than  of  any  other  na- 
tion. Every  citizen  considers  service  in  the  na- 
tional defensive  forces  as  a  natural  duty.  He  thinks 
it  unworthy  of  any  nation  that  its  men  should  need 
to  have  attractions  offered  them  in  order  to  induce 
them  to  take  their  proper  share  in  the  defense  of 
their  country.  Patriotism  is  a  cult  among  the  Ger- 
mans. The  German  youth,  as  a  general  rule,  looks 
forward  with  pleasure  to  the  day  when  he  is  to  don 
the  uniform,  and  if,  for  some  physical  reason,  he 
should  be  rejected,  he  feels  that  he  has  not. quite 
proved  his  manliness.  .  .  .  The  soldier  is  held  up 
to  him  as  the  pattern  which  he  should  follow.  .  .  . 
"For  the  people,  but  not  by  the  people,"  is  the 
motto  that  has  been  adopted  by  the  Empire  ever 
since  Bismarck's  effort  to  limit  the  spread  of  Social- 

153 


ARE  WE  READY? 

ism  by  introducing  State-enforced  thrift.  .  .  .  The 
masses  of  the  people  in  Germany  are  always  treated 
by  the  official  classes  as  minors  requiring  guardian- 
ship with  many  restrictions.  Since  this  method  has 
been  in  vogue  for  so  long  a  time,  the  Germans,  al- 
most to  a  man,  expect  all  ameliorations  of  their 
condition,  political  as  well  as  economical,  to  be 
proposed  by  the  administrative  authorities.  They 
would  not  dream  of  initiating  anything  of  the  kind 
themselves.  .  .  .  The  officer  occupies  a  privileged 
position,  which  is  inviolable  by  the  civil  authori- 
ties. He  takes  precedence  everywhere.  .  .  .  There 
is  in  some  quarters  a  very  strong  argument  urged 
against  this  system  of  paternal  government,  — 
that  it  destroys  individuality  and  takes  away  the 
personal  will  of  the  people.  They  become  so  used 
to  obeying  orders  that  they  cannot  think  for  them- 
selves in  politics.  Spontaneity  is  not  requisite  for 
them.  The  Government  sees  to  all  things :  the  peo- 
ple only  need  to  do  what  they  are  told.  .  .  .  One 
of  the  most  striking  features  of  German  life  is 
that  the  people  have  so  little  understanding  of  the 
way  in  which  they  are  governed.  In  other  things 
the  German  can  recite  long  lists  of  data  without 
the  slightest  hesitation,  but  in  politics  he  replies 
with  a  blank  look  when  questioned.  It  has  never 
impressed  him  as  necessary  that  he  should  compre- 
hend politics.  He  is  governed  —  as  a  rule  well;  that 
is  sufficient  for  him. 

154 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

How  much  of  this  is  due  to  Prussian  influ- 
ence, how  much  to  the  personahty  of  the  Kai- 
ser, how  much  to  the  leaders  in  the  Prussian 
mihtary  cult,  how  much  to  the  long  compul- 
sory military  service,  and  how  much  is  due  to 
the  racial  temper  of  the  German,  writers  disa- 
gree. That  the  Kaiser's  "There  is  but  one  mas- 
ter in  the  coimtry  —  myself.  I  will  tolerate  no 
other";  and  "It  is  the  soldier  and  the  army, 
not  majorities  and  parliamentary  decisions 
that  have  forged  the  unity  of  the  German 
Empire.  It  is  on  the  army  that  my  confi- 
dence rests";  and  "The  army  and  its  sov- 
ereign head  are  the  only  guarantees  of  the 
safety  of  the  empire  and  the  peace  of  the 
world,"  are  accepted  seriously,  cannot  be  ques- 
tioned. To  me  it  is  inconceivable  that,  no 
matter  what  extreme  measures  might  be 
taken  to  increase  our  preparedness  against 
attack,  militarism  in  any  form,  as  we  under- 
stand the  militarism  of  Prussia,  could  gain  a 
foothold  in  our  nation. 

But  before  we  get  around  to  talking  about 
om-selves:  — 

155 


ARE  WE  READY? 

Over  across  the  way  from  the  Kaiser  and 
his  family,  there  is  a  family  that  is  boss  of  itself 
and  thoroughly  well  able  to  take  care  of  itself. 

There  is  a  world  of  difference  between  "the 
army  is  the  people"  and  "the  people  are  the 
army."  There  is  just  that  much  difference  be- 
tween Germany  and  Switzerland;  between  the 
Prussian  system  and  the  Swiss  system;  be- 
tween Prussian  miUtarism  and  Swiss  democ- 
racy. 

Yet,  at  bottom,  the  German  idea  and  the 
Swiss  idea  are  identical.  The  armies  of  both 
come  directly  from  the  citizenship.  The  diflFer- 
ence  is  in  the  manner  in  which  the  citizenship 
has  allowed  the  idea  to  be  applied. 

Switzerland,  certainly  the  most  democratic 
nation  in  Europe,  held  by  some  writers  to  be 
the  world's  model  state  since  the  adoption  of 
the  constitution  of  1874,  has  no  standing  army. 
Its  only  permanent  military  officers  are  mili- 
tary trainers,  selected  by  and  under  the  super- 
vision of  the  general  government. 

With  a  population  of  about  4,000,000  at  an 
expenditure  of  less  than  $8,000,000  annually, 

156 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

the  Swiss  Confederation  can,  in  an  hour  of 
need,  muster  a  fighting  force  of  500,000  men, 
trained  and  perfectly  equipped. 

With  a  population  of  over  90,000,000,  it 
costs  the  Republic  of  the  United  States  in  the 
neighborhood  of  $90,000,000  to  maintain  a 
professional  military  organization  which,  in 
emergency  could  throw  a  bare  30,000  men, 
incompletely  equipped,  into  line  of  battle. 
Where  the  money  goes  and  what  we  get  for  it 
we  have  already  seen.  The  subject  is  intricate. 

To  trace  the  Swiss  eight  millions  into  a  first- 
class  defensive  force  of  half  a  million  is  exceed- 
ingly simple.  The  money  goes  for  training, 
clothing,  and  equipment,  and  pay  of  soldiers 
and  officers  while  they  are  with  the  colors.  It 
is  not  wasted  in  politics  because  it  is  next  to 
impossible  to  play  poUtics  with  the  Swiss  mili- 
tary system. 

Every  male  citizen  of  Switzerland,  who  is 
able,  receives  miUtary  training  for  certain 
short  periods  between  the  ages  of  seventeen 
and  thirty-two.  Every  two  years,  for  the  first 
ten  years,  —  that  is,  five  times  in  all,  —  he 

157 


ARE  WE  READY? 

answers  a  call  to  the  colors.  His  period  of 
training  is  never  more  than  ninety  days  for  any 
one  year  and  that  only  in  the  first  year.  If  an 
artillery  recruit,  his  training  covers  seventy- 
five  days;  if  in  the  cavalry,  ninety  days;  and  if 
in  the  infantry,  sixty  days.  The  period  with 
the  colors  shortens  as  he  grows  older.  During 
his  third,  fifth,  seventh,  and  ninth  years,  this 
period  of  training  is  from  twelve  to  fifteen  days. 
He  is  paid  only  during  the  time  he  is  with  the 
colors.  More  than  that,  so  far  as  is  possible,  his 
military  training  is  made  to  follow  the  fines  of 
his  occupation.  If  he  is  a  baker,  he  finds  his 
place  in  the  commissary;  if  he  is  an  electrician, 
he  can  enter  the  engineers  or  the  signal  corps. 
The  Swiss  soldier  has  as  good  a  chance  of  be- 
coming an  oflScer  as  any  of  his  fellows.  Offi- 
cers are  drawn  from  the  ranks  according  to 
seniority.  The  appointing  power  rests  with  the 
Government. 

"Compulsory  service!" 

Those  are  the  other  scare-words,  the  team- 
mates of  "militarism." 

The  Swiss  miUtary  training  is  the  law  of  the 
158 


fe 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

land,  certainly,  even  if  it  has  become  so  by 
^1  vote  of  all  the  people.  Its  relation  to  democ- 
racy depends  to  some  extent  on  whether  you 
argue  that  a  person  can  be  compelled  to  do 
what  he  wants  to  do. 
^m  The  Swiss  youth,  from  his  earliest  school 
^  days,  is  taught  that  the  army  is  for  defense 
only.  Patriotism  is  interwoven  in  his  develop- 
ment. He  discerns  no  line  between  civic  duty 
and  military  duty.  He  learns  to  look  upon 
each  as  essential  to  real  citizenship.  By  the 
time  he  leaves  school  he  is  not  a  raw  recruit. 
He  has  already  had  some  miUtary  training. 
He  is  ready  and  eager  to  join  the  colors  and  to 
complete  his  education.  Certainly  he  does  not 
regard  as  undemocratic  or  unreasonable  the 
requirement  that  he  must  know  how  to  fight  in 
order  that  he  may  take  an  intelligent  part  in 
the  defense  of  his  country,  any  more  than  we 
consider  undemocratic  and  unreasonable  the 
requirement  that  we  must  know  how  to  read  in 
order  that  we  may  take  an  intelligent  part  in 
the  political  affairs  of  our  country. 
^^^  AustraUa  is  another  country  which  has  been 


ARE  WE  READY? 

working  out  a  system  of  defense  that  has 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  world's  great 
powers.  Within  a  very  few  years  the  mihtary 
theory  there  has  developed  along  lines  which 
have  converted  a  hired  police  force  into  a 
powerful  organization  of  citizen  soldiery. 

The  responsibility  for  the  defense  of  Aus- 
traha  prior  to  1870  rested  on  British  troops 
which  were  quartered  in  the  largest  cities. 
The  chief  function  of  these  troops  was  that  of 
a  convict  guard.  In  any  emergency  where  war 
threatened,  the  only  measures  of  defense  which 
could  be  taken,  except  those  which  would  be 
afforded  by  the  professional  soldiers,  depended 
upon  the  organization  of  volunteers.  , 

It  was  in  1870  that  all  British  troops  were 
withdrawn  from  Australia.  It  was  then  that 
small  bodies  of  permanent  forces  were  formed, 
and  it  was  the  intention  to  build  around  these 
small  detachments  an  organization  of  citizen 
fighters.  The  first  experiment,  in  1883  to  1884, 
was  a  partially  paid  volunteer  militia.  | 

A  system  of  military  instruction  in  schools 
for  boys  was  established  at  this  time.    This 

160 


I^n 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

system  of  cadets  was  purely  of  a  volunteer 
nature,  and  did  not  offer  the  means  of  military 
training  to  boys  who  could  not,  or  for  any  rea- 
son did  not,  attend  these  schools.  It  was  ten 
years  before  the  system  was  so  altered  and 
extended  that  opportunity  was  given  for  the 
training  of  boys  who  were  qualified  to  take  a 
part  in  the  defense  of  the  country,  but  who  did 
not  attend  school. 

The  system  was  found  to  be  unsatisfactory 
to  so  marked  a  degree  that  in  1909  compulsory 
military  training  became  the  law.  This  law 
became  operative  on  June  30,  1911,  when  the 
volunteer  system  of  military  training  came  to 
an  end  and  compulsory  training  began. 

The  military  and  naval  forces  were  divided 
to  permanent  and  citizen  organizations;  the 
one  bound  for  a  definite  term  of  service,  the 
other  not  so  bound.  Until  1911  the  permanent 
forces  were  designated  as  the  militia  and  were 
paid,  and  the  remaining  citizen  soldiers  were 
classed  as  volunteers,  not  ordinarily  paid  for 
their  service,  but  provided  with  a  reserve 
which  included  members  of  rifle  clubs  and  men 

161 


ARE  WE  READY? 

who  had  seen  active  service  at  some  other 
time. 

Up  to  the  time  that  the  compulsory  training 
law  became  operative,  enlistment  was  volun- 
tary in  time  of  peace.  Between  the  ages  of 
eighteen  and  sixty  years,  all  male  citizens  were 
declared  to  be  members  of  the  army  and  liable 
to  service,  in  time  of  war,  within  the  territorial 
limits  of  Australia  only.  The  departure  from 
the  old  theory  was  a  most  radical  one.  The 
Act  of  1909  was  the  direct  outcome  of  a  popu- 
lar belief  that  the  defense  of  Australia  under 
the  volunteer  system  was  wholly  insufficient. 

The  important  section  of  the  new  law  reads 

as  follows :  — 

All  male  inhabitants  of  Australia  (excepting 
those  who  are  exempted  by  this  Act),  who  have 
resided  therein  for  six  months  and  are  British  sub- 
jects, shall  be  liable  to  be  trained  as  follows:  (a) 
from  12  to  14  years  of  age  in  the  junior  cadets; 

(b)  from  14  to  18  years  of  age  in  the  senior  cadets; 

(c)  from  18  to  26  years  of  age  in  the  citizen  forces; 
provided  that,  except  in  time  of  imminent  danger 
or  war,  the  last  year  of  service  in  the  citizen  forces 
shall  be  limited  to  one  registration  or  one  muster 
parade. 

162 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

At  about  the  age  when  the  average  American 
youth  is  tormenting  his  neighbors  with  "bean- 
shooters"  and  making  the  hfe  of  the  family  cat 
almost  unendurable  with  the  inevitable  air- 
gun,  the  Australian  youth  is  beginning  to  get 
the  beginnings  of  a  training  that  will  even- 
tually turn  him  out  as  a  trained  unit  of  his 
country's  defense. 

On  July  1  of  his  twelfth  year,  every  Aus- 
tralian boy  who  has  been  found  to  be  physi- 
cally, morally,  and  mentally  fit,  becomes  a 
junior  cadet.  The  Government  gives  him  a  hat, 
a  shirt,  breeches,  puttees,  and  shoes.  He  re- 
ceives ninety  hours  of  military  training  each 
year  for  two  years,  when  he  graduates  into  the 
ranks  of  the  senior  cadets.  For  four  years  he  is 
put  through  a  course  of  drilling,  marching,  dis- 
ciplining, the  handUng  of  arms,  physical  train- 
ing, guard  duty,  and  elementary  tactics.  Each 
year  he  receives  a  minimum  of  four  four-hour 
drills,  twelve  two-hour  drills,  and  twenty -four 
one-hour  drills.  Upon  entering  the  senior  ca- 
dets, he  becomes  the  proud  possessor  of  a 
cadet  rifle  and  belt.    If,  as  a  marksman,  he 

163 


ARE  WE  READY? 

can  meet  certain  stipulated  requirements,  he 
is  allowed  to  handle  a  man's-size  gun  and  to 
take  part  in  target  practice  with  the  service 
rifle. 

Military  experts,  comparing  the  rifle  fire  of 
the  soldiers  of  the  European  nations  involved 
in  the  present  war,  invariably  comment  on  the 
marked  superiority  of  the  British  over  the 
German  riflemen.  They  agree  that  this  supe- 
riority is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Enghshman 
finds  his  target  before  he  pulls  the  trigger.  Be- 
fore the  missile  leaves  its  chamber  Tommy 
Atkins  is  pretty  sure  on  the  one  thing  that  the 
German  has  the  vaguest  notion  about  —  where 
death  in  a  steel  jacket  is  going  to.  Likewise, 
those  theories  once  propounded  by  profound 
students  of  things  military,  that  rifle  fire  and 
other  forms  of  close-range  killing  would  play 
a  very  small  part  in  modern  warfare,  have 
been  exploded  by  what  is  happening  every  day 
in  Europe. 

The  British  passion  for  expert  marksman- 
ship is  reflected  in  the  Australian  military  sys- 
tem.  Not  only  does  the  senior  cadet  have  the 

164 


Ij      THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

opportunity  of  reaching  his  ambition  of  shoot- 
ing with  a  real  war  gun,  but  he  knows  that 
when  he  is  nineteen  years  old  he  is  to  become 
a  full-fledged  member  of  the  citizen  force  of 
his  country. 

At  that  time  he  receives,  in  addition  to  his 
previous  equipment,  two  woolen  shirts,  two 
pairs  of  breeches,  an  overcoat,  a  hat,  a  sleeping- 
cap,  two  pairs  of  leggings,  two  pairs  of  shoes, 
a  kit  pack,  service  rifle,  and  bayonet. 

As  a  citizen  soldier,  he  must  each  year  re- 
ceive not  less  than  the  equivalent  of  sixteen 
whole  days'  training,  eight  of  which  must  be 
in  camps  of  continuous  training. 

From  the  time  of  his  junior  cadetship,  the 
natural  tendencies  of  the  youth  are  observed, 
and  to  a  great  extent  he  is  allowed  to  follow  his 
bent  in  fitting  himself  for  a  part  in  the  coun- 
try's defense.  By  the  time  he  is  past  his  junior 
and  senior  cadetships,  what  arm  of  the  service 
he  is  best  fitted  for  is  usually  very  apparent. 

I  From  the  time  that  he  is  graduated  from  the 
ranks  of  the  senior  cadets  until  he  is  twenty- 
five  years  old,  he  receives  infantry  and  cavalry 
I 


ARE  WE  READY? 

drill  or  staflF  corps  training.  To  attend  one 
muster  parade  is  all  that  is  required  of  him  in 
his  twenty-sixth  year,  when  he  is  discharged 
from  "active  service."  Not  until  he  is  sixty 
years  of  age,  however,  does  he  cease  to  be  sub- 
ject to  a  call  to  the  colors  in  time  of  war.  To 
win  a  discharge  in  his  twenty-sixth  year  he 
must  be  able  to  show  twelve  annual  certificates 
of  proficiency,  which  have  been  issued  by  a 
board  of  officers  by  whom  he  is  examined  at 
the  end  of  every  year  of  his  training.  If  in  any 
year  he  fails  to  pass  the  efficiency  board  of 
examiners,  he  must  repeat  that  year  of  train- 
ing. 

The  citizen  soldier  of  Australia  receives  pro- 
motion based  entirely  upon  merit. 

Under  the  Defense  Act,  the  following  classes 
of  exemptions  exist:  persons  physically,  men- 
tally, or  morally  unfit,  members  and  officers  of 
Parliament,  judges,  police,  prison  employees, 
ministers  of  religion,  lighthouse  keepers,  and 
physicians  and  nurses  of  public  hospitals.  The 
Governor-General  may  by  proclamation  vary 
or  extend  these  exemptions  or  he  may  exempt 

166 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

specified  areas.  Persons  whose  religion  or  be- 
lief prohibits  them  from  bearing  arms  may 
be  exempted  from  service  in  the  combatant 
branches,  but  are  liable  for  service  in  the  sup- 
ply departments,  and  in  every  case  the  burden 
of  proof  rests  upon  the  person  claiming  exemp- 
tion. 

If  a  parent  or  guardian  fails  or  refuses  to 
register  a  son  or  ward  who  is  of  the  proper  age 
for  service,  or  if  any  employer,  of  the  type  in- 
clined to  subordinate  the  national  interest  to 
his  greed  for  money,  interferes  in  any  way  with 
the  military  service  of  his  employees,  he  is  sub- 
ject to  a  heavy  fine.  Employers  are  not  re- 
quired to  pay  employees  during  the  time  they 
are  on  military  duty. 

Now  the  Australian  Army  is  the  manhood 
of  the  country  —  trained  for  military  defense. 

The  Swiss  Army,  though  the  systems  diflFer 
in  certain  details,  is  the  same. 

The  United  States  Army  is  an  organiza- 
tion of  a  few  thousand  professional  soldiers, 
backed  by  the  manhood  of  the  country,  un- 
trained. 

167 


ARE  WE  READY? 

American  manhood  is  in  no  way  inferior  to 
Swiss  or  Australian  manhood. 

American  patriotism  is  in  no  way  inferior  to 
Swiss  or  Austrahan  patriotism. 

We  pride  ourselves,  with  reason,  on  our  in- 
dependent spirit  and  the  courage  to  back  it. 
Spirit  and  courage  are  about  all  we  have  in  a 
military  way.  Are  they  sufficient  for  any  situ- 
ation we  may  find  ourselves  in  ? 

Our  theory  of  defense,  laid  down  by  Wash- 
ington, and  changed  very  little  since  then,  is 
generally  considered  to  be  both  sound  and  ade- 
quate. That  theory  contemplates  a  small  pro- 
fessional army  as  a  nucleus  combined  with  the 
organized  militia  as  a  first  line  of  defense,  and 
the  whole  backed  by  the  citizenship.  Admin- 
istration after  administration  has  pointed  out 
our  failure  to  apply  this  theory  and  the  perils 
that  lurk  in  our  negligence.  Taft,  Roosevelt, 
and  Wilson,  Root,  Stimson,  and  Garrison,  as 
well  as  the  chief  men  of  our  military  establish- 
ment, have  all  at  intervals  had  something  to 
say  on  this  subject. 

Woodrow  Wilson,  in  his  message  to  Con- 
168 


» 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

gress,  during  the  closing  days  of  1914,  said 
this:  — 

We  must  depend  in  every  time  of  national  peril, 
in  the  future  as  in  the  past,  not  upon  a  standing 
army,  nor  yet  upon  a  reserve  army,  but  upon  a  cit- 
izenry trained  and  accustomed  to  arms.  It  will  be 
right  enough  —  right  American  policy,  based  upon 
our  accustomed  principles  and  practices  —  to  pro- 
vide a  system  by  which  every  citizen  who  will  vol- 
unteer for  the  training  may  be  made  familiar  with 
the  use  of  modern  arms,  the  rudiments  of  drill  and 
maneuver,  and  the  maintenance  and  sanitation 
of  camps.  We  should  encourage  such  training  and 
make  it  a  means  of  discipline  which  our  young  men 
will  learn  to  value.  It  is  right  that  we  should  pro- 
vide it  not  only,  but  that  we  should  make  it  as 
attractive  as  possible,  and  so  induce  our  young 
men  to  undergo  it  at  such  times  as  they  can  com- 
mand a  little  freedom  and  can  seek  the  physical 
development  they  need,  for  mere  health's  sake,  if 
for  nothing  more.  Every  means  by  which  such 
things  can  be  stimulated  is  legitimate,  and  such  a 
method  smacks  of  true  American  ideas.  It  is  right, 
too,  that  the  National  Guard  of  the  States  should 
be  developed  and  strengthened  by  every  means 
which  is  not  inconsistent  with  our  obligations  to 
our  own  people  or  with  the  established  policy  of 
our  Government.   And  this,  also,  not  because  the 

169 


ARE  WE   READY  ? 

time  or  occasion  specially  calls  for  such  measures, 
but  because  it  should  be  our  constant  policy  to  make 
these  provisions  for  our  national  peace  and  safety. 
More  than  this  carries  with  it  a  reversal  of  the 
whole  history  and  character  of  our  policy.  More 
than  this,  proposed  at  this  time,  permit  me  to  say, 
would  mean  merely  that  we  had  lost  our  self-pos- 
session, that  we  had  been  thrown  off  our  balance 
by  a  war  with  which  we  have  nothing  to  do,  whose 
causes  cannot  touch  us,  whose  very  existence  affords 
us  opportunities  of  friendship  and  disinterested 
service  which  should  make  us  ashamed  of  any 
thought  of  hostility  or  fearful  preparation  for 
trouble. 

In  his  Annual  Report  of  1914,  Lindley  M. 
Garrison,  as  Secretary  of  War,  had  the  follow- 
ing comment  to  make  on  this  point:  —  . 

It  would  be  premature  to  attempt  now  to  draw 
the  ultimate  lessons  from  the  war  in  Europe.  It  is 
an  imperative  duty,  however,  to  heed  so  much  of 
what  it  brings  home  to  us  as  is  incontrovertible 
and  not  to  be  changed  by  any  event,  leaving  for 
later  and  more  detailed  and  comprehensive  consid- 
eration what  its  later  developments  and  final  con- 
clusions may  indicate. 

For  orderly  treatment  certain  preliminary  con- 
siderations may  be  usefully  adverted  to.  It  is,  of 
course,  not  necessary  to  dwell  on  the  blessings  of 

170 


d 


COLLEGE  STUDENTS  LEARNING  THE  FINE  POINTS  OF 
TRENCH-DIGGING 


*    V    4    ^ 


A  STUDENT  SOLDIERS'  MESS 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 


I  peace  and  the  horrors  of  war.  Every  one  desires 
peace,  just  as  every  one  desires  health,  content- 
ment, affection,  sufficient  means  for  comfortable 

|l  existence,  and  other  similarly  beneficent  things. 
But  peace  and  the  other  states  of  being  just  men- 
tioned are  not  always  or  even  often  solely  within 
one's  own  control.  Those  who  are  thoughtful  and 
have  courage  face  the  facts  of  life,  take  lessons  from 
experience,  and  strive  by  wise  conduct  to  attain 
the  desirable  things,  and  by  prevision  and  precau- 
tion to  protect  and  defend  them  when  obtained.  It 
may  truthfully  be  said  that  eternal  vigilance  is  the 
price  which  must  be  paid  in  order  to  obtain  the  de- 
sirable things  of  life  and  to  defend  them. 

I  In  collective  affairs  the  interests  of  the  group 
are  confided  to  the  Government,  and  it  thereupon 
is  charged  with  the  duty  to  preserve  and  defend 
these  things.  The  Government  must  exercise  for 
the  Nation  the  precautionary,  defensive,  and  pre- 
servative measures  necessary  to  that  end.  All  gov- 
ernments must  therefore  have  force  —  physical 
force  —  i.e.,  military  force  —  for  these  purposes. 
The  question  for  each  nation  when  this  matter  is 
under  consideration,  is.  How  much  force  should  it 
have  and  of  what  should  that  force  consist? 

We  already  have  our  nucleus  for  defense  — 
a  very  expensive  one  —  well  trained,  well  oflS- 
cered,  and  moderately  well  equipped.    For  a 

171 


ARE  WE  READY? 

nucleus  it  is  pretty  well  scattered.  Washing- 
ton, of  course,  could  not  foresee  that  we  should 
have  to  maintain  fighting  men  at  such  distances 
as  the  Philippines,  Hawaii,  and  Panama. 

Back  of  this  nucleus,  in  accordance  with  the 
original  idea,  we  have  the  militia,  each  state 
organization  adequate  for  local  needs,  no 
doubt,  but  woefully  lacking  as  a  first  line  of 
national  defense  —  its  theoretical  function. 
Our  militia  as  a  whole  is  so  incompletely  organ- 
ized and  so  inadequately  equipped  that  it  would 
be  next  to  powerless  if  pitted  against  a  well- 
prepared  foe  under  modern  methods  of  warfare* 

As  a  nation,  we  have  a  lot  of  family  pride. 
We  are  warlike,  but  not  mihtary.  We  are  quick 
to  resent  insult  and  very  confident  of  our  abil- 
ity to  maintain  our  position.  With  unlimited 
miUtary  resources  there  is  no  doubt  that  we 
are  abundantly  able  to  take  care  of  ourselves. 
But  we  are  apt  to  forget  that  war  has  developed 
from  a  glacier  to  an  avalanche;  that  modern 
international  blows  are  struck  unexpectedly 
and  with  lightning  quickness;  and  that  in  a 
time  of  desperate  and  sudden  necessity,  unde- 

172 


THE  GREAT  AMERICAN  BUGABOO 

veloped  resources  of  men  and  materials  would 
be  as  useless  as  would  be  an  undeveloped  gold 
mine  in  Alaska  in  a  Wall  Street  panic. 

Our  family  has  men,  money,  and  materials 
more  than  sufficient  for  any  military  need. 
But  we  lack  group  and  individual  team  work. 
No  one  has  yet  devised  a  successful  scheme 
for  securing  effective  military  cooperation  be- 
tween the  States  and  the  Federal  Government. 
Jasper  and  Henry  and  Brother  Hiram  are  all 
tied  up  in  their  local  troubles.  They  are  fight- 
ers, every  last  one  of  them,  but  they  have  n't 
had  time  nor  a  desire  to  spend  the  money  nec- 
essary to  prepare  themselves  for  trouble  that 
might  involve  everybody.  Such  an  emergency 
has  appeared  to  us  all  to  be  the  very  remotest 
possibility.  Satisfied  with  our  natural  strength, 
we  have  had  but  the  vaguest  concern  as  to 
what  shape  we  should  be  in  if  we  should  be 
brought  suddenly  to  face  the  necessity  of 
getting  together  for  the  defense  of  all. 

There  is  a  growing  conviction  that  this  is 
not  wisdom  and  that  it  is  not  fair  to  the  httle 
body  of  men  whom  we  hire  to  protect  us. 

173 


ARE  WE  READY? 

This  conviction,  for  a  long  time,  has  been 
crystallizing,  in  some  quarters,  into  a  deter- 
mination to  find  a  way  out.  Some  of  our  states- 
men and  miUtary  men,  notably  former  Secre- 
tary of  War  Henry  L.  Stimson,  and  former 
Chief  of  Staff  Leonard  Wood,  have  been  grap- 
pling with  the  problem.  The  Swiss  idea  and 
the  military  theories  of  other  nations  have 
been  given  the  closest  study. 

A  start  has  already  been  made;  a  beginning 
of  a  system  of  genuine  and  adequate  citizen 
defense  which  already  has  received  the  endorse- 
ment of  President  Wilson,  Secretary  of  War 
Garrison,  President  Hibben  of  Princeton, 
President  Lowell  of  Harvard,  President  Had- 
ley  of  Yale,  and  other  men  of  equal  standing. 

And  not  one  of  them  suggests  the  peril  of 
militarism! 


■F     Thos 


CHAPTER    IX 
THE  EXTRA  TIRE  IN  WAR 


Those  gentlemen  who  have  been  telHng  us 
that  the  United  States  is  the  only  first-class 
nation  in  the  world  which  has  no  military 
reserve  must  have  a  care  lest  they  be  put  down 
as  jingos,  attempting  to  create  hysteria  by 
inflammable  and  inaccurate  utterances. 

We  have  a  reserve.  It  consists  of  16  men. 
At  least,  it  did  up  to  November  15, 1914.  Some 
of  it  may  have  departed  this  life  by  the  time 
these  pages  reach  the  press;  but  the  chances 
are  that  it  is  safe  and  accurate  to  say  that  our 
reserve  to-day  is  about  what  it  was  in  the  mid- 
dle of  November,  1914. 

We  have  a  reserve  law,  too.  Under  its  pro- 
visions a  man  intending  to  enlist  in  the  regular 
army  has  the  privilege  at  the  time  of  his  enlist- 
ment of  expressing  a  wish  that  he  be  discharged 
on  furlough  when  he  has  served  his  term,  and 
HI  be  held  subject  to  recall  to  the  colors  at  any 

I 


I 


ARE  WE  READY? 

time  his  services  may  be  needed.  In  twenty- 
four  months  this  law  produced  the  16  reserv- 
ists. 

And  there  we  are. 

The  law  is  a  joke  —  just  as  much  of  a  joke  as 
the  "American  Landsturm."  If  by  any  chance 
war  should  be  brought  our  way  by  any  first- 
class  nation  on  earth,  the  joke  would  instantly 
become  a  tragedy;  and  it  is  the  purpose  of  this 
volume  to  serve  in  its  small  way  in  presenting 
facts  and  figures  that  may  assist  the  Ameri- 
can people  in  reaching  some  conclusion  as  to 
whether  our  small  regular  army  and  our  incom- 
plete and  poorly  organized  militia  are  sufficient 
military  protection  for  this  country. 

The  territory  of  continental  United  States 
is  about  3,027,000  square  miles,  with  a  popu- 
lation of  about  99,000,000.  There  are  590,800 
square  miles  in  Alaska  and  a  population  of 
about  65,000.  We  have  spent  $400,000,000  as 
an  investment  in  the  Panama  Canal.  In 
Hawaii,  the  population  of  192,000  is  contained 
within  6500  square  miles.  The  area  of  Porto 
Rico  is  about  3600  square  miles,  with  a  popu- 

176 


THE  EXTRA  TIRE  IN  WAR 

lation  of  1,118,000.  In  the  Philippine  Islands, 
with  127,800  square  miles,  there  is  a  population 
of  7,640,000. 

Our  miUtary  responsibilities  over  this  scat- 
tered area  are  both  heavy  and  complicated. 
The  distribution  of  our  regular  army  of  less 
than  90,000  men  has  been  described  in  detail 
in  a  previous  chapter. 

The  most  superficial  study  of  our  standing 
military  forces  and  the  duties  which  devolve 
upon  them,  reveals  immediately  the  utter  folly 
of  contending  that  our  available  miUtary  forces 
could  cope  successfully  with  even  as  small  an 
army  as  200,000  trained  men  of  any  first-class 
power.  In  his  Report  for  1914,  Lindley  M. 
Garrison,  as  Secretary  of  War,  compared  our 
peace  and  war  strength  with  those  of  other 
nations,  as  shown  on  the  following  page. 

Mr.  Garrison's  figures  for  the  United  States 
are  generous.  They  include  the  Philippine 
scouts  and  the  organized  militia.  As  has  been 
previously  pointed  out,  there  is  a  vast  difference 
between  paper  strength  and  actual  strength. 
It  is  the  opinion  of  those  who  have  given  the 

177 


ARE  WE  READY? 


Area 

(square  miles) 

Germany 

208,830 

France 

207,054 

Russia 

8,647,657 

Great  Britain 

and  colonies 

11,467,294 

Italy 

110,550 

Austria-Hun- 

gary  

261,035 

Japan 

147.655 

Turkey 

1,186,874 

Spain 

194,783 

Switzerland. . . 

15,976 

Sweden 

172,876 

Belgium 

11,373 

United  States. 

3,026,789 

Population 

Peace 
strength 

64,903,423 

620,000 

38,961,945 

560,000 

160,095.200 

1,200,000 

396,294,752 

254,500 

32,475,253 

275,000 

49,418,596 

360,000 

53,875,390 

230,000 

35,764,876 

420,000 

19,503,008 

115,000 

3,741,971 

140,000 

5,476,441 

75,000 

7,074,910 

42,000 

98,781,324 

97,760 

Total 

trained  war 

strength 


4,000,000 
3,000,000 
4,500,000 

800,000 
1,200,000 

2,000,000 

1,200,000 

1,200,000 

300,000 

275,000 

400,000 

180,000 

1225.170 


*  Including  Philippine  scouts  and  Organized  Militia. 

closest  study  to  this  subject  that  the  actual 
and  immediate  war  strength  of  our  regular 
army  and  militia  combined,  including  combat- 
ants and  non-combatants  and  troops  in  for- 
eign service,  is  not  more  than  140,000  men;  and 
that  the  total  armed  force  which  we  could 
assemble  on  instant  notice  at  any  one  point 
within  the  continental  limits  of  the  United 
States,  a  force  which  could  be  looked  to  for 
immediate  resistance  of  invasion,  is  not  more 
than  50,000  men,  including  regular  troops  and 
miUtia.  The  whole  outfit  could  be  put  into  the 

178 


THE  EXTRA  TIRE  IN  WAR 

Yale  Bowl,  and  there  would  be  room  left  for  a 
good-sized  crowd  of  admiring  sisters. 

Mr.  Garrison's  figures  for  Switzerland,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  most  conservative.  Swit- 
zerland really  has  no  standing  army.  Its  per- 
manent establishment  consists  of  a  general 
staff  and  a  small  number  of  recruiting,  supply, 
and  instructor  oflScers.  With  a  population  of 
4,000,000,  Switzerland,  in  1912,  had  a  mili- 
tary  force  of  490,340  men,  fully  organized  and 
equipped,  well  trained  and  disciplined,  and 
instantly  available.  Incidentally,  the  military 
expense  of  the  Government  for  that  year  was 
$8,299,941,  or  $16.77  per  man.  Our  regular 
soldier  costs  us  about  $1000  each  year.  Mr. 
Garrison's  figures  for  England,  France,  and 
Russia  were  low.  The  peace  armies  of  these 
countries  were  greatly  augmented  subsequent 
to  his  report. 


Back  of  our  hired  regular  force,  and  back  of 
our  militia,  we  have  16  trained  men  as  Usted 
reservists ! 

Back  of  the  whole  is  the  citizenship  —  a 
179 


ARE  WE  READY? 

citizenship  second  to  none  in  the  world  in 
hardihood,  courage,  intelhgence,  and  patriot- 
ism.   That   this   citizenship,   in   any  conflict 


Boardman  Robinson,  del, 
WE  HAVE  16  TRAINED  MEN  AS  LISTED  RESERVISTS 

with  any  power  on  earth,  would  ultimately 
triumph,  we  none  of  us  question. 

What  do  we  want  to  pay  in  life,  property, 
and  treasure,  for  ultimate  triumph  ?  About 
that  question  centers  the  whole  military  prob- 
lem of  the  United  States.  There  are  two  pos- 
sible answers  to  it :  — 

180 


THE  EXTRA  TIRE  IN  WAR 


Either  we  can  continue  to  ignore  the  prin- 
ciples of  our  mihtary  poHcy; 

Or  we  can  devise  means  whereby  our  whole 
citizenship  will  have  opportunity  to  re- 
ceive military  training. 

In  other  words:  — 

We  shall  have  a  reserve; 

Or  we  shall  not  have  a  reserve. 

Or  still  another  way:  — 

We  shall  continue  to  throw  the  whole  burden 
of  first  defense  on  a  handful  of  professional 
hired  soldiers; 

Or  we  shall  undertake  to  fit  ourselves  intel- 
Ugently  to  back  our  hired  men  in  time  of 
national  peril. 

It  all  means  that:  — 

We  shajl  continue  to  invite  trouble  by  our 
unpreparedness  for  it; 

Or  we  shall  discourage  foreign  trouble- 
seekers  by  being  ready  for  any  military 
emergency. 

Those  of  us  who  spend  our  week-ends  in 
automobiles  would  feel  a  certain  sense  of  dis- 
grace if  our  neighbors  should  catch  us  start- 

181 


ARE  WE  READY? 

ing  out  without  our  extra  tire.  Some  of  us  are 
inclined  to  surround  ourselves  with  an  atmos- 
phere of  disgusting  prosperity  by  packing 
along  two  extras;  and  if  we  head  away  on  a 
particularly  long,  rough,  dangerous,  or  impor- 
tant trip,  a  few  of  us  carry  a  whole  extra  set. 

What  is  more,  we  take  pains  in  providing 
tires  that  fit  our  rims.  Think  of  it!  We  make 
sure  that  tires  and  rims  match.  Why,  we  even 
insist  that  the  threads  of  our  extra  spark  plugs 
shall  match  up  with  the  threads  that  are  to 
receive  them;  and  that  extra  parts  shall  be 
especially  designed  for  our  particular  machine. 
Yet  nobody  ever  accuses  us  of  letting  these 
precautions  for  safety,  convenience,  and  com- 
fort interfere  with  our  commercial,  profes- 
sional, or  domestic  duties  and  activities.  It 
is  most  remarkable. 

Now  I  am  not  ready  to  admit  that  this  di- 
gression is  far-fetched. 

Our  army  is  a  machine  —  a  most  expensive 
one.  A  nation  keeps  a  military  machine  on 
hand  for  use  in  emergency.    Its  efficiency  as  a 

182 


THE  EXTRA  TIRE  IN  WAR 

nation's  economic  possession  depends  upon 
the  fighting  power  it  can  develop  and  maintain 
in  conjBict. 

As  soon  as  a  mihtary  machine  is  used  in 
actual  warfare,  it  immediately  becomes  sub- 
ject to  heavy  losses.  Wear  and  tear  begins. 
Parts  are  broken,  destroyed,  lost  through  sick- 
ness or  desertion,  or  stolen. 

Not  all  the  losses  are  directly  due  to  vio* 
lence.  Some  come  through  disease,  some 
through  the  hard  going  —  the  hardships  of  a 

I  campaign.  In  its  marches  to  Sedan  the  Prus- 
sian Guard  lost  5000  men.  The  Guard  had  to 
arrive  at  a  given  place  on  time,  and  the  neces- 
sary speed  of  marching  was  more  destructive 
than  battle.  The  members  of  that  Guard  were 
trained  soldiers.  Raw,  soft  troops  would  never 
have  arrived  at  all,  in  all  probability. 

We  spend  large  amounts  of  money  to  main- 
tain military  forces  through  long  periods  of 
■I  peace  which  we  count  upon  to  meet  a  com- 
paratively brief  emergency  in  war.    It  would 
appear  to  be  sound  economics  as  well  as  ordi- 
^     nary  horse  sense  that  the  war  eflSciency  of  our 


ARE  WE  READY? 

machine  should  be  commensurate  with  the 
money  we  spend  on  it  in  time  of  peace. 

It  is  not  —  by  any  means. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  we  know  that  our 
fighting  machine  will,  in  war,  immediately  de- 
teriorate unless  we  provide  for  replacing  loss 
and  destruction  of  its  parts,  both  trivial  and 
vital,  we  have,  throughout  our  military  history, 
persisted  in  ignoring  the  peril  that  is  involved 
in  our  neglect  to  apply  the  sound  and  funda- 
mental principles  of  our  established  military 
poHcy. 

It  has  been  proved  by  cold  figures  and  broad 
averages  that  in  modern  warfare  any  given 
unit  loses  near  to  fifty  per  cent  of  its  initial 
strength  during  the  first  six  months  of  a  con- 
flict. If  the  parts  making  up  this  loss  are  not 
replaced  with  other  identical  parts,  the  fight- 
ing machine  loses  at  least  haK  its  power.  If 
the  lost  and  destroyed  parts  are  replaced  by 
inferior  and  ill-fitting  ones,  the  initial  eflFec- 
tiveness  of  the  machine  is  destroyed  in  the 
ratio  of  the  rapidity  with  which  the  new  parts 
can  be  remodeled  and  adjusted. 

184 


THE  EXTRA  TIRE  IN  WAR 


Remodeling  and  readjusting  mean  careful 
training.  Training  can  be  accomplished  eco- 
nomically in  time  of  peace  or  at  a  frightful  cost 
during  the  progress  of  actual  war. 

The  United  States  is  the  only  great  nation 
of  the  world  that  chooses  the  latter  course.  In 
all  the  wars  in  our  history,  the  units  first  sent 
into  the  field  have  shrunk;  and  as  they  dwin- 
dled, new  bodies,  untrained,  and  under  un- 
trained oflBcers,  have  been  organized,  and 
sent  into  the  line  of  battle.  The  results  from 
■|lhe  Revolution  down  have  been  a  demonstra- 
tion that  continued  and  persistent  fighting  is 
impossible  under  such  a  system.  With  almost 
every  battle  followed  by  exhaustion,  disorgan- 
ization, and  a  period  of  inactivity,  our  wars 
have  dragged  out  their  weary  course,  taking  a 
toll  of  life  and  treasure  out  of  all  proportion  to 
the  sacrifice  that  would  be  necessary  under  a 
system  of  military  preparedness. 
Ht  Our  military  peace  organization  is  the  auto- 
^"mobile  stripped  down  to  the  motor,  chassis, 
and  driving  gears.  Not  only  should  there  be 
at  hand  the  necessary  spare  parts,  but  there 


ARE  WE  READY? 

should  be  accessible  the  means  for  building  it 
up  completely  without  confusion  at  a  mo- 
ment's notice. 

The  army  was  never  intended  to  be  more 
than  the  peace  skeleton  for  an  adequate  war 
force.  Our  forebears  went  on  the  assumption 
that  we  would  supply  ourselves  with  the  means 
of  expansion.  That  we  have  not  done  so  can 
be  charged  to  the  negligence  of  our  legislators, 
not  to  those  in  charge  of  our  military  affairs. 
An  adequate  reserve  of  trained  men  would 
mean  that,  at  the  present  time  and  in  the  future, 
our  standing  forces  should  be  kept  at  the  ab- 
solute minimum  consistent  with  the  military 
obligations  devolving  upon  us  in  time  of  peace, 
and  our  security  in  the  face  of  a  threatened 
invasion. 

Suppose  that  an  invasion  actually  threat- 
ened. Suppose  that,  in  the  opinion  of  our  miU- 
tary  experts,  an  army  of  100,000  men  were 
necessary  successfully  to  repel  an  attack  by 
land.  Not  only  should  we  have  to  put  these 
100,000  trained  men  into  the  field,  but  we 
should  have  to  maintain  a  force  of  that  size 

186 


THE  EXTRA  TIRE  IN  WAR 


I 

H  throughout  a  campaign.  We  should  have  to 
H  avoid,  first  of  all,  a  lowering  of  the  efficiency  of 
the  initial  force  through  the  absorption  of  raw 
recruits  to  replace  the  first  losses.  We  should 
assume,  with  good  ground,  that  during  the  first 
six  months  of  fighting,  we  should  lose  about 
fifty  per  cent  of  our  initial  fighting  fine.  If  the 
training  of  recruits  were  begun  at  once,  some 
of  the  new  men  would  be  ready  to  go  to  the 
front  before  the  expiration  of  the  six  months. 
Perhaps  we  might  be  able  so  to  train  25,000 
raw  recruits.  In  order,  therefore,  to  maintain 
100,000  men  at  top  efficiency  during  six  months 
of  war,  our  fighting  force  would  have  to  have 
an  initial  strength  of  125,000  trained  men. 

All  this  is  based  on  the  assumption  of  our 
military  organization  being  without  trained 

■  reserves.  With  the  average  cost  of  each  soldier 
$1000,  this  force  would  cost  us  $125,000,000 
per  year. 

■      Suppose   that,   under  these  same  circum- 
stances, we  had  at  hand  a  trained  reserve  of 
50,000  men.    Our  professional  military  estab- 
_     lishment,  then,  could  be  limited  to  75,000  men, 

L 


n 


ARE  WE  READY? 

and  it  has  been  estimated  that  the  cost  per 
year  for  maintaining  such  a  force  at  top  effi- 
ciency would  not  be  more  than  $75,000,000. 
The  war  effectiveness  of  such  a  peace  organi- 
zation would  be  as  high  as  the  larger  standing 
army. 

We  can't  seem  to  get  it  out  of  our  national 
head  that  the  "Indian  Days"  are  past.  In 
those  days  the  longer  we  held  a  man  in  the  serv- 
ice, the  better  he  became  acquainted  with  the 
ways  of  the  redskin  and  the  more  efficient  as 
an  Indian  fighter  he  was.  To-day  we  need  men 
ready  for  any  emergency  —  sound  in  body 
and  trained  for  modern  warfare.  Yet  we  persist 
in  looking  upon  our  army  as  a  police  force. 
The  longer  a  policeman  deals  with  crooks  and 
criminals,  the  more  efficient  he  is  in  locating 
criminals  and  suppressing  crime.  Only  in  ac- 
tual warfare  is  this  true  of  the  soldier.  In  time 
of  peace  he  can  only  study  military  science  and 
keep  his  body  in  trim  to  apply  what  he  has 
learned.  Our  police-force  system  of  enlistment, 
as  a  matter  of  pure  business,  is  ridiculous.  We 
take  a  man  into  the  army,  train  him,  and  pay 

188 


THE  EXTRA  TIRE  IN  WAR 

him  the  most  at  the  time  that  he  is  least  effi- 
cient —  when  he  is  on  the  down  grade.  And  we 
have  very  few  of  him,  at  that. 

Suppose  we  took  him  for  a  very  short  period 
of  enhstment,  and  at  the  end  of  it  returned  him 
to  civil  life,  thereafter  calling  him  to  the  colors 
only  for  a  few  days'  brushing  up  each  year,  and 
in  time  of  war.  He  would  cost  not  more  than 
$100  a  year.  The  regular  soldier  costs  about 
$1000.  For  what  we  pay  for  each  regular,  we 
could  have  ten  reservists.  And  the  reservist 
would  be  in  all  respects  the  equal  of  the  regular 
as  a  unit  of  defense. 

The  regular  army  was  designed  originally 
to  be,  among  other  things,  a  training  school. 
It  has  proved  its  efficiency  in  this  respect,  but 
year  after  year  we  have  continued  the  poUcy 
of  educating  and  training  our  citizens  who 
have  enlisted  in  the  regular  army,  and  then  of 
returning  them  to  private  life  w^ithout  provid- 
ing any  means  of  assuring  ourselves  of  their 
further  services  if  ever  required. 

We  shall,  of  course,  always  need  a  regular 
force  sufficient  for  garrison  duty  at  home  and 

189 


ARE  WE  READY? 

abroad.  But  if  we  ever  decide  to  substitute, 
for  minimum  defensive  strength  at  maximum 
cost,  maximum  strength  at  minimum  cost,  we 
are  going  to  find  the  trained  reserve  the  easy 
and  democratic  way  out. 

The  time  that  must  be  consumed  in  making 
an  efficient  soldier  out  of  a  raw  recruit  in  the 
regular  army  training-school  is  a  matter  con- 
cerning which  there  is  a  rather  wide  diver- 
gence of  opinion.  Averaging  the  views  of  mili- 
tary men  of  long  experience,  it  can  be  safely 
said  that  the  regular  army  can  turn  out  a  sol- 
dier in  twelve  months.  From  my  talks  with 
leading  military  men,  I  am  inclined  to  the  be- 
lief that  a  recruit  of  average  intelligence  and 
good  habits  can  be  made  an  effective  fighting 
unit  within  six  months.  It  is  a  fact  that  has 
been  established  that  any  young  man  of  good 
health  and  average  mental  equipment  can  be 
fitted  for  military  service  within  that  time. 
Under  a  system  of  intensive  training,  the  ex- 
periment has  been  successfully  tried  in  other 
countries. 

What  is  more,  there  is  no  good  reason  why 
190 


the  militia  organizations,  as  well  as  the  regular 
army,  should  not  be  useful  as  military  training- 
schools. 

■L  Should  Congress  suddenly  decide,  after  long 
years  of  inactivity,  that  it  is  in  the  interest 
of  the  nation  to  put  something  beside  high- 
sounding  utterances  complimentary  to  the 
manhood  of  the  nation  behind  our  hired  sol- 
diers and  our  militiamen,  and  should  it  enact 
legislation  under  which  a  reserve  strength  could 

Hi  be  built  up,  we  should  still  be  without  the  one 
great  essential  for  turning  recruits  into  trained 
soldiers.  We  have  hardly  enough  officers  for 
our  present  regular  army,  and  not  nearly 
enough  efficient  officers  to  bring  our  militia  to 
the  degree  of  organization  and  effectiveness 
which  it  should  have.  Theoretically,  we  should 
have  sufficient  officers  in  the  regular  army  to 
assist  in  the  training  of  the  mihtia,  and  if  we 
should  decide  that  it  would  be  good  business 
for  us,  in  addition,  to  have  a  reserve,  we  should 
have  absolutely  no  officers  available  to  handle 
the  detail  of  organizing,  training,  and  admin- 
istering  the  reserve,  not  to  mention  the  fact 


ARE  WE  READY? 

that  if  the  regular  army  should  be  expanded 
with  reserve  troops,  we  should  not  have  any- 
where near  enough  leaders  to  handle  the  larger 
force  in  time  of  war. 

"If  we  were  called  upon  to  mobilize  to  meet 
a  first-class  power,"  said  General  Leonard 
Wood,  recently,  "we  should  require  immedi- 
ately several  thousand  officers.  Where  are  we 
to  get  them?  This  is  a  matter  of  vital  impor- 
tance and  one  which  should  be  attended  to  at 
once,  and  not  left  to  the  rush,  hurry,  and  con- 
fusion preceding  the  war." 

A  possible  answer  to  General  Wood's  ques- 
tion will  be  given  further  on. 

Should  we  find  a  way  to  supply  ourselves 
with  a  reserve  of  men  and  of  officers  suffi- 
cient to  bring  the  regular  army  and  the  militia 
to  war  strength  in  absolute  uniformity  of  or- 
ganization, the  final  problem  would  be  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  reserve  of  war  material.  Our 
military  forces,  particularly  the  militia,  are  not 
only  without  the  equipment  that  would  be 
essential  to  any  successful  campaign,  but  we 
have  taken  no  means  whatever  of  supplying 

192 


n 


i( 


THE  EXTRA  TIRE  IN  WAR 

anything  like  a  reserve  supply  of  weapons,  par- 
ticularly field  guns,  ammunition,  supplies,  hos- 
pital trains,  and  the  equipment  necessary  to 
eflScient  operation  of  other  auxiliary  arms  of 
the  service. 

There  are  two  vital  aspects  of  this  situation : 
The  first  is  the  safety  of  the  nation;  and  the 
second  is  the  unfairness,  which  in  time  of  war 
I  will  amount  to  criminal  negligence  on  our  part, 
in  putting  such  a  burden  of  responsibihty  as 
now  exists  upon  men  who  have  voluntarily 
stepped  forward  as  willing  to  train  themselves 
for  the  defense  of  the  nation. 

President  Taft  emphasized  the  fact  that  a 
large  body  of  men  does  not  necessarily  consti- 
tute an  army,  and  that  a  volunteer  enUsted 
to-day,  or  a  militiaman  enrolled  to-morrow, 
I  cannot  be  expected,  no  matter  what  his  desire 
may  be,  to  be  an  effective  fighting  unit  at  once. 

What  has  been  accomplished  in  our  military 
history  by  the  soldiers  who  have  made  up  our 
forces  under  the  shpshod  system  which  has 

Bued  since  the  Revolution,  is  the  highest 
e  to  the  spirit  and  valor  of  the  individual 


t 


ARE  WE  READY? 

American  soldier,  whether  regular  or  militia- 
man. 

Our  unfairness  toward  the  man  who  volun- 
tarily assumes  his  share  of  the  burden  of  the 
national  defense  was  emphasized  by  General 
Richard  Henry  Lee,  commander  of  the  famous 
Partisan  Legion.  Years  after  the  Revolution, 
Lee  said  this:  "A  government  is  the  murderer 
of  its  citizens  which  sends  them  to  the  field 
uninformed  and  untaught,  where  they  are 
to  meet  men  of  the  same  age  and  strength, 
mechanized  by  education  and  discipline  for 
battle." 


m 


CHAPTER  X 
WELL? 

What  are  we  going  to  do  about  it? 

Probably,  either  we  are  going  to  assume  that 
there  is  no  need  to  do  anything  about  it,  or  we 
are  going  to  take  the  position  that,  because 
there  is  peril  in  our  present  state  of  military 
preparedness,  there  is  necessity  for  deciding 
upon  some  means  of  increasing  our  miUtary 
strength. 

Some  of  us  hold  very  firmly  to  the  belief  that 
our  system  in  its  present  application  is  suflS- 
cient  for  any  possible  emergency  which  we 
might  face,  and  point  to  the  successful  and  glo- 
rious outcome  of  every  armed  struggle  in  which 
we  have  been  engaged. 
I  Others  of  us  are  inclined  to  the  belief  that 
those  very  conflicts  furnish  the  strongest  proof 
of  the  unnecessary  disasters  and  needless  sacri- 
fices that  go  with  military  unreadiness. 

Assuming  that  a  first-class  nation  might  de- 
195 


» 


ARE  WE  READY? 

cide  that  it  would  be  profitable  and  advisable 
to  attack  us  by  land,  would  an  immediately 
available  force  of  50,000  trained  men,  plus  our 
patriotism,  be  adequate  for  our  defense?  Evi- 
dently such  a  force,  particularly  if  ill-equipped, 
poorly  organized,  and  not  supplied  with  suffi- 
cient field  artillery  and  ammunition,  would  be 
no  match  against  trained  troops,  perfectly 
equipped.  The  element,  then,  upon  which  we 
would  rely  to  give  us  superiority  and  ultimate 
success,  would  be  our  patriotism. 

It  was  an  inspiring  picture  which  William 
J.  Bryan,  as  Secretary  of  State,  is  quoted  as 
having  painted —  *'The  President  knows  that 
if  this  country  needed  a  milhon  men  and  needed 
them  in  a  day,  the  call  could  go  out  at  sunrise, 
and  the  sun  would  go  down  on  a  million  men 
under  arms."  But  it  is  a  picture  without  his- 
torical background.  Mr.  Bryan,  no  doubt,  in 
common  with  the  great  majority  of  people 
unexpert  in  things  military,  has  had  neither 
the  time  nor  the  inclination  to  study  the  re- 
quirements of  military  science.  Among  those 
of  us  whose  information  is  of  the  most  general 

196 


OPEX-ORDER  PRACTICE  AT  BURLINGTON,   VERMONT 


WELL  ? 

character,  nothing  is  more  common  than  mis- 
taking mihtary  resources  for  military  strength. 
This  misconception  is  particularly  characteris- 
tic of  the  American  people.  Our  histories  give 
us  the  record  of  our  triumphs  in  the  Revolution, 
in  the  War  of  1812,  and  succeeding  conflicts; 
and  since  nearly  all  of  these  wars  were,  for  the 
most  part,  begun  by  forces  of  militia  and  vol- 
unteers, we  have  very  naturally  formed  the 
conviction  that,  since  our  system  has  been  ulti- 
mately successful,  there  is  little  pressing  need 
for  altering  it. 

We  are  apt  to  forget  that,  in  relating  the 
events  of  our  wars,  our  historians  have  for  the 
most  part  limited  themselves  to  describing  the 
battles  that  have  been  fought,  without  laying 
much  stress  upon  the  delays  and  unnecessary 
disasters  which  accompanied  them;  nor  has  it 
been  pointed  out  to  us  that  in  nearly  every  in- 
stance our  wars  have  been  so  protracted  that 

I     the  national   resources  have  been  well-nigh 

I     exhausted. 

I         An  understanding  of  the  enormous  life  and 

I     treasure  loss  which  has  attended  our  refusal  to 

i^^  197 


ARE  WE  READY? 

carry  out  the  principles  of  our  military  policy 
would  surely  lead  to  prompt  remedy  of  the 
most  dangerous  of  our  present  weaknesses. 

Argue  as  we  may,  we  cannot  evade  the  fact 
that  all  our  wars  have  been  prolonged  for  lack 
of  preparation,  and  that  often  the  news  of 
humiliating  defeat  instead  of  victory  has 
plunged  the  people  into  mourning. 

Patriotism  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  produce 
at  once  very  large  forces  of  volunteers.  It  is 
not  pleasant  to  reflect  that,  out  of  every  five 
men  who  went  into  the  Union  forces  during 
the  Civil  War,  one  was  a  deserter;  that  early 
in  the  second  year  of  the  war  (August  4,  1862) 
President  Lincoln  had  to  resort  to  the  draft, 
and  that  before  the  struggle  had  continued  two 
years  Congress  was  compelled  to  adopt  gen- 
eral conscription;  that  the  only  real  land  vic- 
tory we  won  in  the  War  of  1812  was  after  the 
war  was  over;  that  a  French  navy  and  army 
played  a  powerful  role  at  Yorktown;  that 
Washington  himself,  in  November,  1775,  after 
most  heroic  efforts  to  assemble  an  army  of 

20,000  men  around  Boston,  wrote  this :  — 

198 


WELL  ? 

The  trouble  I  have  in  the  arrangement  of  the 
Army  is  really  inconceivable.  Many  of  the  officers 
sent  in  their  names  to  serve  in  expectation  of  pro- 
motion; others  stood  aloof  to  see  what  advantage 
they  could  make  for  themselves,  while  a  number, 
who  had  declined,  have  again  sent  in  their  names  to 
serve.  So  great  has  the  confusion  arising  from  these 
and  many  other  perplexing  circumstances  been  that 
I  found  it  absolutely  impossible  to  fix  this  very  in- 
teresting business  exactly  on  the  plan  resolved  on 
in  the  conference,  though  I  have  kept  up  to  the 
spirit  of  it  as  near  as  the  nature  and  necessity  of  the 
case  would  permit. 

The  difficulty  with  the  soldiers  is  as  great,  in- 
deed, more  so,  if  possible,  than  with  the  officers. 
They  will  not  enlist  until  they  know  their  colonel, 
lieutenant-colonel,  major,  and  captain,  so  that  it 
was  necessary  to  fix  the  officers  the  first  thing, 
which  is,  at  last,  in  some  manner  done,  and  I  have 
given  out  enlisting  orders.  .  .  . 

There  must  be  some  other  stimulus,  besides  love  of 
their  country,  to  make  men  fond  of  the  service.  .  .  . 
[  The  number  enlisted  since  my  last  is  2540  men. 
I  am  sorry  to  be  necessitated  to  mention  to  you 
the  egregious  want  of  public  spirit  which  reigns 
here.  Instead  of  pressing  to  be  engaged  in  the  cause 
of  their  country,  which  I  vainly  flattered  myself 
would  be  the  case,  I  find  we  are  likely  to  be  deserted 
in  a  most  critical  time.  Those  that  have  enlisted 

199 


ARE  WE  READY? 

must  have  a  furlough,  which  I  have  been  obliged 
to  grant  to  fifty  at  a  time,  from  each  regiment. 
The  Connecticut  troops,  upon  whom  I  reckoned, 
are  as  backward,  indeed,  if  possible,  more  so  than 
the  people  of  this  colony.  Our  situation  is  truly 
alarming,  and  of  this  General  Howe  is  well  apprised, 
it  being  the  common  topic  of  conversation  when 
the  people  left  Boston  last  Friday.  No  doubt  when 
he  is  reinforced  he  will  avail  himself  of  the  informa- 
tion. .  .  .  Such  a  dearth  of  public  spirit  and  such 
want  of  virtue,  such  stock- jobbing  and  fertility  in 
all  the  low  arts  to  obtain  advantages  of  one  kind 
or  another  in  this  great  change  of  military  arrange- 
ment I  never  saw  before,  and  pray  God's  mercy  that 
I  may  never  be  witness  to  again.  What  will  be  the 
end  of  these  maneuvers  is  beyond  my  scan.  I  trem- 
ble at  the  prospect.  We  have  been  till  this  time 
enlisting  about  3500  men.  To  engage  these  I  have 
been  obliged  to  allow  furloughs  as  far  as  fifty  men 
to  a  regiment,  and  the  officers,  I  am  persuaded, 
indulge  as  many  more.  The  Connecticut  troops 
will  not  be  prevailed  upon  to  stay  longer  than  their 
term,  saving  those  who  have  enlisted  for  the  next 
campaign,  and  are  mostly  on  furlough;  such  mer- 
cenary spirit  pervades  the  whole  that  I  should  not 
be  at  all  surprised  at  any  disaster  that  may  happen. 
In  short,  after  the  last  of  this  month  our  lines  will 
be  so  weakened  that  the  minute  men  and  militia 
must  be  called  in  for  their  defense,  and  these  being 

200 


WELL? 

under  no  kind  of  government  themselves  will  de- 
li  stroy  the  little  subordination  I  have  been  laboring 
to  establish,  and  run  me  into  one  evil  while  I  am 
endeavoring  to  avoid  another;  but  the  less  must  be 
chosen.  .  .  . 
li       Our  enlistment  goes  on  slowly.   By  the  returns 
»    last  Monday,  only  5917  men  are  engaged  for  the 
ensuing  campaign,  and  yet  we  are  told  that  we  shall 
get  the  number  wanted,  as  they  are  only  playing 
off  to  see  what  advantages  are  to  be  made,  and 
whether  a  bounty  cannot  be  extorted,  either  from 
the  public  at  large  or  individuals,  in  case  of  a 
draft. 


» 


I  Similar  instances  of  the  disappointing  results 
of  reliance  upon  volunteer  enlistments  can  be 
found  almost  without  number  in  the  full  rec- 
ords of  our  military  operations.  While  these 
facts  may  not  be  pleasant  to  contemplate,  per- 
haps it  is  high  time  that  we  faced  them.  In 
the  opinion  of  able  military  men  and  states- 
men, these  instances  do  not  indicate  any  lack 
of  patriotism,  but  do  demonstrate  that  a  sys- 
tem which  depends  wholly  upon  patriotism  to 
produce  armed  forces  in  time  of  necessity  is 

M|    imperfect. 

HK       All  our  history  gives  a  complete  demonstra- 


ARE  WE  READY? 

tion  of  the  fact  that  our  great  weaknesses  have 
been  the  persistent  use  of  raw  troops;  the  lack 
of  an  expansive  organization;  and  voluntary 
enlistments  with  large  bounties.  Where  men, 
enlisted  for  a  period  of  three  months,  as  at 
Bladensburg,  are  thrown  against  veteran 
troops,  no  matter  what  the  ultimate  result  of 
a  campaign  may  be,  needless  sacrifice  and  pro- 
longed fighting  is  inevitable.  Military  men 
agree  that  the  excellence  of  the  troops  shown 
at  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  was  due,  not  to 
the  fact  that  they  were  volunteers,  but  to  the 
fact  that  their  long  term  of  service  enabled 
them  to  become  expert  soldiers  with  discipline 
and  a  knowledge  of  military  science  to  back 
their  courage.  Every  battlefield  of  the  Civil 
War  after  1861  gave  proof  of  the  valor  of  the 
trained  American  soldier,  but  it  must  be  re- 
membered that,  in  producing  such  soldiers, 
nearly  every  family  in  the  land  was  in  mourn- 
ing, and  the  nation  was  all  but  overwhelmed 
with  a  debt  with  which  we  are  still  bur- 
dened. 

A  people  forget  easily.  Already  we  are  ceas- 
202 


WELL? 


Hf  ing  to  dwell  on  the  costly  sacrifices  of  the  Civil 
War;  and  yet,  unless  we  take  some  means  of 
profiting  by  past  experience,  and  devise  some 
system  of  national  military  preparedness,  we 
shall  continue  a  condition  that  would,  if  war 
should  come,  involve  the  nation  in  the  same 
difficulties,  and  expose  the  country  to  the  same 
terrible  sacrifices  as  in  the  past. 

HI  Probably  no  man  in  the  history  of  our  na- 
tion was  better  qualified  to  speak  as  an  au- 
thority on  the  question  of  national  defense 
than  was  Washington.  Through  all  his  writ- 
ing runs  the  plea  for  trained  citizens  and  uni- 
formity of  organization.  At  the  time  that  W^ash- 
ington  wrote,  the  line  between  the  mihtia  and 
the  volunteer  forces  of  the  country  was  an  in- 
definite one. 

■i  It  has  been  in  comparatively  recent  years 
that  we  have  drawn  a  clear-cut  distinction  be- 
tween unorganized  volunteers  and  organized 
volunteers.  The  peril  of  being  unprepared  to 
put  trained  citizens  into  the  field  on  short 
notice  has  been  sounded  by  military  men  and 
statesmen  from  the  time  of  Washington  down. 

flt  203 


ARE  WE  READY? 

Elihu  Root,  in  1904,  declared:  — 

One  .  .  .  field  of  great  importance  remains  to  be 
covered  by  legislation:  the  establishment  of  an 
adequate  system  for  raising,  training,  and  officer- 
ing the  volunteer  forces  of  the  future.  It  is  of  first 
importance,  that  the  distinction  between  volun- 
teers and  militia  shall  be  observed. 

Our  Secretaries  of  War  and  our  army  ofll- 
cers,  in  administration  after  administration, 
have  pounded  away  on  the  same  point. 

In  recent  years  we  have  created  machinery 
which  could  give  us  not  only  an  efficient  regu- 
lar army,  but  an  adequate  and  uniform  divi- 
sional organization  of  well-equipped  and  well- 
trained  militia. 

We  have  shown  a  disinclination  to  use  the 
machinery.  Yet  none  of  us  would  question  the 
fact  that  a  nation's  success  in  war  depends 
upon  the  organization  and  application  of  its 
military  resources.  Military  resources  are  men, 
material,  and  money. 

The  organization  of  these  three  depends  on 
the  wisdom  of  the  statesmen.  The  military 
men  can  only  advise.   Our  Constitution  gives 

204 


WELL? 


Congress  the  power  to  raise  and  support  armies. 
A  Congress  thoroughly  informed  on  mihtary 
matters,  and  awake  to  the  perils  that  follow  in 
the  wake  of  negUgenee,  would  mean  a  miUtary 
system  wholly  adequate  for  any  emergency. 
No  matter  what  the  skill,  efficiency,  and  cour- 
age of  the  individual  soldier  may  be,  the  re- 
sponsibility of  defeat  or  victory  in  a  war  Ues  as 
heavy  on  the  civil  as  on  the  military  authority. 
HI     American  battles  have  not  been  wholly  won 
or  lost  in  the  field.    A  close  scrutiny  reveals 
that  they  may  be  lost  in  the  Cabinet  room,  in 
the  dome  of  the  Capitol,  or  in  the  private  office 
of  the  Secretary  of  War.   Wherever  the  ulti- 
mate responsibiUty  may  he,  it  is  the  young 
men  of  the  country  who  die,  and  it  is  the 
whole  people  of  the  country  who  suflFer.   Legis- 
lative negligence  is  an  ofiFense  against  the  cit- 
izenship of  the  country,  and  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  in  the  event  of  disaster,  due  wholly 
^m  to  the  failure  of  Congress  to  enact  laws  that 
^  would  have  insured  national  safety,  the  Ameri- 

Bople  would  call  their  representatives  in 
5SS  by  their  right  names. 
205 


ARE  WE  READY? 

The  broad  purposes  of  our  military  policy 
have  not  changed  since  the  time  of  Washing- 
ton. Our  standing  army  and  our  military  or- 
ganizations were,  and  are  intended  to  be,  merely 
the  skeleton  in  time  of  peace  for  a  great  defen- 
sive force  in  time  of  war. 

The  skeleton,  as  has  been  shown  in  previous 
chapters,  is  not  in  the  very  best  of  shape.  In 
fact,  certain  parts  of  it  are  missing.  But  the 
defects,  if  certain  simple  legislation  can  be 
enacted,  and  if  military  cooperation  between 
the  States  and  the  Federal  Government  can 
be  secured,  can  be  easily  remedied. 

It  is  the  total  lack  of  any  means  of  putting 
the  meat  on  the  skeleton  that  is  declared  by 
many  military  experts  to  be  the  great  and  seri- 
ous weakness. 

In  an  athletic  club  to  which  I  once  belonged, 
we  had  a  crack  wrestler.  We  called  him 
"Fatty"  because  he  was  so  thin.  He  knew 
every  hold  and  trick  of  the  game,  and  for  a 
long  time  he  took  on  anybody,  big,  little,  or 
middle-sized,  who  cared  to  try  conclusions 
with  him  —  always  with  the  same  result,  a 

206 


WELL? 


^H  scientific  twist  of  some  sort  or  other  that  sent 

^^  the  ambitious  antagonist  to  the  mat.  He 
finally  came  to  a  heavy-weight  who  had  meat 
and  science  combined.  Our  crack  wrestler, 
within  a  few  seconds,  discovered  that  he  had 

|l  a  sprained  back.  He  never  wrestled  again. 
He  couldn't. 

Hf !  The  proposition  that  the  good  little  man  can- 
not successfully  match  strength  and  skill  with 
the  good  big  man  is  as  old  as  the  Olympiads. 
Military  men  with  whom  I  have  talked  insist 
that  the  proposition  applies  exactly  to  the 
question  of  the  chances  of  a  good  little  miU- 
tary  force  against  a  good  big  miUtary  force. 
The  great  problem  which  they  have  set  them- 
selves to  solve  is  not  that  of  the  size  or  the 
organization  of  the  regular  army,  nor  yet  that 
of  bringing  our  militia  organizations  to  a 
greater  degree  of  uniformity  and  eflBciency, 
though  both  of  these  go  into  it.  It  is  the  ques- 
tion of  creating,  back  of  the  regular  army  and 
back  of  the  organized  militia,  an  adequate  re- 
serve of  trained  men. 

Both  the  army  and  the  militia  are  at  present 
207 


ARE  WE  READY? 

at  less  than  half  of  their  war  strength,  and  no 
means  of  filling  out  the  organizations  in  time 
of  war  has  been  provided. 

It  is  because  of  this  condition  that  our  army 
experts  and  some  of  our  ablest  statesmen  are 
urging  that  our  negUgence  has  placed  us  in  a 
position  of  peril. 

Should  war  suddenly  come  our  way,  there 
is  no  reason  to  believe  that  our  situation  would 
be,  in  its  fundamental  aspects,  much  different 
from  the  one  which  Washington  faced  in  1775. 
In  the  light  of  the  facts  and  figures  which  an 
investigation  into  the  present  state  of  our 
military  preparedness  reveals,  the  following 
portion  of  a  letter  written  by  Washington  on 
January  4,  1776,  to  Joseph  Reed,  is  most 
interesting:  — 

Search  the  volumes  of  history  through,  and  I 
much  question  whether  a  case  similar  to  ours  is  to 
be  found,  namely,  to  maintain  a  post  against  the 
flower  of  the  British  troops  for  six  months  together, 
without  powder,  and  then  to  have  one  army  dis- 
banded and  another  to  be  raised  within  the  same 
distance  of  a  reinforced  enemy.  It  is  too  much  to 
attempt.   What  may  be  the  final  issue  of  the  last 

208 


I 


I 


WELL? 

maneuver,  time  only  can  unfold.  I  wish  this  month 
was  well  over  our  heads.  The  same  desire  of  retir- 
ing into  a  chimney  corner  seized  the  troops  of  New 
Hampshire,  Rhode  Island,  and  Massachusetts,  so 
soon  as  their  time  expired,  as  had  wrought  upon 
those  of  Connecticut,  notwithstanding  many  of 
them  made  a  tender  of  their  services  to  continue 
till  the  lines  could  be  sufficiently  strengthened. 
We  are  now  left  with  a  good  deal  less  than  half- 
raised  regiments  and  about  5000  militia,  who  only 
stand  engaged  to  the  middle  of  this  month,  when, 
according  to  custom,  they  will  depart,  let  the  neces- 
sity of  their  stay  be  ever  so  urgent.  Thus  for  more 
than  two  months  past  I  have  scarcely  emerged 
from  one  difficulty  before  I  have  been  plunged  into 
another. 


The  confusion  that  would  inevitably  mark 
I  an  attempt  to  assemble  a  force  to  repel  a  land 
attack,  and  the  hopelessness  of  sending  our 
j  available  forces,  with  their  inadequate  equip- 
ment and  organization,  against  150,000  trained 
troops,  have  been  previously  shown.  If,  as 
our  military  men  assert,  there  is  no  extrava- 
gance in  the  speculation  contained  in  those 
chapters,  as  to  the  possible  results  of  our 
present  state  of  preparedness,  and  if  it  is  as- 

209 


ARE  WE  READY? 

sumed  that  there  is  a  possibiHty  of  our  being 
attacked  by  land,  what  is  there  that  we  can  do 
that  will  not  turn  the  United  States  into  what 
President  Wilson  calls  "an  armed  camp"  and 
will  in  no  way  interfere  with  the  economic 
activity  and  freedom  of  the  individual? 

For  years,  our  General  Staff  and  our  War 
College,  our  Presidents,  our  Secretaries  of  War, 
and  our  leading  active  and  retired  army  oJE- 
cers  have  been  working  on  this  question. 
What  has  been  worked  out  combines  the  crea- 
tion of  a  trained  reserve  strength  through 
enlistment  in  the  regular  army,  with  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  private  citizen  to  receive  mili- 
tary training. 

Should  we  decide  upon  a  reserve,  it  should 
not  only  be  large  enough  to  fill  up  the  regular 
army  and  the  militia,  but  it  should  be  suffi- 
ciently in  excess  of  this  to  make  up  the  wast- 
age for  the  first  three  months  of  a  war:  that 
is,  besides  being  large  enough  to  bring  the 
army  and  the  militia  to  war  strength,  the  re- 
serve should  be  at  least  fifteen  per  cent  of  the 
combined  war  strength  of  both  organizations. 

210 


I 


WELL? 


I 


I 


It  should  also  be  large  enough  to  provide  new 
organizations. 

We  can,  if  we  want  to,  accomplish  this  by 
legislation.  We  can  so  change  our  enlistment 
laws  that  the  recruit,  when  enUsting,  will  know 
that  after  he  has  served  with  the  colors  for  a 
short  period  of  training,  sufficient  to  make 
him  proficient  as  a  soldier,  he  will,  for  a  num- 

(ber  of  years,  perhaps  eight  or  ten,  be  subject 
to  call  to  the  colors  in  time  of  war  and  pos- 
sibly each  year  for  a  few  days  of  additional 
training. 

Back  of  the  regular  army,  back  of  the  mili- 
tia, and  back  of  the  reserve,  should  we  enact 
legislation  which  would  create  the  reserve, 
H  would  still  be  the  great  citizen  body.  Our 
military  policy  from  the  beginning  has  consid- 
ered this  body  as  the  real  defensive  strength 
■|  of  the  nation.  If  that  body  should  be  trained, 
as  it  is  trained  in  Switzerland  and  Australia, 
we  should  have  an  immediate  military  strength 
second  to  none  in  the  world,  and  a  security  that 

k would  be  the  greatest  safeguard  against  war. 
In  Switzerland,  the  training  of  citizens  is 
I 


ARE  WE  READY? 

based  absolutely  on  the  idea  that  the  nation 
shall  never  go  to  war  save  for  defense,  and  the 
closest  observers  of  the  Swiss  Government  and 
the  Swiss  people  agree  that  the  military  train- 
ing of  the  citizens,  even  though  that  training 
is  compulsory,  has  not  in  any  way  operated 
against  the  advanced  democratic  standards  of 
that  nation  or  against  the  liberty  and  freedom 
of  its  individual  citizens. 

The  proponents  of  a  system  of  military 
training  for  our  citizens  do  not  advocate  the 
compulsory  training  which  is  a  part  of  the 
Swiss  system.  They  do  urge,  however,  the  ad- 
visability of  opening  the  way  for  training  to 
any  citizen  who  desires  it.  A  most  important 
move  in  this  direction  is  already  well  under 
way. 

During  the  summer  of  1913,  two  experi- 
mental military  camps  for  the  instruction  of 
students  of  educational  institutions  were  es- 
tablished and  were  highly  successful.  Since 
then  two  more  have  been  opened.  The  object 
of  these  camps  is  to  give  the  young  men  of  the 
country  an  opportunity  for  a  short  course  in 


THK  STUDENTS'   CAMP  AT  LUDIXGTOX 


STIDKNTS   IN    IllK  TKKNCIIKS   AT  (JETTYSBURG 


WELL? 


^M  military  training  should  their  sense  of  patriotic 
service  prompt  them  to  fit  themselves  for  a 
part  in  the  defense  of  the  nation.  It  is  the 
policy  of  these  camps  to  make  the  training  of 
the  most  intensive  character.  It  is  now  sug- 
gested that  the  whole  period  of  training  should 

If  be  divided  into  three  periods  of  not  more  than 
two  months  each,  these  months  to  fall  during 
the  school  and  college  vacation  time,  as  well 
as  during  the  usual  business  vacation.  This 
training,  undertaken  in  time  of  peace,  would 
be  at  least  six  times  as  long  as  the  time  that 
would  be  available  for  training  of  volunteers 
if  we  were  suddenly  confronted  with  war. 

II  It  is  urged  that  besides  the  benefit  that 
I  would  come  to  the  students  through  the  broad- 
I  ening  influence  of  intimate  association  with 
the  students  of  other  institutions,  the  oppor- 
tunity for  athletic  contests  as  well  as  the  ac- 
quired habits  of  discipline,  obedience,  and 
II  self-control,  the  nation  would  profit  through  a 
I  greater  fostering  of  the  patriotic  spirit  and  a 
f  wider  spread,  among  the  whole  citizenship  of 
the  country,  of  a  more  thorough  knowledge  of 

213 


ARE  WE  READY? 

military  history,  military  policy,  and  military 
needs. 

These  camps,  it  is  contended,  will  have  an 
exceptional  value  as  a  military  asset,  since  they 
are  instrumental  in  instructing  a  class  of  highly 
intelligent  and  well-educated  men  who,  in 
time  of  national  emergency,  would  be  espe- 
cially well  fitted  to  undertake  the  duties  of 
officers. 

Under  the  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
these  camps  are  open  to  students  between  the 
ages  of  eighteen  and  thirty,  in  universities, 
colleges,  and  the  graduating  classes  of  high 
schools,  and  other  schools  rated  as  such.  Ap- 
plicants for  admission  to  a  student's  military 
instruction  camp  must  be  citizens  of  the  United 
States  or  men  who  have  declared  their  inten- 
tion of  becoming  citizens.  It  is  required  that 
they  must  be  of  good  moral  character,  physi- 
cally sound,  and  of  good  scholastic  standing. 
Each  season's  training  in  the  camp  consumes 
five  weeks.  The  students  are  required  to  at- 
tend during  the  full  period.  At  the  present 
time  the  students  are  required  to  pay  their  own 

214 


WELL? 

traveling  expenses  to  and  from  the  camp.  For 
this  reason  camp  sites  have  been  selected  in 
as  central  locations  as  possible.  The  military 
authorities  furnish  food  for  $3.50  a  week  for 
each  student,  or  $17.50  for  each  year's  period 
of  training. 

The  students  of  the  camps  are  also  required 
to  supply  themselves  with  a  uniform,  consist- 
ing of  two  suits  of  cotton,  olive  drab,  one  extra 
pair  of  breeches,  one  campaign  hat,  one  pair 
of  leggings,  and  two  oUve  drab  shirts.  A  dis- 
tinctive hat  cord  is  worn  to  distinguish  the 
student's  uniform  from  the  uniform  of  the 
regular  army.  The  cost  for  clothing  is  from 
$5  to  $10  for  each  student.  The  Government 
furnishes,  without  cost,  cots,  blankets,  tents, 
cooking  outfits,  a  complete  infantry  equip- 
ment, including  rifles,  bayonets,  cartridge  belts, 
canteens,  shelter  tents,  tent  poles  and  pins, 
haversacks,  pack  carriers,  mess  kits,  and  other 
property  of  the  quartermaster  and  ordnance 

I  departments,  all  of  which  are  turned  in  at  the 
end  of  the  period  of  training.  The  necessary 
instructors  and  the  personnel  for  the  organiza- 
I 


ARE  WE  READY? 

tion  and  maintenance  of  camp  wagon  trans- 
ports, medical  care  and  sanitation,  and  all 
other  means  of  protecting  the  health  and  in- 
suring the  comfort  of  the  students,  which 
under  the  law  can  be  furnished  by  the  War 
Department,  are  provided. 

Such  troops  of  the  regular  army  as  can  be 
spared,  for  purposes  of  demonstration  and 
assisting  in  the  instruction  of  the  students, 
attend  the  camps  for  field  maneuvers,  exer- 
cises, and  other  forms  of  military  training. 

The  course  of  instruction,  as  outlined  by 
the  War  Department,  is  along  the  following 
lines:  — 

The  theoretical  principles  of  tactics,  includ- 
ing advance  and  rear  guards,  patrols,  outposts, 
and  combat,  are  studied  and  explained  in  a 
series  of  informal  talks,  tactical  walks,  and  war 
games  conducted  by  selected  competent  offi- 
cers. 

The  practical  application  of  the  above  is 
carried  out  in  the  field  by  the  students  them- 
selves, and  also  in  conjunction  with  the  regular 
troops,  blank  ammunition  being  used. 

^16 


WELL? 

Military  map-making  and  road-sketching 
are  explained  and  opportunities  for  practical 
work  in  that  subject  offered  to  those  who  de- 
sire it. 

The  proper  handling  and  use  of  the  rifle  is 
taught  and  experience  given  by  means  of  gal- 
lery (or  subcaliber)  practice,  and  by  actual  fir- 
ing with  the  service  rifle  and  ammunition  on 
the  target  range.  To  those  students  making 
the  necessary  qualifications  over  the  prescribed 
course,  the  National  Rifle  Association  of  Amer- 
ica offers  its  prescribed  marksmanship  badges 
and  a  trophy,  to  be  competed  for  by  teams  rep- 
resenting the  different  educational  institutions. 

Physical  drill,  marching,  camping,  tent- 
pitching,  making  and  breaking  camp,  loading 
and  unloading  wagons,  camp  expedients,  field 
cooking,  camp  sanitation,  first  aid  to  the  in- 
jured, personal  hygiene,  and  the  care  of  troops 
in  the  field  are  taught  by  practice. 

Informal  talks  by  selected  officers  are  given 
on  the  following  subjects:  Use  and  duties  of 
the  different  arms  and  branches  of  the  serv- 
ice (infantry,  field  artillery,  cavalry,  engineers, 

217 


ARE  WE  READY? 

signal  troops,  and  the  medical  corps) ;  field  forti- 
fication, including  the  laying-out,  construction, 
and  use  of  trenches;  military  bridge-building; 
use  of  explosives;  demolitions;  the  installa- 
tion and  operation  of  field  lines  of  electrical 
information  and  the  use  of  buzzers,  field  tele- 
phones, and  radio-telegraphic  apparatus;  sig- 
nal flags,  heliographs,  and  acetylene  lanterns, 
and  other  apparatus  used  by  signal  corps  or- 
ganizations in  the  field;  the  tactical  organiza- 
tion of  the  military  forces  of  the  United  States, 
the  reasons  therefor,  and  comparison  with  that 
of  foreign  armies;  the  supply  (food  and  mate- 
rial) of  an  army  and  the  problems  connected 
therewith;  the  psychology  of  war;  the  military 
history  of  our  country  —  not  the  illuminated 
school-book  versions  of  our  victories  merely, 
but  the  true  versions,  as  taken  from  the  official 
records,  of  our  failures  and  defeats,  as  well  as 
our  successes  and  victories,  with  reasons  for 
them;  our  military  policy,  past  and  present,  the 
necessity  for  some  sound,  definite  military  pol- 
icy; and  the  present  scheme  of  organization 
of  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States  as  pre- 

218 


WELL? 

pared  by  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army  and 
recommended  by  the  War  Department  to  Con- 
gress. 

The  schedule  of  instruction  includes  a  prac- 
tice march  of  several  days'  duration,  in  which, 
as  nearly  as  possible,  there  are  actual  cam- 
paign conditions  of  march,  bivouac,  and  com- 
bat such  as  the  assumed  situation  would  exact 
in  war. 

To  each  student  who  successfully  completes 
the  prescribed  course  of  instruction,  a  certifi- 
cate is  issued  and  his  name  kept  on  file  in  the 
War  Department,  with  such  remarks  as  to  his 
degree  of  efficiency  and  recommendations  as  to 
his  fitness  for  future  command  as  may  be  made 
by  the  officers  in  charge. 

A  correct  understanding  of  the  principles 
involved  being  considered  of  more  importance, 
in  the  short  time  available  for  instruction,  than 
the  exercise  itself,  only  that  degree  of  precision 
in  close  order  drill  necessary  to  insure  disci- 
pline is  insisted  upon.  Extended  order  drill  and 
field  exercises  are  considered  most  important. 
Work  is  confined,  as  far  as  practicable,  to  the 

219 


ARE  WE  READY? 

morning,  leaving  the  afternoons  and  evenings, 
with  due  regard  to  proper  supervision,  at  the 
disposal  of  the  student  for  rest,  athletic  sports, 
and  recreation,  or  for  such  other  work  or  in- 
struction as  he  may  desire  and  which  can  be 
given. 

All  companies  commanded  by  a  selected  reg- 
ular army  officer,  or  officers,  are  aided  by  sub- 
altern officers  and  non-commissioned  officers 
selected  from  among  the  students  themselves. 

The  discipline  exacted  is  strict  and  just. 
Students  are  on  a  cadet  status;  that  is,  they 
are  treated  with  the  courtesy  due  prospective 
officers,  but  subject  to  all  rules  and  regulations 
of  the  camp  and  to  disciplinary  measures  for 
infractions. 

The  greatest  care  has  been  exercised  by  the 
General  Staff  in  the  selection  of  camp-sites,  in 
order  that  they  shall  fulfill  not  only  the  military 
requirements  of  a  good  camp,  with  suitable 
grounds  for  maneuver  purposes,  but  that  they 
shall  be  located  in  a  healthful,  cool,  and  pleas- 
ant climate  and  in  a  region  in  each  section 
offering  advantages  desirable  from  the  summer- 

220 


WELL? 


If 


outing  standpoint,  such  as  being  on  a  lake,  the 
seashore,  or  in  the  mountains. 

The  idea  of  the  students'  camp  has  gained 
ground  with  surprising  rapidity.  Not  only  has  it 
become  intensely  popular  with  students  them- 
selves, but  many  parents  have  written  letters 
congratulating  the  army  authorities  upon  the 
benefits  derived  by  their  sons  from  the  camps 
which  have  already  been  operated.  Already 
one  organization  has  sprung  up,  which  is  called 
the  "Association  of  the  National  Reserve 
Corps  of  the  United  States."  H.  S.  Drinker, 
President  of  Lehigh  University,  is  president 
of  the  organization,  and  the  following  heads  of 
representative  colleges  throughout  the  country 
act  as  its  advisory  committee:  John  G.  Hibben, 
President  of  Princeton  University;  A.  Law- 
rence Lowell,  President  of  Harvard  University; 
Arthur  Twining  Hadley,  President  of  Yale  Uni- 
versity; John  H.  Finley,  President  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  the  State  of  New  York;  H.  B.  Hutch- 
ins,  President  of  the  University  of  Michigan; 
George  H.  Denny,  President  of  the  University 
H[  of  Alabama;  E.  W.  Nichols,  Superintendent, 


ARE  WE  READY  ? 

Virginia  Military  Institute;  Benjamin  Ide 
Wheeler,  President  of  the  University  of  Cali- 
fornia. 

At  the  close  of  the  first  period  of  instruc- 
tion in  1913,  this  committee  issued  the  follow- 
ing statement  which  has  a  peculiar  interest  as 
bearing  upon  recent  objections  to  the  military 
training  of  citizens,  based  on  the  ground  that 
such  preparation  tends  toward  militarism :  — 


After  careful  inquiry  regarding  the  organization 
and  management  of  the  camps  of  instruction  for 
college  students,  established  by  the  Secretary  of 
War  in  the  summer  of  1913,  we  take  pleasure  in 
certifying  to  their  excellence. 

The  military  instruction  was  thorough.  The  dis- 
cipline was  strict;  but  the  work  was  so  well  arranged 
that  it  caused  enjoyment  rather  than  hardship. 
The  food,  sanitation,  and  medical  care  were  good, 
and  the  lessons  received  by  the  students  in  these 
matters  were  scarcely  less  valuable  than  the  mili- 
tary instruction  itself. 

We  commend  these  camps  to  the  attention  of 
college  authorities  as  a  most  important  adjunct  to 
the  educational  system  of  the  United  States,  fur- 
nishing the  student  a  healthful  and  profitable  sum- 
mer course  at  moderate  expense. 

222 


I 


•RESIDKXT  WILSON   DELIVERING   AN   ADDRESS   IN  FRONT  OF 
INDKPKNDENCE  HALL.   PHILADELPHIA,  JULY  4.   1914 


I» 


WELL? 

Woodrow  Wilson,  in  a  statement  issued 
September  22,  1913,  as  President,  took  this 
view  of  instruction  camps :  — 

I  am  very  much  interested  in  the  successful  work- 
ing-out of  the  idea  of  these  college  camps.  I  believe 
the  students  attending  will  derive  not  only  a  great 
deal  of  physical  benefit  from  the  healthful,  open- 
air  life,  but  also  that  they  will  benefit  from  the  dis- 
cipline, habits  of  regularity,  and  the  knowledge  of 
personal  and  camp  sanitation  which  the  experience 
in  camp  will  give  them. 

At  about  the  same  time  the  following  en- 
dorsement came  from  William  H.  Taft:  — 

For  young  men  who  have  a  taste  for  outdoor  life 
and  military  training,  —  and,  indeed,  for  "  rough- 
ing it,"  —  I  can  conceive  of  no  better  opportunity 
for  them  to  gratify  this  taste  than  to  accept  the  in- 
vitation of  the  War  Department.  They  can  be  sure 
it  will  be  no  boys'  play  if  they  go  into  it,  but  it  will 
not  only  give  them  substantial  knowledge  of  the 
principles  of  military  science,  but  an  opportunity 
for  physical  development  and  muscular  training, 
and  a  regular  life  that  will  contribute  greatly  to 
their  health  and  strength.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
knowledge  that  they  will  acquire  will  be  a  very  good 
foundation  for  their  becoming  members  of  state 

223 


ARE  WE  READY? 

militia  in  their  homes  after  graduation,  and  will 
fit  them  to  come  to  the  rescue  of  the  country  in  an 
emergency  whenever  that  may  arise. 

I  commend  the  plan  to  the  earnest  consideration 
of  all  who  have  the  tastes  I  have  indicated,  and 
urge  that  they  consult  the  agent  of  the  War  De- 
partment who  is  coming  here,  in  order  to  learn  just 
exactly  what  their  duties  and  what  their  responsi- 
bilities will  be. 

The  suggestion  has  come  from  General  Wood, 
who  is  a  college  man  and  knows  college  men,  and  is 
most  sympathetic  with  college  men  who  love  out- 
door life  and  have  an  inclination  to  do  a  little  sol- 
diering. 

Lindley  M.  Garrison,  as  Secretary  of  War, 
also  has  expressed  his  approval  of  the  conduct 
of  military  camps  and  the  ideas  back  of  them. 

It  is  advocated  that,  with  his  training  in  the 
instruction  camps  completed,  the  trained  man 
should  be  held  for  a  period  of  six  years  as  a  re- 
servist, with  the  understanding  that  he  will  not 
be  called  to  the  colors  except  for  defense  and 
for  a  yearly  period  of  instruction  not  to  exceed 
eight  days.  As  each  student  in  the  military 
camp  completed  his  instruction,  he  could  be 
assigned  to  some  reserve  organization. 

2U 


WELL  ? 


F 

V  With  a  steadily  increasing  number  of  trained 
"  citizens  would  go  the  immediate  necessity  of 
finding  officers.  All  regular  officers  are  needed 
with  the  regular  establishment  and  the  militia 
is  short  of  officers.  Outside  of  these  two  organ- 
izations we  have  the  following  source  of  supply: 
A  very  limited  number  of  graduates  of  the 

better  class  of  military  schools; 
A  certain  number  of  former  non-commis- 
sioned officers  of  the  regular  army,  who 
have    the    necessary    qualifications    de- 
manded of  the  lower  grades  of  volunteer 
officers; 
A  very  small  list  of  men,  who  have  qualified 
through  examination  for  appointment  as 
officers  of  volunteer  organizations; 
A  certain  number  of  men  who  have  passed 
through  the  Students'  Instruction  Camps 
recently  established. 
All  these  sources  combined  could  produce  a 
number  of  available  men  for  officers  which 
would  be  insignificant  in  comparison  with  the 
requirements.   Those  who  are  forwarding  the 
plan  advocate  that  military  instruction  in  all 

225 


ARE  WE  READY? 

schools  where  regular  officers  are  instructors 
be  standardized;  that  each  year,  from  the 
graduates  of  these  schools,  from  500  to  1000 
men  be  appointed  as  provisional  second  lieu- 
tenants in  the  various  arms  of  the  service,  in- 
fantry, cavalry,  field  and  coast  artillery,  serv- 
ing for  one  year  in  this  capacity,  and  receiving 
the  full  pay  and  allowances  of  a  second  lieu- 
tenant in  the  regular  army. 

It  is  argued  that  this  system  would  supply 
a  well-trained  reserve  officer  who  would  have, 
in  addition  to  his  military  training  at  school  or 
college,  a  full  year's  service  in  the  regular  army . 
The  marked  success  of  the  experimental  schools 
has  led  to  the  encouragement  of  plans  for  a 
very  great  extension  of  the  system,  and  it  is 
expected  that  important  details,  such  as  fixing 
the  course  of  instruction  and  securing  govern- 
ment aid  in  the  way  of  uniforms,  rations,  and 
transportation,  will  be  speedily  worked  out. 

Here,  then,  is  what  we  can  do  about  it, 
whether  or  not  we  decide  that  it  is  worth  while 
to  do  anything  about  it :  — 

S26 


WELL? 

We  can  supply  the  necessary  equipment  for 
all  arms  of  the  service  in  both  regular  army 
and  militia; 
We  can  provide  an  adequate  reserve  of  guns, 
ammunition,  and  other  necessary  imple- 
ments and  supplies; 
We  can  abolish  useless  and  costly  army  posts 
and  concentrate  our  regular  forces  into  large 
and  uniform  groups  in  strategic  locations; 
We  can  bring  our  militia  and  regular  army 

into  uniformity  of  organization; 
We  can  give  our  citizens  a  chance  to  receive 

military  instruction; 
We  can  build  up  a  strong  reserve. 
We  can  do  all  this  without  altering  in  the 
slightest  the  position  of  the  military  in  its  sub- 
ordination to  the  civil  authority. 

And  if  we  want  to  be  doubly  secure  against 
an  attempt  of  any  man  or  set  of  men  to  turn  the 
United  States  of  America  into  another  Prussia, 
we  can  make  it  the  law,  since  the  people  foot 
the  bills  and  do  the  fighting,  that  offensive  war 
shall  not  be  declared  except  by  direct  vote  of 
all  the  people. 

227 


ARE  WE  READY? 

That  is  national  referendum.  It  would 
quickly  and  definitely  solve  su«h  problems  as 
the  question  of  intervention  in  Mexico,  and 
would  be  most  troublesome  to  gentlemen  who 
would  fill  their  pockets  by  driving  the  nation 
to  a  season  of  killing  and  of  being  killed. 


THE  END 


CAMBRIDGE  .  MASSACHUSETTS 
U    .    S    .   A 


THE  DIPLOMACY  OF 
THE  WAR  OF  1914 

1.  The  Beginning  of  the  War 

By  ELLERY  C  STOWELL 


This,  the  first  of  three  volumes  which  are  to 
trace  the  entire  diplomatic  history  of  the  war,  is 
perhaps  the  most  complete,  authoritative,  and 
impartial  account  of  the  subject  yet  written. 
Pushing  aside  the  web  of  contradictions  in 
which  partisans  of  both  sides  have  veiled  the 
issues,  the  author  analyzes  the  official  docu- 
ments with  the  skill  and  experience  of  an  ac- 
complished international  lawyer  and  specialist 
in  diplomatic  history,  showing  the  fundamental 
relations  of  the  powers  and  preserving  always 
the  thread  of  exceedingly  complicated  nego- 
tiations. The  volume  culminates  in  a  discus- 
sion of  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality, 
and  after  a  searching  analysis  of  the  cases  of 
England  and  of  Germany,  the  author  closes 
with  a  study  of  the  interests  of  the  United 
States  in  the  war.  A  most  suggestive  chapter 
of  questions  and  answers,  a  carefully  prepared 
chronology  of  events,  and  an  index  make  the 
book  as  useful  for  study  or  reference  as  it  is 
interesting  to  read. 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 


ARE  WE  READY? 

By  H.  D.  WHEELER 
With  an  introduction  by 
Maj.-Gen.  Leonard  Wood. 

A  sane,  constructive  study  of  our  preparedness 
for  war,  in  which  the  strength  and  weakness  of 
our  present  system  are  pointed  out  and  specific 
plans  are  proposed  for  the  formation  of  a  citi- 
zen army. 

Beginning  with  an  absorbing  narrative  of  an 
imaginary  "  attack  on  New  York,"  the  author 
shows  the  present  situation  in  the  regular  army, 
the  militia,  and  the  navy.  He  then  deals  with 
our  traditional  military  policy,  what  it  contem- 
plates and  how  it  has  been  applied  ;  with  "  the 
militia,"  its  history,  function,  organization, 
equipment,  and  its  one  great  weakness;  with 
militarism  vs,  democracy,  making  illuminating 
comparisons  of  the  military  situation  in  the 
United  States  with  that  in  Switzerland  and  in 
Australia ;  —  and  concludes  with  two  very  im- 
portant chapters  in  which  he  proposes  certain 
concrete  administrative  and  legislative  reforms. 

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THE  BELGIAN  SPIRIT 

By  EMILE  VERHAEREN 

The  story  of  what  Belgium  has  endured  and  how  she 
has  endured  it  told  by  Belgium's  greatest  living  poet. 

SIX  WEEKS  IN  THE  TRENCHES 

By  FRITZ   KREISLER 

Fritz  Kreisler,  world-famous  violinist,  served  as  lieu- 
tenant with  the  Austrian  army  in  Galicia  until  wounded 
by  a  Cossack's  lance.  In  this  book  he  gives  a  graphic, 
gripping  picture  of  life  at  the  front. 

A  HANDBOOK  OF 
UNIVERSAL  HISTORY 

From  the  Dawn  of  Civilization  to  the  Outbreak  of  the 
Great  War.  With  a  Supplement  covering  the  first  five 
months  of  the  fighting. 

By  CARL  PLOETZ 

"All  history  condensed  into  a  single  handy  volume.  A 
unique  arrangement  and  elaborate  index  make  it 
equally  serviceable  for  study  or  reference.    ;^3.oo  net. 

PAN-GERMANISM 

By  ROLAND  G.  USHER 

This  graphic  explanation  of  international  politics  fore- 
casts the  present  war  and  analyzes  the  forces  that 
have  made  it  inevitable.  Every  move  in  Germany's 
titanic  struggle  for  a  dominant  position  in  Europe  is 
unveiled;  every  counter-move  by  the  circle  of  her  de- 
termined enemies  is  made  clear.  It  is  THE  BOOK 
OF  THE  HOUR  because  it  is  the  only  book  giving 
just  the  information  everyone  is  looking  for.  ^1.75  net, 

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KITCHENER, 

Organizer  of  Victory 

By  HAROLD  BEGBIE 

This  picturesque  biography  and  illuminating  character 
study  is  the  first  satisfactory  account  of  the  life  and 
deeds  of  England's  soldier  hero  that  has  been  given 
to  the  world.  Mr.  Begbie  has  had  access  to  special 
sources  of  information,  and  tells  with  authority  and 
with  a  wealth  of  picturesque  detail  the  tale  of  Kitchen- 
er's birth  and  boyhood,  his  first  service  in  the  English 
army,  his  fighting  in  the  armies  of  France  during  the 
Franco-Prussian  war,  his  services  in  Egypt  and  in 
South  Africa. 

Illustrated.    1^1.25  net, 

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AN  EMPRESS 

By  COUNTESS  ZANARDI  LANDI 

In  this  sensational  book  the  author,  who  is  the  fourth 
child  of  the  Austrian  Emperor,  gives  an  intimate  and 
fascinating  account  of  life  at  the  Austrian  court.  Her 
story  throws  a  flood  of  light  on  the  present  generation 
of  the  House  of  Hapsburg  in  Austria,  particularly  on 
the  life  and  mysterious  death  of  the  author's  brother. 
Prince  Rudolph,  and  on  the  intrigue  in  regard  to  the 
succession  to  the  imperial  throne,  and  is  of  extraordi- 
nary interest,  especially  at  the  present  time. 

Lavishly  illustrated.    ^4.50  net. 
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14  DAY  USE 

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LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  CAUFORNIA  UBRARY 


